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Abstract 
Longitudinal surveys have revolutionized empirical research and our 
understanding of the dynamic processes that affect the economic prosperity, health and 
well-being of the population. This dissertation explores and provides evidence, through 
three empirical applications, on the costs and benefits of designing, implementing and 
using data from a new, innovative longitudinal survey, the Mexican Family Life Survey 
(MxFLS). The survey, which is representative of the Mexican population living in 
Mexico in 2002, is designed to follow movers within Mexico and also those who move to 
the United States. This design lies at the center of the contributions of my research to the 
scientific literature. 
Attrition is the Achilles heel of longitudinal surveys.  The first essay of the 
dissertation focuses on the cost of attrition for scientific knowledge. Following the same 
individual through time allows a researcher to trace the evolution of a respondent's 
behaviors and outcomes in a dynamic framework; however, if attrition is selected on 
unobserved characteristics, the advantage of using panel data could be severely 
hindered. Exploring different methods to adjust for attrition, this essay provides 
evidence of limitations of standard post-survey adjustments strategies that are the 
standard in the literature. These approaches, exploit only baseline characteristics of the 
respondents and, conditional on those characteristics, treat attriters as missing at 
random. I provide evidence that this assumption is substantively important and rejected 
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in the MxFLS in spite of the fact that attrition in that survey is low relative to other 
nationally-representative surveys conducted in the United States and abroad.   
The second essay in this dissertation exploits the fact that MxFLS follows movers 
within Mexico and those who move across the Mexico-US border to provide new 
insights into the mechanisms that underlie the selectivity of migrants within Mexico, 
how they differ from migrants who move from Mexico to the U.S. and how those who 
return contrast with the migrants who remain in the U.S. more permanently. The results 
provide evidence that human capital is predictive of migration within Mexico and to the 
United States, but that there is little indication that the decision to stay in the United 
States is highly correlated with education. In contrast, having relatives in the United 
States is not only a powerful predictor of migration to the United States, but it is also 
predictive of successful economic assimilation.  
The third essay exploits a different dimension of the longitudinal survey in order 
to address an important question regarding the impact of unanticipated crime and 
violence on population well-being. To wit, the essay rigorously examines the impact of 
the recent surge in violent crime in Mexico on the labor market outcomes, migration, 
and wealth of the Mexican population. The timing of the last two waves of the MxFLS 
paired with the panel nature of the survey, allows the comparison of outcomes of the 
same individual in periods of low and high violence, which removes the potentially 
endogenous time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between respondents. Moreover, 
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due to the fact that the MxFLS was designed to follow migrant respondents, this study is 
able to directly test whether there is a systematic migratory response to crime. The 
results from this analysis find that crime predicts migration and it negatively affects the 
labor outcomes of self-employed individuals. In addition, the negative effects on the 
labor outcomes have translated into reductions in per capita expenditure at the 
household level, which suggests that the recent wave of violence in Mexico may have 
long-term consequences on the wealth and well-being of Mexican households.  
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1. Introduction  
The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) is ideally suited to address an analysis 
of the costs and benefits of designing, implementing and using data from longitudinal 
surveys. The MxFLS is a longitudinal survey representative of the Mexican population 
living in Mexico in 2002, and while the level of respondent attrition is very low 
compared to similar surveys, there is not perfect sample retention in subsequent waves. 
One of the challenges in many longitudinal surveys is the successful tracking of 
migrants. As a consequence, in many longitudinal surveys conducted in developing 
countries, the vast majority of attrition is driven by loss to follow-up of migrants so that 
attrition is selected on characteristics associated with migration. This type of attrition is 
particularly problematic as it would lead to a sample that is endogenously selected on 
characteristics associated with migration behavior. To address this concern the MxFLS 
was specifically designed to follow migrants both within Mexico and into the U.S and to 
continue to track individuals even if they were not interviewed in a previous wave. 
The first essay of this dissertation, “Attrition in Longitudinal Surveys: Evidence from 
the Mexican Family Life Survey”, joint work with Maria Genoni, Luis Rubalcava, Graciela 
Teruel and Duncan Thomas, is a methodological chapter focused on providing analysis 
of the costs of attrition in longitudinal surveys. When attrition is selected on 
characteristics that are not observed in the data, post-survey adjustments based on 
observed characteristics may not properly compensate for the lost respondents. Data 
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from the MxFLS is used to examine attrition between the 2002 baseline and the first 
follow up in 2005. In addition to uncovering the observed attributes that predict 
attrition, we also explore how different methods for making adjustments for attrition, 
including a multiple imputation approach, would affect the estimates of a standard 
model of earnings. Using this rich data set, this essay posits that attrition is selective and 
discusses the potential bias it may have on an uncorrected model of earnings. Moreover, 
exploiting information from individuals that had not been interviewed in the second 
wave of the MxFLS but were surveyed in the third wave, we test the effectiveness of a 
standard post-survey adjustment strategy in a model of earnings.  The results suggest 
that assuming that attrition is ignorable based solely on baseline characteristics, and not 
accounting for changes in the lives of respondents that occurred after the baseline 
interview, may lead to biased estimates. 
In addition to being ideally suited for exploring the costs of attrition in 
longitudinal surveys, the MxFLS's design and timing make it possible to explore many 
other topics of great relevance in developing countries including the labor market 
impact of crime and violence and the selection and assimilation process of migrants. 
Specifically, the two additional essays of my dissertation focus first, on Mexican 
migration to the United States, and second, on the economic consequences of the recent 
surge of Mexican drug war-related violence. 
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In the second essay, “Selection and Assimilation of Mexican Migrants to the 
U.S”, joint work with Gabriela Farfan, Maria Genoni, Luis Rubalcava, Graciela Teruel 
and Duncan Thomas, we exploit data from the U.S. component of the MxFLS to provide 
evidence on the selectivity and assimilation of recent migrants from Mexico to the 
United States. The empirical specification exploits information on Mexican migrants 
measured at baseline, prior to the migration decision, to assess the characteristics that 
predict selection into migration. Then, using information measured in the U.S., during 
the two follow-up surveys conducted in 2005 and 2009, we explore the determinants of 
successful assimilation, measured by labor market outcomes, per capita expenditure, use 
of English, and living arrangements while in the United States. 
The third essay of this dissertation, “The Economic Burden of Crime: Evidence from 
Mexico”, is an empirical analysis of the effect the rapid, unanticipated, and 
unprecedented rise in violent conflict in Mexico since 2007 has had on individual labor 
market outcomes and household expenditures. Exploiting information from the MxFLS 
during periods of both low and high levels of violent crime, this study estimates an 
individual fixed effect model that controls for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
that could potentially be correlated with both the level of exposure to violence and labor 
market outcomes. Moreover, by using the MxFLS this analysis is able to examine the 
impact of violence on migratory behavior and then utilize an “intent-to-treat” approach 
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in order to shield the estimates from the potential bias of systematic migratory response 
to crime. 
The results of this study show that increasing violence in Mexico had a 
particularly strong and multidimensional impact on the labor market outcomes of self-
employed women. I find that exposure to violent conflict leads self-employed women to 
leave the labor market and, amongst those that remain employed, reduce their labor 
intensity. Similarly, for males, the negative impact is also strongest for the self-
employed. A major difference between the genders, though, is that for males, labor 
market participation is not significantly reduced and their earnings are not sensitive to 
lower levels of violence. Additionally, I provide evidence of a negative effect of violence 
on per capita expenditure at the household level, which, for female lead households, is 
related to a reduction in spending on education. 
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2. Attrition in Longitudinal Surveys: Evidence from the 
Mexican Family Life Survey  
2.1 Introduction 
Innovative longitudinal surveys have revolutionized empirical research in 
economics and been the foundation for many important contributions to the 
understanding of many processes that affect population health and well-being. 
Following the same individuals over time has enabled research to trace the evolution of 
behaviors and outcomes in a dynamic framework and to better understand the role that 
different sources of unobserved heterogeneity play in economic models of behavior.  
However, the contributions of studies that use longitudinal data depend 
critically on the extent to which attrition is selected on characteristics that are both 
correlated with outcomes of interest and not observed. If attrition depends only on 
characteristics that are observed, then it is straightforward to re-weight the respondents 
who are followed and adjust estimates for attrition. In general, however, attrition is 
likely to also depend on characteristics that are not observed in which case there is a risk 
that re-weighted estimates will be biased. Determining the extent to which attrition 
contaminates inferences in specific models of behavior remains an unresolved issue in 
studies that use longitudinal survey data.  
This chapter addresses this question using data from three waves of the Mexican 
Family Life Survey (MxFLS). Along with detailed information on socioeconomic 
characteristics that are collected in many broad-purpose socio-economic surveys, the 
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MxFLS collects extensive information not usually included in these surveys that is 
potentially related to attrition. These include, for example, expectations and intentions 
about the future, perceptions of current and future health and perceptions of quality of 
life. We explore the extent to which these data are predictive of attrition. Further, we 
explore how different methods for making adjustments for attrition affect estimates of 
the impact of standard covariates in a model of earnings. 
While high rates of attrition may result in sample sizes that lack power to detect 
effects of interest, the rate of attrition is not enough to determine the potential bias due 
to attrition in behavioral models. If attrition is completely random, it is ignorable in any 
model (Rubin, 1987). In practice, such happenstance is unlikely and it is inherently 
difficult to test.  
If attrition is selected on observed characteristics, estimates of interest may not be 
biased. If it is possible to construct post-survey weights to reconstruct a sample that 
mimics the baseline sample from the perspective of the behavioral model of interest, 
then attrition can be treated as ignorable, conditional on these characteristics. (See, for 
example, Fitzgerald et al., 1998; Alderman et al., 2001; Abraham et al., 2006.) Such a 
situation may arise in at least two situations. First, if attrition is selected only on 
characteristics that are observed at baseline then it is straightforward to reconstruct the 
original sample with weights. Second, if attrition is selected on characteristics that are 
not observed at baseline and also not correlated with any of the characteristics that are 
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included in a specific model of interest then, in the context of that model, attrition can be 
treated as missing at random and is thus ignorable.1  In this situation, the conclusion that 
attrition is ignorable is model-dependent and is not a general result for a particular 
longitudinal survey. While it is straightforward to test the first case, it is difficult to 
construct empirical tests for the second case since it involves assumptions about the 
correlation between attrition and characteristics that are not observed.  
In general, attrition is likely to be related to characteristics that are observed at 
baseline and characteristics that are not observed at that time and may not even be 
observable at baseline. For example, unanticipated changes in the life of a respondent 
that occurs after baseline cannot be measured at that time. If respondents attrite from the 
survey because of post-baseline changes in their lives that are not observed, then 
attrition will, by definition, depend on unobserved characteristics. This poses a 
challenge for tests of the ignorability of attrition that is predicated on information 
collected at baseline unless, of course, the changes that occur after baseline can be 
predicted by baseline characteristics. This suggests that attrition may be of greater 
concern in panels that span a longer time frame, among populations that are undergoing 
large changes in their lives (such as adolescents entering adulthood) and in study 
                                                   
1   Without loss of generality, the second case can be extended to include attrition that is correlated with 
observed characteristics. 
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settings that involve unanticipated changes in the lives of respondents (such as large 
economic or natural shocks or experimental interventions). 
The next section places this research in context and describes a general 
conceptual framework to structure the analysis. This is followed by a description of the 
Mexican Family Life Survey and by a detailed examination of the attrition rates in the 
second wave. We then present a model that predicts attrition based on a rich set of 
outcomes measured at baseline. In addition to a broad array of socio-economic 
characteristics, we include an additional set of variables, for example information about 
future expectations and migration that are not usually included in these models. The 
results show that these characteristics are predictive of subsequent attrition, which 
provides a first signal that attrition may be selected on characteristics that are potentially 
unobserved at baseline. These analysis is followed by an estimation of a standard model 
of earnings measured at baseline. We explore the impact of excluding respondents who 
attrited after baseline and we then test the effectiveness of a multiple imputation 
strategy to adjust for attrition. We conclude that a multiple imputation strategy, based 
on measured characteristics at baseline, may correct for attrition. However, evidence of 
whether attrition is ignorable and/or if attrition is predicted by changes in the lives of 
the respondents that occurred after the baseline interview cannot be provided by 
standard post-survey adjustment strategies. In order to shed light on this matter we test 
a multiple imputation strategy, exploiting information from respondents who had not 
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been found in the second wave of the MxFLS but who were recovered in the third wave. 
While most longitudinal surveys do not track individuals that had not been found in 
previous rounds, this unique aspect of the MxFLS makes it possible to compare a model 
of earnings using data measured in the third wave of the MxFLS with data calculated 
using a post-survey adjustment strategy. The results suggest that, in this case, the 
multiple imputation strategy is not capable of successfully replicating the information of 
attritors. This analysis provides evidence that changes in the respondent’s characteristics 
between waves are important predictors of attrition and highlights the limitation of 
post-survey adjustments based solely on baseline characteristics. 
 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
The consequences of non-response are a relevant issue in any study that relies on 
household and individual level data. Longitudinal surveys at the baseline and cross-
sectional studies may suffer from non-response bias if sampled respondents are not 
assessed. The issue gets more complicated in following waves of longitudinal surveys 
because maintaining the initial representativeness of the sample depends on finding the 
same individuals interviewed at the baseline. 
Studies that have examined the effects of non-response in longitudinal surveys 
treat the impact of attrition as a selection bias problem. Seminal work by Fitzgerald et al. 
(1998) provides a model of attrition that distinguishes selection on observed and 
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unobserved characteristics. This is a key distinction since attrition that is selected on 
observed factors may be taken into account with post-survey weights, while attrition 
that is associated with characteristics that are not observed potentially poses a larger 
concern. Alderman et al. (2001) follows the Fitzgerald et al. (1998) methodology in their 
analysis of attrition in panel data from Bolivia, Kenya and South Africa. These studies 
conclude that, conditional on observed characteristics, attrition is ignorable. This essay 
follows the approach of Fitzgerald et al. and develops an imputation strategy to adjust 
for attrition using data from MxFLS. In addition, we extend the approach by taking into 
account uncertainty in the imputation strategy by adopting multiple imputation 
methods suggested by Rubin (1987). 
Thomas et al. (2012) note that in addition to this literature on attrition in panel 
data, a different line of survey research has highlighted that non-response is related to 
the structure of the interview and characteristics of enumerators’ characteristics on 
attrition rates. Integrating these perspectives in a study of attrition in the Indonesia 
Family Life Survey (IFLS), the authors argue that it is difficult to rule out that attrition in 
IFLS is correlated with characteristics that are not observed at baseline (in the context of 
an earnings function) and show that characteristics of interviewers are predictive of 
attrition and may serve as instruments for attrition in behavioral models.2  While our 
                                                   
2 With regard to the role of survey design, Olsen (2005) highlights the importance of persistence during 
interview follow-ups and the significance of explaining the survey in a clear way to both interviewers and 
respondents. See also Maluccio (2000) and Zabel (1998). 
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work on MxFLS follows the first strand of the literature, on-going research will integrate 
the second perspective into the analyses. 
Following Fitzgerald et al. (1998), we describe our conceptual framework in this 
section. Assume that the outcome of interest is a conditional population density |, 
where y is the dependent variable of interest and x is a vector of independent variables. 
Let A be a latent index of attrition equal to one if y is missing because of attrition, and 
assume x as a set of covariates that is observed for the entire sample (this assumption is 
valid for the models developed in the following sections. One can think of this vector as 
time invariant characteristics or as lagged variables). Given that y is not observed over 
the entire sample, the econometrician can estimate |, 	 = 0.	 The challenge is to 
infer the function f from the estimation of g. 
One solution is to impose restrictions on the attrition function (defined in 
equations 2.2 and 2.3 below) to infer the real density f from the estimated density g. 
Define the probability of attrition as Pr	 = 0|, ,  where x and z are observed for all 
the sample. The restrictions imposed in this function in order to test for attrition bias 
depend on whether attrition is selected on observed or unobserved variables. Formally, 
attrition is selected on observed characteristics if Pr	 = 0|, ,  can be reduced to 
Pr	 = 0|,  and:  
0 1it it ity xβ β ε= + +                                                                         (2.1) 
*
0 1 2it it it itA x zδ δ δ µ= + + +                                                                        (2.2) 
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*1 0it itA if A= ≥                                                            (2.3a) 
*0 0it itA if A= <                                                            (2.3b) 
where  is an unobserved factor that may affect attrition. When attrition is a selection on 
observed characteristics then | is independent from  but | is not independent from 
z. The variable z is an endogenous variable that affects both attrition and the outcome y 
but affects y only through A. In a model of earnings, for example, basic demographics 
such as age, gender and marital status have been found to be determinants of both the 
earnings and attrition equations (x variables). When attrition is selected on observed 
factors, the real density function f can be computed using weighted least squares with 
the weights from the conditional joint density of the outcome of interest observed only 
for non-attritors and the characteristic z observed for the entire sample. 
Selection on unobserved characteristics occurs when | is independent from z 
but | is not independent from	. For example, in the context of the model of earnings 
suppose that the variable z is a measure of the length of the interview and suppose that 
in the residuals in the model of earnings are unobserved measures of ambition. 
Unobserved variables that are endogenous in a behavioral model may influence the 
willingness to move to places with higher wages, and individual’s or household’s 
migration may difficult tracking, which affects attrition rates. In this case, residuals in 
the model of earnings are not correlated with z but are correlated with . One of the 
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standard methodologies to address selection on unobserved characteristics is based on 
the Heckman selection model.3 
The Heckman selection model is a two-step equation model, where the first 
equation is a regression based on equation (2.1). The model is truncated because the 
outcome y is not observed for the attritors’ sample. Equation (2.2) represents the 
estimation of the selection model; in this case the attrition function. 
If the correlation between  and  is zero, then sample selection is not an issue 
and OLS estimates are consistent. When the correlation is different from zero, the 
Heckman correction allows the use of information from the attritors’ sample in the 
regression model. However, identification of ′ requires an exclusion restriction, a 
variable z that explains attrition and is not correlated with the residual on the earnings 
equation. Finding such a variable (an instrument) is a challenge as any variable related 
with behavioral choices may influence both models and be invalid. 
In the framework of models of attrition in longitudinal surveys the ideal z’s that 
satisfy the exclusion restriction are characteristics of the survey. Such variables explain 
attrition and are exogenous to the respondents’ behavior. Variables such as the 
characteristics of the surveyors (as long as surveyors are allocated randomly to 
                                                   
3 Along with selection correction methods, an additional test proposed for Fitzgerald et al. (1988) is the 
comparison of the survey of interest with an external data set. In their study they compare the PSID with the 
Current Population Survey (CPS). The next section of this chapter discusses possible tests of attrition in the 
context of the MxFLS. 
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respondents) are good examples of possible z variables. As mentioned before, such 
variables are used by Thomas et al. (2012) as instruments for attrition in behavioral 
models using the IFLS. 
 
2.3 Data: The Mexican Family Life Survey 
The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) is an ongoing longitudinal data set that 
is representative at the national level and includes information on approximately 8,440 
households and 35,600 individuals among 150 communities throughout Mexico. The 
baseline survey was conducted in 2002, the first follow-up started in 2005 (MxFLS2), and 
the third wave started in 2009 (MxFLS3) and it is currently in the final stages of 
fieldwork. The MxFLS is designed to follow all baseline respondents and their children 
who were born after baseline, regardless of migration.   
Table 1 shows attrition rates in 2005. About 11% of the sample was lost to follow-
up. A fundamental characteristic of the survey is that every respondent in 2002 is a 
target respondent for follow-up regardless of migration, such that Mexican migrants to 
the U.S. and return migrants from U.S. to Mexico are tracked and interviewed as well as 
movers within Mexico. This is the first longitudinal survey that attempts to follow-up 
Mexican migrants in the U.S. In 2005, about 2.4% of the baseline respondents were 
known to have moved to the U.S. Of those, 91% were tracked and interviewed in the 
U.S. 
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The first two columns of Table 1 show the number of individuals tracked in 2005 
for the entire sample. The percentages are very similar between the complete sample 
and the sample of individuals older than 15. The analysis of this chapter will focus on 
adults (members older than 15 years of age in 2002) since they were individually 
assessed by an enumerator whereas a primary care-giver provided information about 
each child (under 15).  
Of the original sample, 543 people had died by 2005, 525 of which were adults. 
All the original members except those who died comprise the eligible sample in 2005. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that of the 11% attrition rate, 8.8% of the cases involve entire 
households that are lost. Approximately 83% of the 2002 sample is found in their 
original 2002 household, and 6 percent is found either in a new household in Mexico or 
in the U.S. In 2005, 4,529 individuals are new respondents because they were living with 
a target respondent. Panel B shows that from the people found, 86% complete the 
interview and almost 4 percent are found but are not interviewed. From the found but 
non-interviewed, less than 1 percent are directly classified as refusals. Although there is 
not complete data for these individuals, the reasons for non-response in these cases may 
be quite different from those who are lost to follow up.4 Individuals who refuse to 
answer take a conscious decision about cooperating with the study. In the MxFLS the 
                                                   
4 Groves and Couper (1998) highlight the importance of distinguishing between different types of attrition. 
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group of individuals found and without an interview may be considered as refusals. An 
analysis distinguishing different types of attrition will be explored in future research. 
The rich information collected in the MxFLS allows to explore a rich set of 
covariates as predictors of attrition. The MxFLS contains information about the 
economic, social and health status of each member of a surveyed household. The 
questionnaire for adults includes sections on education, labor supply and earnings, 
migration history, marriage and fertility history, health status, and use of health care. In 
addition, one member is interviewed about information at the household level. This 
questionnaire includes a complete household roster including basic socio-demographic 
characteristics of each household member, and information of household expenditure, 
and assets ownership (Rubalcava and Teruel, 2006). 
As well as variables that are traditionally found in household surveys, the 
MxFLS contains detailed information on characteristics that are not standard in broad-
purpose socio-economic surveys. The MxFLS questionnaire includes information about 
expectations about the future, perceptions of current and future health and well-being as 
well as information about crime and victimization.  
 
2.4 Analysis of Attrition 
With this background, this section draws comparisons between the group of 
attritors and non-attritors across multiple variables measured at the baseline. A model of 
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attrition is also estimated as a function of variables measured at the baseline in order to 
examine whether differences between attritors and non-attritors hold after controlling 
for diverse socio-demographic characteristics. In the spirit of Becketti et al. (1988) and 
Fitzgerald et al. (1998), a test of attrition is performed using a model of the quartic root 
of monthly earnings in 2002. The model of earnings is chosen because it is a common 
dependent variable used in economic studies and testing whether attrition may bias its 
results is an important contribution. After testing for attrition, possible methods of 
correction are discussed. The limitations of the Heckman model represent a challenge in 
the context of the MxFLS, so an alternative procedure will be discussed in the next 
section. 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This section examines the observed correlates of attrition in the MxFLS. Tables 2 
and 3 show comparisons between the sample of attritors and non-attritors. The 
comparisons are made across a number of characteristics measured at baseline (2002), 
therefore are observed for all the sample of respondents. Column three of Table 2 shows 
the differences in the mean for all the sample of individual older than 15, and Table 3 
shows the differences in the mean for the sample stratified by gender. Most of the results 
hold for both males and females; however, some of the dissimilarities that exist by 
gender are highlighted at the end of this section. 
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The variables are classified in two broad groups. The basic model includes 
variables measured in most surveys and which are considered as standard determinants 
of attrition. This group includes individual demographics, participation in the labor 
force, household composition and resources, and the rural-urban characteristic of the 
locality where respondents were living in 2002. 
The variables in the extended model consist of non-typically measured variables. 
Along the lines of Abraham et al. (2006), measures of community integration are 
included. Respondents better integrated to the community have more contacts, which 
could facilitate their tracking. Migration history and plans about moving may also be 
determinants of attrition. We will test whether past migration and expectation about 
migration in the future are important predictors of attrition. This of great relevance 
since, as mentioned in the introduction, most of attrition in developing countries is 
driven by loss to follow-up of migrants. 
The extended model also includes a set of variables that measure perceptions of 
quality of life, crime and victimization and wellbeing. The index of emotional wellbeing 
is built from 21 questions comprised in a section specially designed to measure welfare. 
The possible values of the index vary between 9 and 63, being 9 the person that felt 
better and 63 the person that felt worst in terms of emotional welfare.5 
                                                   
5 As an illustration, consider the following question, in parenthesis next to each question is the value that the 
answer receives to build the wellbeing index: In the last 4 weeks, have you felt lonely? 1. Yes, sometimes (1) 
2. Yes, a lot of times (2) 3. Yes, all the time (3) 4. No (0). 
 19 
The results in Table 2 show that the sample of attritors are on average younger 
and more likely to be single. On the other hand, attritors are more likely to be more 
educated and to have more educated parents; they are taller and show higher average 
cognitive scores. The general results of the variables that measure households’ resources 
show that homeowners and farm-business owners are less likely to attrite. However, 
individuals with higher levels of wealth are more likely to be in the attritors’ sample. 
Higher levels of per capita expenditure (PCE) also increase the odds of not being 
interviewed; but it is important to underline that the effect of the per capita expenditure 
may be driven by the fact that smaller households are lost with higher probability. 
Respondents who are tracked in the first follow-up are more likely to live in 
households with more children and to have at least one co-resident parent, although the 
difference with the non-tracked individuals is not significant. Abraham et al. (2006) 
maintains that the number of children may be a proxy for integration in the community. 
In the same line of analysis, having at least one co-resident parent alive may augment 
the probability of tracking. If older people are less mobile, their contact information may 
be crucial to relocate moving households. 
Healthier people may be more willing to incur the physical costs of migration. 
Two types of variables are considered as a measure of health status, a perception of 
respondents’ health status relative to their age and gender demographic group, and 
objective health indicators. Self-assessed health is difficult to interpret as it shows the 
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information each person has of her own health rather than objective health. Poorer 
people that do not have access to health facilities may be less healthy but also may not 
be aware of it. To complement the analysis of health, measures of hypertension and the 
body mass index (BMI) are also included. The set of health related variables show that 
attritors have better measures of both hypertension and BMI, and perceive themselves as 
healthy relative to their age and gender group. In the set of variables measuring 
participation in the labor force, attritors are more likely to be employed and to be non-
agricultural workers, which is consistent with the result that show that respondents in 
rural areas have lower probability of being lost during follow-up.  
A higher opportunity cost to participate in the survey and a busier working 
schedule can also significantly affect the likelihood of survey response. For the MxFLS, 
the numbers support this hypothesis. For every employment category, individuals who 
were not interviewed had significantly higher total earnings at baseline and worked on 
average two additional hours per week.  
Among the variables that measure the level of integration with the community 
the key is to consider characteristics that may facilitate the contact of eligible 
interviewees in 2005. Non-attritors are more likely to be beneficiaries of welfare 
programs, which is consistent with the fact that in order to keep receiving these 
program’s benefits individuals are not allowed to move away from their original 
locality. Interestingly, the descriptive statistics show that attritors seem more tied to the 
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community. They are more likely to participate in activities outside their household and 
to take care of vulnerable people. Even though these variables may increase the 
probability of being more involved with the community, they could also diminish the 
probability of finding respondents at home. Moreover, attritors are more likely to know 
people or institutions that could lend them money. This result is consistent with the fact 
that they are more likely to have thought about migrating. Migration requires an 
important initial investment that the poorest people cannot afford. Attritors are, in fact, 
more likely to have moved by age 12, and 9.9 percentage points more likely to think 
about moving in the future.6  
The last group of characteristics measure perceptions of wellbeing, crime and 
victimization, and will allow us to condition the probability of attrition on a large set of 
observed variables. Because these variables are not often collected in longitudinal 
surveys, if the group of attritors and non-attritors are different in this set of variables, 
this could be a first proof of selection on characteristics that are usually unobserved. 
Moreover, these variables may work as a proxy for the quality of life in the place of 
residence in 2002. Lower cooperation between neighbors, higher perceptions of 
insecurity and lower perceptions of improvement in the quality of life may affect the 
desire to change residence. The results show that attritors are more likely to have 
                                                   
6 Thomas et al. (2012) finds that respondents that moved before 12 are less likely to be re-interviewed. 
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perceived improvements in their qualities of life but feel less safe and have been victims 
of robbery with higher probability. Respondents that felt less safe in 2002 might have 
moved without leaving any contact information, which could hinder their tracking. The 
index of wellbeing shows that attritors are more likely to have higher levels of emotional 
status. 
Many significant differences exist between the sample of attritors and non-
attritors and the general findings are similar for the stratified sample by gender. The 
results in Table 3 show that the differences in health measures between the attritors’ and 
non- attritors’ sample hold only for females. The most remarkable differences between 
females and males are the measures of participation in the labor force. Females that 
worked the week before the interview are more likely to be lost in follow-up, while for 
males this difference is not significant. In addition, male agricultural workers are more 
likely to be found while for females the probability of being involved in agricultural 
activities is not different between attritors and non-attritors. Moreover, when 
disaggregating the measure of earnings by employment sector, the differences are only 
significant for men at the 5% confidence level.  These results may reflect some 
differences in the patterns of attrition between males and females. 
At this point of the analysis, attritors and non-attritors look different in a 
significant number of observed characteristics and in the set of variables that measure 
expectations, perceptions of safety and quality of life. Logit models in the next section 
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allow controlling for a different set of socio-demographic variables to analyze whether 
these differences persist. 
2.4.2 Prediction of Attrition  
This section shows results of estimating logistic models that predict the 
probabilities of attrition between baseline and the first follow-up using the same 
characteristics presented in the previous section. The analysis is based on data collected 
at baseline. 
As in the previous section the sample consists of all 2002 interviewees older than 
15 years of age. The analysis of the descriptive statistics showed evidence of differences 
in many key socio-economic variables between those who attrite and those who are 
found, which should generate some concern in ignoring attrition. The logit model allows 
analyzing these differences controlling for other socio-economic variables. Identifying 
the characteristics of attritors contributes to improving the design of follow-ups and to 
determine whether attrition may bias estimation results.  
The model is based on the function of attrition explained in section 2.2. The goal 
is to estimate Pr	(	 = 0|, ), where y is the outcome of interest observed only for non-
attritors and x is the set of covariates measured in 2002. The outcome y can be estimated 
from the set of covariates observed for the entire targeted sample, therefore (|) =
 + .  When	Pr(	 = 0|, ) = Pr(	 = 0|), the selection of attrition is based only on 
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observed characteristics and controlling for these should take into account the 
differences between the sample of attritors and non-attritors.  
Two models that estimate the probability of attrition are examined. The basic 
model estimates the probability as a function of 2002 characteristics considered in 
standard models of attrition. This model includes as covariates demographic 
characteristics at the individual level, household’s composition, measures of households’ 
assets and socio-economic status, individual health measures, participation in the labor 
market and whether the place of residence in 2002 is rural or urban (Table 4). An 
extended model adds variables that measure migration experience and expectations 
about future migration, integration with the community and perceptions of quality of 
life (Table 5). 
Tables 4 and 5 show the results for the basic and extended logit regressions, 
where the dependent variable equals one if the respondent was not found in 2005. The 
results are shown as odd-ratios that indicate the odds of not being tracked relative to 
being tracked in 2005 for each of the covariates. All the models control for municipality 
of residence at baseline and the standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
The results of the first column show the odds for the entire sample, and columns two 
through five present the results after stratifying the sample by gender and by rural and 
urban areas. Special interest should be given to the set of variables of quality of life, 
crime and victimization, and migration expectations. These variables are not usually 
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measured in standard surveys or are not usually considered in attrition models (an 
exception is Fitzgerald et al. that controls for expectations of migration). The significance 
of these variables in a model of attrition could give support to the fact that attrition may 
be determined by unobserved characteristics. 
The results for the basic model (Table 4) show that gender, human capital, 
household’s resources, household composition and whether the place of residence is 
urban or rural are significant predictors of attrition, and their significance holds when 
looking across the columns in the stratified samples. The results in the first column for 
the entire sample show that being a female increases the odds of being lost in follow-up, 
and this significance persists in urban places.  
Looking at the different set of characteristics across the different samples, it is 
evident that human capital is an important predictor of attrition, but there is an 
important level of heterogeneity depending on gender and place of residence. Better 
educated respondents as well as those with better educated parents are less likely to be 
found, and this result is being driven by male respondents and individuals living in 
urban places. Both the respondent’s and their father’s education have a non-linear effect 
on the probability of attrition. Male respondents with complete high school are 54 
percent more likely to be lost in follow-up relative to men with incomplete primary and 
those with college or more are 45 percent more likely to be attritors from the sample. If, 
for example, unobserved characteristics correlated with education, like ambition, drive 
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attrition, and, it is the most ambitious individuals within each education group that have 
the highest earnings after baseline, a post-survey adjustment based only on education 
would underestimate the returns to education in future follow-ups. Moreover, higher 
levels of education increase geographical mobility especially in urban areas where the 
expected return of education is higher. Movers are more difficult to track, and variables 
that explain mobility may also be determinants of attrition. 
An additional difference in the stratified versions is the effect of marital status in 
urban and rural areas. While in urban areas being married does not have a significant 
effect on the probability of being lost, in rural areas married individuals are 60 percent 
less likely to be interviewed. In the category of household characteristics, homeowners 
are on average 65 percent more likely to be interviewed in follow-up and this is 
consistent across the different samples (except in rural places where the probability 
decreases to 25 percent). This result may indicate that those with higher investments at 
the place of residence may be less likely to be lost in follow-up because of the lower 
probability associated with migration. The measure of wealth per capita shows that the 
probability of being found is lower among the households above the 25th percentile of 
the wealth distribution, and the results are significant in the different samples with the 
exception of rural localities. This is consistent with the fact that households with more 
assets are less mobile and therefore easier to track.   
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The effects of household composition are as expected. Households with more 
children and co-resident parents have lower probabilities of being lost. This result 
supports the finding of Abraham et al. (2006) that households with more children are 
better integrated into the community. However, the set of variables that measure health 
are not significant predictors of attrition, and these results persist across the different 
sub-samples.    
After controlling for a rich set of characteristics the effects of variables related 
with the labor market are only significant for the sample of males. Men whose earnings 
are in the second quartile of the distribution are more likely to not be found relative to 
those in the bottom quartile, but males at the top of the 50th percentile of the distribution 
are around 40 percent less likely to attrit from the sample. People with better jobs and 
higher earnings could be less willing to move, although these people could also have 
higher opportunity costs. We will discuss in detail a model of earnings in the next 
section. Moreover, working more hours per week increases the probability of being lost, 
although the coefficient is very close to one.  
Finally, being from a rural community greatly reduces the odds of being lost, 
particularly in the sample of females. Rural communities rely usually on closer social 
networks in the community, which facilitates tracking in follow-ups. 
Table 5 shows the results for the extended model. The significance and 
magnitude of the variables of the basic model persist when adding the additional 
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variables of the extended model. In the set of variables that measure migration, on the 
one hand, individuals who have migrated by age 12 seem to be more likely to be lost in 
follow-up, however, the effects are not significant in any of the sub-samples. The 
variable that measures expectations about migration in the future, on the other hand, is a 
significant predictor of attrition in every model, except for individuals living in rural 
areas. Women who expect to migrate in the future are 26 percent more likely to be lost in 
follow-up, this number increases to 30% for males and to 34% in urban areas. An 
important result is the lack of significance of this variable in rural areas. Rural areas had 
a higher follow-up rate (in urban areas the attrition rate was 15.07% while in rural areas 
was only 4.35%) and one of the reasons could be the lower mobility rates in these areas. 
After controlling for these rich set of variables, the initial significant effects found for the 
characteristics that measure emotional well-being or perceptions on security lose their 
significance in the different sub-samples.  
The results of the logit models show that, in addition to the standard socio-
economic characteristics, expectation about future migration play a significant role as 
determinant of the probability of attrition. Moreover, it seems like the attritors’ sample 
has similar characteristics to the standard variables that characterize migrants. Less 
educated people, individuals more likely to be married and homeowners show lower 
geographic mobility (Rosenzweig, 1986; Smith and Thomas, 1998; Thomas et al., 2001). 
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Ignoring attrition or performing corrections based solely on observed 
characteristics may bias the estimations when attrition is selected on unobservables that 
are related with the outcome of interest. Unobserved factors like, for example, ambition 
and aversion towards risk, may determine the decision to participate in certain sectors of 
the labor market. If such participation requires migrating or working more hours, the 
probability of attrition may be affected, as well as earnings. Ignoring factors that explain 
both models cause biased estimations.  
Assessing whether attrition is ignorable when is selected on unobserved 
characteristics remains an empirical question and the methods to correct for attrition 
impose important assumptions on the distribution of the missing data. Assuming that 
attrition is ignorable when it is not can seriously compromise the validity of the 
estimations based on longitudinal data. The next section explores the effect of attrition in 
a model of earnings.  
2.4.3 Attrition in a Model of Earnings 
This section presents a model for the quartic-root of monthly earnings and a test 
for attrition bias in the spirit of Becketti et al. (1988) and Fitzgerald et al. (1998). The test 
for attrition proposed in this section complements the discussion held in previous 
sections. 
The test originally proposed by Becketti et al. (1988) estimates the outcome of 
interest on a set of covariates x and on whether the respondent is found in subsequent 
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waves. While in the previous section the model estimated the probability of attrition 
based on a set of covariates including , the model in this section estimates the expected 
value of  conditioned on x and A. Equation (2.4) shows the attrition function, where 	∗ 
is a latent index for attrition explained in previous sections, x is a set of 2002 covariates 
and  is the quartic-root of monthly earnings in 2002. In this model 2005 information is 
used only to distinguish the sample of attritors and non-attritors.  
	
∗ =  +  +  +                                                                                     (2.4)   
The purpose of the test is to identify whether the conditional expectation of  
depends on the attrition function by inverting equation 2.4 and taking expectations to 
measure (|	, . The empirical strategy to determine the effect of attrition on the 
conditional expected value of  is based on a linear approximation of |	,  using 
OLS (Becketti et al., 1988). 
In the framework of the MxFLS, the idea of the test is to estimate separate 
regressions for the respondents that attrite and those that did not and compare their 
coefficients. The comparison is with data in 2002 between the attritors and non-attritors 
in order to examine how different the parameters are if only the non-attriting sample is 
considered in a statistical analysis. The following estimation represents the model of 
earnings, where the subscript equal to one in y and x stands for the sample of 
respondents found in 2005, the subscript equal to zero stands for the sample of 
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respondents not found in 2005 and the subscript with 1 and 0 represents the full sample 
of respondents: 
 ! = " + " + #                                                                                                  (2.5)     
  ! =  +  + $                                                                                                  (2.6) 
 !, =  + , +                                                                                       
	 !, = [&" + (1 − &)] + [&" + (1 − &)] +                                           (2.7) 
Equation (2.5) estimates the quartic-root of monthly earnings at baseline for non-
attritors, equation (2.6) estimates the same regression for the sample of attritors and 
equation 2.7 estimates the full sample, where ω is the weight of non-attritors in the 
sample. 
The test proposed by Becketti et al. is whether  = " and  = ", whether 
using only the sample of attritors presents significantly different estimates from using 
the full sample of targeted respondents. When the hypothesis of equality between 
coefficients cannot be rejected, attrition is not a significant determinant of  and does 
not bias the estimates of the model. This test is equivalent to a test of the γ coefficients in 
the following equation: 
 ! = α + α + γ + γ, +                                                                                 (2.8)     
where L is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent was not found in 2005. 
Therefore, 
 = " + -                                                                                                                  (2.9)     
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 = " + -                                                                                                                (2.10)     
and the test can be re-written as: 
 = "                                                                                                              
&" + (1 − &) = "                                                                                      
" =                                                                                                               
Using equation (2.9): 
- = 0                                                                                                                           (2.11)     
which is a test of the γ coefficients on equation (2.8). The same analysis holds for the 
",	 and - coefficients. The test of differences between the coefficients of equations 
(2.5) and (2.6) is therefore equivalent to the test that looks at the significance of the 
interacted terms in equation (2.8). Testing coefficients across separate regression may be 
more difficult that testing the γ coefficients. 
Table 5 shows the results of equation (2.5) for the quartic-root of monthly 
earnings conditioned on 4-segment spline functions in age7, education, height and 
whether the locality of residence was rural or urban. The sample is restricted to 
respondents in 2002 between 21 and 65 years old that report being working the week 
before the interview and are not unpaid, includes municipality fixed effects and clusters 
the standard errors at the municipality level.  
                                                   
7 Semi-parametric spline functions impose fewer restrictions on the functional form than the quadratic option. 
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The results in Table 6 show the estimations of equations (2.7) (model 1) and (2.8) 
(model 2), for the entire sample and stratifying by gender and by urban-rural. Model 1 
shows the coefficients without attrition. In model 2 the purpose is to test the significance 
of the interacted terms. When the coefficients with the interaction are significantly 
different from zero, then the hypothesis of equality of coefficients between attritors’ and 
non-attritors’ is rejected and attrition bias is evident. 
Without stratifying by gender (columns 1 and 2), the interaction of the indicator 
for attrition with the coefficients of gender, incomplete high school, and college or more, 
are significant. If in the follow-up, the sample of attritors were ignored, the negative 
effects of the female gender on earnings would be overestimated and the returns to 
incomplete high school and college, relative to incomplete primary, would be 
underestimated. These results show that the individuals that are not being tracked are 
not missing at random. The women in age to work that are not tracked in 2005 have 
higher earnings, as well as attritors with some high school or college.  
Although women lost in follow-up have on average higher earnings, the returns 
to education between the samples of women who were found and those who were lost 
in follow-up do not seem to be significantly different. Even though the magnitude of the 
coefficients of the interaction between the variables of education and the indicator of 
attrition are not small, the effects are imprecisely estimated. While the results for women 
are not significant, it is interesting to contrast their sign and magnitude with the results 
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for males. While for women, ignoring the sample of attritors could potentially 
overestimate the effect of education on earnings the effect for males show exactly the 
opposite pattern. In the sample of males, all the coefficients of education are significantly 
different between the sample of attritors and non-attritors. For levels of education above 
complete primary, considering only the sample of non-attritors would underestimate the 
returns of education. These results support the findings of the previous section. Not only 
are more educated males lost with higher probability, but also those with higher returns 
to education. 
This result supports one of the prior conclusions: men and women have different 
determinants for attrition, and education is one of the determinants that plays a differing 
role. While higher education increases the probability of attrition for males, it does not 
have an effect on females. In addition, while using only the non-attritors’ sample 
underestimates the returns of education in the group of males, the effect is not 
significant for females. 
Previous results also show differences on the attrition patterns in rural and urban 
localities, and the results in Table 6 support those results. On the one hand, in rural areas 
education is not a strong predictor of attrition and those with the lowest returns to 
education are more likely to attrit from the sample. On the other hand, education 
significantly predicts attrition in urban areas and those without an interview in the 
follow-up have also the highest returns to education. Ignoring the sample of attritors 
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would, for example, underestimate the returns to college in around 46 percent for 
individuals living in urban places.  
2.4.4. Methods to Handle Missing Data due to Attrition 
The previous sections showed the differences between attritors and non-attritors 
and the bias that exists in a model of earnings when ignoring attrition. The results of 
both the model of attrition and the model of earnings highlight two conclusions: first, 
attritors and non-attritors are different in a significant number of characteristics 
including a set of non-standard observed variables; second, estimations of the model of 
earnings using only the non-attritors sample bias the estimations. The standard method 
to correct attrition for selection on unobservables is based on the exclusion restriction. 
However, finding a variable that explains attrition and is not related with the residuals 
of the earnings model is challenging. 
Although there had been advancements in the literature to handle the cases with 
missing data due to attrition, , there is still little guidance in the literature regarding the 
most effective approaches to mitigating the impact of attrition in empirical studies that 
use longitudinal data. Some of the most used techniques are re-weighting methods and 
imputation methods that assigns a value to the variables of the missings respondents. 
There are at least two different strategies that use re-weighting methods. First, studies 
re-weight the sample of non-attriters so that it replicates the baseline sample. This 
‘raking’ is usually on a small set of characteristics such as age, gender, education and 
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location. Second, studies estimate a multivariate model of attrition and calculate the risk 
or propensity that an individual will attrite from the sample. The propensity score is 
used to re-weight the sample of non-attritors. This method typically uses a relatively 
large number of characteristics to predict the propensity. When attrition is selected only 
on observed factors, post-survey weights can adjust for attrition. The great limitation of 
this strategy is that without a sample of attritors it is not possible to test the assumption 
of selection of attrition only on observables measured at baseline.  
An alternative methodology to solve for attrition is to impute values for missing 
information in the outcome of interest. Both a single imputation and a multiple 
imputation strategy have been largely used in the literature. Multiple imputation, takes 
one more step and essentially repeats the single imputation process multiple times to 
take account of the fact that attrition is a stochastic process (Rubin and Zanutto, 2002).  
 
2.5 Multiple Imputation  
The imputation strategy is a method that deals with missing variables based on a 
specific model that results in a valid statistical inference (Rubin, 1987). In longitudinal 
surveys, the imputation strategy model gives a value to the missing variables as a 
function of observed characteristics that determine the non-response behavior. In this 
sense, both multiple and single imputation models allows including hypothesis for the 
reasons of non-response. Rubin (1987) claims that assumptions about non-response are 
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not straightforward and a number of possible models for non-response should be 
considered in the analysis. 
The imputation model makes a match between a respondent with complete 
information and one with missing information. The match is made based on the 
hypothesis of non-response. The fundamental advantage of multiple imputations 
against a single imputation strategy is that it imputes several values (m) to the outcome 
y, which creates m different complete data sets (for a discussion of the optimal number 
for m see Rubin, 1987). The multiple imputation accounts, therefore, for the variance of 
estimates and this increases the efficiency of its estimates (Rubin, 1987). 
2.5.1 Imputation of Earnings at Baseline 
In this section we predict earnings in 2005 based on observed variables, namely 
those variables measured in 2002 that predict attrition, for all employed respondents, 
aged 21 to 65, in 2002.  Before explaining the model of earnings in 2005 and its results, it 
is important to conduct an examination of the validity of the model of imputation by 
performing a test using the baseline data.8 For this analysis, the sample is restricted to 
respondents, between 21 and 65 year old at baseline, that report working the week 
before the interview (self-employed and employees).  
                                                   
8 The same exercise has been performed using a re-weighting strategy that calculates a propensity score for 
the probability of attrition to re-weight the sample of non-attritors. For a model of earnings the results from 
the multiple imputation strategy were more closely matched to the results using the original data. 
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To carry out this test the same model of earnings is applied to two different 
samples. One sample is the entire set of respondents that have full information at 
baseline and the second is the same data set with multiple imputation estimates 
replacing the 2002 earnings variable for non-tracked individuals in 2005.  If the multiple 
imputation model replicates the estimations found when using the original 2002 data we 
can be more confident about a multiple imputation strategy to handle missing earnings 
in 2005 of those who attrited.  
However, this exercise has an important limitation. Even if the multiple 
imputation model replicates the estimations of the original data, we still cannot identify 
whether non-response is related to events that happened between baseline and follow-
up. For example, if respondents attrited because of life changes that occurred in the 
hiatus of the survey’s waves, then attrition will, by definition, depend on unobserved 
characteristics. We will discuss potential methodologies to test whether differing 
changes in baseline characteristics may be correlated with attrition at the end of the 
section. 
We start our analysis by examining the imputation model at baseline. In the 
sample of employed respondents, a small proportion of individuals do not have 
information for earnings. In this case, missing information on earnings in the targeted 
sample is not explained by attrition. In order to deal with this different type of missing 
data a two-stage imputation model is proposed. The first stage imputes earnings to the 
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respondents that did not answer the question for earnings and reported being 
employed. This is not an imputation for attrition. The imputation is based on basic 
demographics, education and characteristics at the locality level. Once the data at 
baseline is complete the second-stage imputation can be done. 
In addition, we examine the extent to which the inclusion of characteristics that 
are not usually observed in surveys in the imputation algorithms affects the substantive 
results. This section discusses the results of a basic and an extended strategy for the 
multiple imputation models based on the two versions of the attrition model.9 If the set 
of additional variables, in particular migration expectations, are good predictors of 
attrition taking those into account should improve the accuracy of the imputation 
models.  
Table 7 shows the results of the test of the imputation model. The first three 
columns report the results for the full sample and the following columns for the 
stratified sample by gender, and by urban-rural. For each sample three models are 
reported: the model with the original data at baseline, the basic imputation model and 
the extended imputation.  
                                                   
9 The accuracy of the imputation strategy relies on the model that defines attrition and, following Rubin 
(1987), more than one model should be specified when dealing with multiple imputation strategies. 
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The results show that the multiple imputation strategy is a reliable tool to 
estimate the model for earnings with missing variables.10 However, in contrast to our 
intuition, it seems that the extended imputation does not add precision to the 
imputation model.  
As shown in the previous section, estimates of (2.8) provide a test of whether 
using only the non-attritors sample biases the results. Table 8 shows the results using the 
original data at baseline, and both imputed data sets. The coefficients without 
interactions represent the coefficients for the sample of non-attritors. The first three 
columns show the results for the entire sample. The coefficients for the non-attritors are 
similar between the original data and both the imputed data sets. However, the 
significance and magnitude of the interacted terms are different between samples. 
Specifically, the data set imputed with the basic model only shows a significance effect 
for the interaction between attrition and high school incomplete. Moreover, the estimate 
of the interaction between the indicator of attrition and the gender variable not only 
loses its significance when using the imputed data but the coefficient has the opposite 
sign.  
                                                   
10 A test for the difference in the coefficients between samples was made and only the rural variable is 
significantly different at the 5% significance level between the original data and the basic imputed data set 
for the sample of males; and, the variable of some college or more between the original data and the 
extended imputed data set for the urban sample at the 10% significance level. 
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In this case the extended model, which incorporates migration expectation 
questions, shows more accurate results but still does not replicate perfectly the original 
data for the sample of attritors. This could indicate that including variables potentially 
unobserved in most of the surveys captures better the heterogeneity between tracked 
and non-tracked individuals at the baseline, but not perfectly. When stratifying the 
sample by gender and urban-rural, and focusing on the coefficients of the interaction 
with the attrition indicator, the results show that the extended model is in every case the 
most accurate. We can also infer that the extended model may work better because it 
captures the unobserved heterogeneity between tracked and non-tracked individuals.  
However, for the sample of males and the sample of rural localities, the extended 
imputation model does not replicate the estimates of the original data. For both samples, 
both imputation models, do not properly capture the relationship between education 
and labor market success for the sample of attritors. Although the results in Table 7 
indicate that a multiple imputation strategy is reliable for a model of earnings, the 
results in Table 8 show that the replication is not perfect particularly when focusing on 
the returns to education of the sample who attrited from the survey.  
To sum up, the results in Tables 6 to 8, show that ignoring the sample of attritors 
would bias the estimations on a model of earnings. Both imputation models are 
successful in replicating on average the estimations of the model that uses the original 
data; however, the estimations for the sample of attritors is not perfectly matched, 
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particularly for males and rural areas. In the next sub-section we perform an imputation 
analysis for the earnings in 2005 of individuals who were loss in follow-up and measure 
the bias caused by ignoring the sample of attritors.  
2.5.2 Imputation of Earnings in MxFLS2 
Table 9 presents results for the model of earnings in 2005 using the version of the 
extended model for the multiple imputation. The first column shows the results of the 
earnings model for the sample that was tracked in 2005, the second column shows the 
results for the same sample that additionally includes multiple imputation estimates of 
earnings for the individuals between 21 and 65 that were working in 2002 and were not 
tracked in 2005, and the third column shows the significance of the difference of the 
coefficients between the two samples.  If we rely on our imputation model, the results in 
Table 9 show that without a post-survey adjustment strategy, and relying only on the 
tracked sample the returns of education would be overestimated for females and in 
urban places. However, in previous results we show evidence of the potential 
underestimation in the returns of education for the attritor’s sample in urban places 
when using a multiple imputation strategy. Without information on the attritors’ sample 
in future follow-ups it is not possible to test the assumptions of the different techniques 
to handle missing data. In the next subsection we exploit information on individuals 
who attrited from the MxFLS in 2005 but were found in 2009. We make a contribution to 
the understanding of the potential bias of post-survey adjustments that rely solely on 
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observed characteristics at baseline by comparing the estimates from a model of 
earnings including information of attritors in the 2005 wave who were interviewed in 
2009 with the estimates from a model that imputes missing data for these individuals.   
2.5.3 Imputation of Earnings in MxFLS3 
In this section we compare the distribution of the earnings in 2002 and in 2009 
between two groups, the tracked individuals in both 2005 and 2009, and the non-tracked 
individuals in 2005 but found in 2009.11 Figure 1 shows the distribution of the quartic-
root of earnings, of the entire sample, for these two groups in 2002. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov t-test for equality of the distribution functions fails to reject equality of the 
distribution functions. When we compare the distributions of the quartic-root of 
earnings in 2009 between both groups (Figure 2), the t-test for equality of distributions is 
rejected. While we cannot reject that the distribution of earnings was equal in 2002 for 
both groups, they no longer appear to have similar earnings in 2009, and the distribution 
of the attritors in MxFLS2 is skewed to the right. This might be consistent with the 
previous results that show that more educated individuals are more likely to attrit in 
MxFLS2.  These results persist when stratifying the sample by gender. Figures 3 and 4 
show the results for males and Figures 5 and 6 for females.  
                                                   
11 At  this time, March 2014, for the sample of our interest in this chapter (individuals age 15 and older at 
baseline and interviewed in Mexico in both follow-ups),1,025 out of 2,461 individuals not tracked in 2005 
have been tracked in 2009 (41.64%).  
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Table 10 shows the results of the estimates for a model of earnings for 
individuals age 15 and older at baseline who were active in the labor force at the time of 
the interview in the third wave. For each sub-sample the first column reports the 
estimates using the data collected in the third wave with no imputations; the second 
column, reports the estimates replacing the data of the 2005 attritors with data from a 
multiple imputation strategy; and, the third column reports the significance of the 
difference between the estimators using these two different samples. These results are 
thought to be conservative estimates because, by limiting the imputation process to 
attritors whom we know are actively working in 2009, we are providing the imputation 
model with additional information that the researcher would not actually have. In a real 
world situation, the researcher would not know if the attritors are working in 2009, and 
thus, they would have to either impute the probability that each attritor is participating 
in the labor market or assume that only those working in 2002 remained in the labor 
force in 2009. 
The results suggest that a multiple imputation strategy adjust for attrition for the 
sample of females and individuals living in rural localities; but, the imputed sample 
underestimates significantly the returns to education in urban places.  Even when 
including a rich set of baseline characteristics, including measures of education, in the 
imputation process, it is not enough to replicate the estimates for individuals who live in 
urban places. This is most likely due to the fact that attrition in urban places is 
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particularly high, and is related to unobserved characteristics or changes that cannot be 
captured by simply relying on data collected at baseline. Thus, we find an adjustment 
based solely on baseline characteristics is not able to compensate for attrition for this 
group of individuals. 
 Moreover, even though, the results in Table 10 suggest that a multiple 
imputation strategy might adjust for attrition for females and in rural localities, if the 
additional 60 percent of the 2005 attritors are significantly different from those who were 
interviewed in 2009, the attrition bias still persist and it is impossible to test its selection 
on unobservables. In order to make a contribution to this important discussion, in 2012 
we started a follow-up survey within the third wave on a random sample of attritors. 
Combining information from the respondents tracked before intensive tracking with the 
intensive-tracking random sub-sample, appropriately re-weighted, will yield a uniquely 
rich analytical sample that fully represents the Mexican population who were living in 
Mexico in 2002. These data will be used to rigorously test whether attrition is ignorable 
by assessing whether attrition is explained by characteristics at baseline and, 
importantly, changes in the lives of respondents that occurred since the baseline 
interview. Standard post survey adjustments that are intended to take attrition into 
account will be rigorously evaluated. These include reweighting and multiple 
imputation methods.  
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2.6 Conclusions 
The consequences of non-response are a relevant issue in any study that relies on 
household and individual level data. Longitudinal surveys may suffer from attrition if 
the targeted respondents are not reached in subsequent waves. Ignoring attrition or 
performing corrections based solely on observed characteristics may bias the estimations 
when attrition is selected on unobserved attributes that are correlated with the outcome 
of interest. 
In the first wave of the MxFLS the attrition rate was nearly 11%. In terms of 
characteristics measured at baseline, attritors are significantly different from those who 
are interviewed in the first follow-up. These differences extend to, for example, 
expectations about the future and thoughts about migrating in the future; which are not 
included in most models of attrition. This evidence suggests that attrition may not be 
ignorable in Rubin’s sense. Experiments with models of earnings functions estimated on 
the baseline sample indicate that coefficient estimates are biased if those who attrit are 
excluded from the baseline sample. Moreover, although on average a multiple 
imputation strategy seems to be a successful strategy to adjust for this attrition bias in 
the context of models of earnings, when focusing on the estimates of the sample of 
attritors, the multiple imputation underestimates the returns to education particularly 
for males and in urban places. The limitations of a post-survey adjustment that relies 
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only on observed characteristics at baseline is also evidenced when exploiting 
information of the 2005 attritors that were found and interviewed in the third wave.    
Future work using the results of an innovative strategy that conducts and 
intensive tracking on a random sample of attritors will identify cost-effective ways to 
find and interview the hardest to find respondents as well as provide rigorous evidence 
on the most effective empirical methods for reducing the costs of attrition in behavioral 
models.  
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2.7 Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Attrition Rates 
 
Panel A.  
TRACKING 2002-2005 # % # %
Eligible for survey (total sample 2002) 35,677 23,803
Died between Waves 543 525
Eligible to be tracked of whom 35,134 23,278
Total Found 31,338 89.20 20,652 88.72
Found in original HH 29,293 83.38 19,165 82.33
Found in new HH 1,271 3.62 929 3.99
Found in US 774 2.20 558 2.40
Not Found 3,796 10.80 2,615 11.23
Individual not found 688 1.96 515 2.21
Original household not tracked 3,108 8.85 2,100 9.02
New entrants 4,529 4,529
Total Sample 2005 39,663 100 27,807 100
Panel B.
TRACKING 2002-2005 # % # %
Eligible for survey (total sample 2002) 35,677 23,803
Died between Waves 543 525
Eligible to be tracked of whom 35,134 23,278
Found with interview 30,050 85.53 19,780 84.97
Non proxy 27,497 78.26 17,514 75.24
Proxy 2,553 7.27 2,266 9.73
Found without interview 1,288 3.67 870 3.74
Not Found 3,796 10.80 2,615 11.23
New entrants 4,529 4,529
Total Sample 2005 39,663 100 27,807 100
All Age >=15 
All Age >=15 
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Table 2: Characteristics Lost vs. Found Age 15+ 
 
Variables measured in 2002 Lost Found
Basic demographics
Age 33.53 38.54 -.501 **
% female 51.63 52.77 -1.14
Years of Education
Respondent 8.66 6.70 1.97 **
Father 5.79 3.43 2.36 **
Mother 4.94 3.01 1.93 **
Height 160.33 158.53 1.80 **
Cognitive Score 6.63 5.87 0.76 **
% married 63.28 69.03 -5.75 **
Household resources 0.00
% HH owns farm business 7.61 23.48 -15.86 **
% HH own no farm business 15.54 15.69 -0.15
% HH owns house 49.98 70.38 -20.40 **
Per capita expenditure1 1,941 1,415 525 **
Wealth1 1,317,446 667,707 649,740 **
Household size 4.51 4.96 -0.45 **
Household composition 0.00
Number of coresident children 1.14 1.43 -0.30 **
% at least one coresident parent 32.06 33.34 -1.28
% both parents dead 13.85 22.35 -8.50 **
Health 0.00
% relative health status: better 36.60 33.95 2.65 *
% relative health status: same 59.01 58.98 0.04
% relative health status: worse 4.39 7.07 -2.69 **
% ever visited hospital/clinic 16.13 16.78 -0.64
% hypertension 34.82 38.98 -4.16 **
BMI 26.50 26.89 -0.39 **
Labor 0.00
% worked last week 60.72 54.67 6.04 **
% worked for payment 57.47 51.09 6.37 **
% peasant in own plot 0.92 3.88 -2.96 **
% unpaid 3.06 3.45 -0.40
% non agricultural employee 41.27 29.73 11.54 **
% agricultural employee 2.72 5.50 -2.79 **
% employer 2.23 2.63 -0.40
% self-employed 10.33 9.35 0.98
1. Earnings in pesos of 2002 (9.56 pesos/US dollars)
Continue on next page
Difference 
(Lost-Found)
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Variables measured in 2002 Lost Found
Earnings Last 12 Months1 22,771 14,658 8,113 **
Earnings Last 12 Months - Self Employed 43,223 26,083 17,140 **
Earnings Last 12 Months -Employee 45,208 31,562 13,647 **
Earnings Last 12 Months - Excluding Unpaid 26,103 15,684 10,419 **
# hours worked regular week 45.58 43.76 1.81 **
Locality characteristics
Rural 16.37 42.91 -26.55 **
Integration to community 0.00
% know person/institution to borrow 37.43 33.78 3.65 **
% received income from Progresa 5.35 17.46 -12.11 **
% received income from Procampo 2.61 11.27 -8.66 **
% activities outside HH 20.90 14.36 6.55 **
% take care of elder or sick people 32.89 29.74 3.15 **
Migration 0.00
% moved by age 12 27.78 23.46 4.32 **
% thought about migrating 25.74 16.22 9.52 **
Quality of life/Expectations 0.00
% life has improved 39.88 31.86 8.02 **
% life has remained the same 52.20 59.56 -7.36 **
% life has worsen 7.92 8.58 -0.65
% a lot of fear of being assualted during day time 8.31 6.28 2.02 **
% a lot of fear of being assualted during night time 12.32 10.05 2.27 **
% positive probability of being victim of assualt 24.48 18.78 5.70 **
% has been a victim of assaults 17.33 11.07 6.26 **
% in neighborhood: gangs 29.19 26.03 3.15 **
% in neighborhood: cooperative neighbors 10.79 10.42 0.37
% in neighborhood: paramilitaries 5.44 4.78 0.66
% in neighborhood: militaries 5.57 5.80 -0.24
% in neighborhood: neighbors with guns 3.44 5.40 -1.96 **
% in neighborhood: robbery 21.53 18.24 3.29 **
% in neighborhood: insecurity 9.85 7.15 2.70 **
Emotional Status 6.53 7.11 -0.58 **
Observations 2,615 20,652
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Earnings in pesos of 2002 (9.56 pesos/US dollars)
Difference 
(Lost-Found)
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Table 3: Characteristics Lost vs. Found - By Gender Age 15+ 
 
Variables measured in 2002 Lost Found Lost Found
Basic demographics
Age 33.54 38.48 -4.94 ** 33.53 38.61 -5.08 **
% female
Years of Education 8.38 6.75 1.63 ** 8.93 7.10 1.83 **
Respondent 8.30 6.46 1.84 ** 9.05 6.96 2.09 **
Father 5.79 3.39 2.40 ** 5.79 3.47 2.33 **
Mother 4.86 2.95 1.91 ** 5.03 3.08 1.95 **
Height 155.00 152.93 2.07 ** 166.86 165.51 1.35 **
Cognitive Score 6.47 5.70 0.77 ** 6.81 6.08 0.73 **
% married 63.62 71.26 -7.64 ** 62.92 66.54 -3.62 *
Household resources
% HH owns farm business 6.95 22.63 -15.68 ** 8.31 24.42 -16.11 **
% HH own no farm business 50.48 70.30 -19.82 ** 49.45 70.46 -21.02 **
% HH owns house 15.01 15.69 -0.68 16.10 15.70 0.40
Per capita expenditure1 1,935 1,408 526 ** 1,947 1,423 524 **
Wealth1 1,440,725 695,909 744,816 * 1,189,086 636,180 552,906 +
Household size 4.54 4.94 -0.39 ** 4.48 4.99 -0.51 **
Household composition
Number of coresident children 1.19 1.51 -0.32 ** 1.08 1.35 -0.27 **
% at least one coresident parent 29.73 30.56 -0.82 34.56 36.54 -1.98
% both parents dead 14.50 22.29 -7.80 ** 13.15 22.42 -9.27 **
Health 
% relative health status: better 35.67 32.59 3.07 * 37.74 35.65 2.09
% relative health status: same 59.11 58.77 0.35 58.89 59.24 -0.35
% relative health status: worse 5.22 8.64 -3.42 ** 3.37 5.11 -1.74 *
% ever visited hospital/clinic 20.69 21.15 -0.46 10.58 11.30 -0.72
% hypertension 26.38 31.29 -4.91 ** 45.55 48.81 -3.25
BMI 26.80 27.47 -0.67 ** 26.13 26.16 -0.04
Labor
% worked last week 43.56 33.41 10.16 ** 79.29 79.08 0.22
% worked for payment 40.21 30.15 10.05 ** 76.16 75.11 1.05
% peasant in own plot 0.09 0.41 -0.32 1.82 7.86 -6.04 **
% unpaid 3.26 3.21 0.06 2.83 3.73 -0.91
% non agricultural employee 29.38 19.64 9.74 ** 54.14 41.29 12.85 **
% agricultural employee 0.93 1.09 -0.16 4.65 10.56 -5.92 **
% employer 1.59 1.90 -0.31 2.93 3.47 -0.54
% self-employed 8.21 7.11 1.10 12.63 11.92 0.70
1. Earnings in pesos of 2002 (9.56 pesos/US dollars)
Continue on next page
Difference 
(Lost-Found)
Female
Difference 
(Lost-Found)
Male
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Variables measured in 2002 Lost Found Lost Found
Earnings Last 12 Months1 10,428 6,952 3,476 ** 37,800 23,970 13,829 **
Earnings Last 12 Months - Self Employed 24,307 16,263 8,045 + 55,060 30,604 24,456 **
Earnings Last 12 Months -Employee 32,444 27,828 4,616 52,544 33,305 19,240 **
Earnings Last 12 Months - Excluding Unpaid 12,512 7,488 5,024 ** 41,195 25,447 15,748 **
# hours worked regular week 40.41 37.86 2.55 * 48.66 46.69 1.97 **
Locality characteristics
Rural 16.30 42.30 -26.00 ** 16.51 43.39 -26.88 **
Integration to community 
% know person/institution to borrow 32.22 29.34 2.87 + 43.80 39.33 4.47 *
% received income from Progresa 5.76 17.69 -11.93 ** 4.92 17.19 -12.27 **
% received income from Procampo 2.80 10.98 -8.18 ** 2.41 11.60 -9.18 **
% activities outside HH 14.23 9.60 4.62 ** 29.15 20.31 8.84 **
% take care of elder or sick people 44.98 42.15 2.83 + 17.96 14.21 3.75 **
Migration
% moved by age 12 27.26 23.17 4.09 ** 28.41 23.82 4.59 **
% thought about migrating 23.58 15.48 8.10 ** 28.41 17.14 11.27 **
Quality of life/Expectations
% life has improved 38.91 32.93 5.97 ** 41.08 30.52 10.56 **
% life has remained the same 53.13 58.13 -4.99 ** 51.05 61.36 -10.32 **
% life has worsen 7.96 8.94 -0.98 7.87 8.12 -0.25
% a lot of fear of being assualted during day time 11.54 9.20 2.34 * 4.31 2.63 1.67 **
% a lot of fear of being assualted during night time 16.62 14.34 2.28 + 7.01 4.67 2.34 **
% positive probability of being victim of assualt 24.98 18.86 6.12 ** 23.86 18.69 5.18 **
% has been a victim of assaults 13.63 7.86 5.77 ** 21.89 15.09 6.80 **
% in neighborhood: gangs 30.42 26.49 3.93 ** 27.88 25.52 2.36 +
% in neighborhood: cooperative neighbors 10.08 10.25 -0.16 11.53 10.61 0.91
% in neighborhood: paramilitaries 5.59 4.75 0.84 5.27 4.81 0.47
% in neighborhood: militaries 5.25 5.71 -0.45 5.90 5.91 -0.01
% in neighborhood: neighbors with guns 3.14 5.56 -2.42 ** 3.75 5.21 -1.46 *
% in neighborhood: robbery 21.95 18.54 3.41 ** 21.09 17.90 3.19 **
% in neighborhood: insecurity 10.41 7.15 3.26 ** 9.25 7.15 2.10 *
Emotional Status 8.12 8.86 -0.74 * 4.74 5.06 -0.32
Observations 1,353 10,942 1,262 9,710
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Earnings in pesos of 2002 (9.56 pesos/US dollars)
Male
Difference 
(Lost-Found)
Difference 
(Lost-Found)
Female
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Table 4: Probability of Attrition - Basic Logit Model Age15+ 
 
Variables measured in 2002 All Female Male Rural Urban
Basic demographics 
(1) Age>15 0.990+ 0.984* 0.996 0.986 0.99
[0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.012] [0.007]
(1) Age>36 0.99 0.998 0.978+ 0.976 0.993
[0.011] [0.015] [0.012] [0.023] [0.012]
(1) Age>58 0.999 0.992 1.005 0.999 1.004
[0.013] [0.018] [0.020] [0.039] [0.015]
(1) Age>80 1.108** 1.099* 1.130* 1.117 1.110**
[0.036] [0.045] [0.069] [0.089] [0.045]
(1) Female 1.143* 1.252 1.113+
[0.062] [0.199] [0.066]
Respondent's Education
(1) Primary complete1 0.955 0.985 0.909 0.799 0.962
[0.090] [0.127] [0.114] [0.123] [0.109]
(1) High school incomplete 1.039 0.982 1.072 0.772 1.094
[0.099] [0.148] [0.118] [0.124] [0.124]
(1) High school complete 1.275+ 1.008 1.540** 0.951 1.329*
[0.164] [0.165] [0.244] [0.279] [0.188]
(1) Some college or more 1.344** 1.176 1.456* 1.152 1.395**
[0.148] [0.187] [0.236] [0.347] [0.172]
Father's Education
(1) Primary complete1 1.086 0.984 1.218+ 1.306 1.051
[0.101] [0.123] [0.134] [0.220] [0.120]
(1) High school incomplete 1.320** 1.258+ 1.391* 0.963 1.401**
[0.133] [0.170] [0.190] [0.290] [0.156]
(1) High school complete 1.587** 1.334 1.846** 3.365** 1.510*
[0.283] [0.329] [0.363] [1.166] [0.293]
(1) Some college or more 1.703** 1.919** 1.478+ 1.214 1.767**
[0.242] [0.317] [0.309] [0.565] [0.267]
Zscore Raven's test 0.957 0.998 0.913+ 0.914 0.966
[0.034] [0.045] [0.045] [0.071] [0.039]
Height (cm) 1.008* 1.010+ 1.001 1.012 1.007
[0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.004]
(1) Married 1.049 0.995 1.2 1.611* 0.917
[0.096] [0.110] [0.159] [0.337] [0.094]
Household characteristics 
(1) Own farm business 0.811 0.723+ 0.921 0.666+ 0.999
[0.139] [0.132] [0.187] [0.149] [0.246]
(1) Own house 0.442** 0.432** 0.453** 0.745+ 0.382**
[0.039] [0.043] [0.045] [0.114] [0.039]
(1) Own non-farm business 0.853 0.862 0.834 0.903 0.847
[0.097] [0.108] [0.101] [0.213] [0.107]
(1) Quartile 2 PCE2 0.815 0.831 0.806 0.756 0.848
[0.117] [0.141] [0.115] [0.152] [0.169]
(1) Quartile 3 PCE 0.874 0.899 0.859 0.534* 0.999
[0.114] [0.137] [0.119] [0.142] [0.168]
(1) Quartile 4 PCE 1.202 1.205 1.207 0.735 1.36
[0.189] [0.230] [0.197] [0.230] [0.269]
Basic Model
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Variables measured in 2002 All Female Male Rural Urban
(1) Quartile 2 pc wealth2 0.697** 0.687** 0.698** 0.946 0.638**
[0.086] [0.098] [0.090] [0.199] [0.099]
(1) Quartile 3 pc wealth 0.578** 0.560** 0.587** 0.696 0.561**
[0.079] [0.091] [0.081] [0.176] [0.087]
(1) Quartile 4 pc wealth 0.726* 0.745* 0.693** 0.736 0.738*
[0.094] [0.111] [0.095] [0.225] [0.114]
Household size 0.991 1.02 0.962 0.959 1.006
[0.026] [0.030] [0.027] [0.041] [0.031]
Household composition 
Number of children in the same dwelling 0.885** 0.869** 0.898* 0.715** 0.938
[0.034] [0.037] [0.042] [0.051] [0.041]
(1) At least one parent coresident 0.707** 0.606** 0.795* 0.783 0.677**
[0.055] [0.070] [0.092] [0.145] [0.062]
(1) Both parents dead 0.967 0.938 0.991 1.097 0.963
[0.085] [0.129] [0.122] [0.244] [0.091]
Health 
(1) Relative GHS better 0.942 0.95 0.929 0.93 0.944
[0.058] [0.081] [0.074] [0.123] [0.064]
(1) Relative GHS worse 0.845 0.759+ 1.032 0.621 0.915
[0.098] [0.111] [0.231] [0.183] [0.116]
(1) Hypertension 0.956 0.944 0.941 1.025 0.953
[0.065] [0.086] [0.108] [0.146] [0.077]
Labor market
(1) Work for pay 1.221 1.002 1.208 1.505 1.176
[0.199] [0.301] [0.274] [0.546] [0.219]
(1) Quartile 2 earnings last month2 1.559 0.698 2.574* 1.463 1.578
[0.489] [0.379] [1.110] [0.789] [0.601]
(1) Quartile 3 earnings last month 0.759+ 1.137 0.583* 0.717 0.78
[0.119] [0.310] [0.128] [0.183] [0.149]
(1) Quartile 4 earnings last month 0.852 1.273 0.667+ 0.96 0.82
[0.140] [0.355] [0.146] [0.288] [0.163]
Hours worked/week 1.004+ 1.004 1.004+ 1.007 1.003
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
Locality Characteristics
Rural 0.426** 0.325** 0.545*
[0.075] [0.040] [0.148]
Constant 0.032** 0.046** 0.070* 0.005** 0.022**
[0.021] [0.037] [0.077] [0.008] [0.014]
Number of observations 22,829 11,825 10,361 8,866 13,963
ll -6,722 -3,449 -3,199 -1,460 -5,192
R-squared 0.171 0.177 0.166 0.147 0.141
1. Omitted category: Primay incomplete
2. Omitted category: Quartile 1
Municipality Fixed Effects
Standard errors in brackets (adjusted for clusters at municipality level)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Basic Model
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Table 5: Probability of Attrition - Extended Logit Model Age15+ 
 
Variables measured in 2002 All Female Male Rural Urban
Basic demographics 
(1) Age>15 0.990+ 0.984* 0.996 0.987 0.99
[0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.012] [0.007]
(1) Age>36 0.99 0.998 0.979+ 0.975 0.993
[0.011] [0.015] [0.012] [0.023] [0.012]
(1) Age>58 0.999 0.991 1.006 1.001 1.004
[0.014] [0.018] [0.020] [0.038] [0.015]
(1) Age>80 1.107** 1.103* 1.124+ 1.109 1.110*
[0.036] [0.045] [0.069] [0.088] [0.045]
(1) Female 1.161** 1.289 1.125+
[0.067] [0.212] [0.071]
Respondent's Education
(1) Primary complete1 0.949 0.977 0.907 0.801 0.958
[0.089] [0.125] [0.111] [0.124] [0.108]
(1) High school incomplete 1.035 0.98 1.067 0.77 1.1
[0.098] [0.147] [0.119] [0.125] [0.124]
(1) High school complete 1.269+ 1.003 1.551** 0.946 1.333*
[0.163] [0.166] [0.250] [0.289] [0.189]
(1) Some college or more 1.307* 1.147 1.411* 1.125 1.363*
[0.147] [0.186] [0.232] [0.346] [0.172]
Father's Education
(1) Primary complete1 1.079 0.976 1.215+ 1.297 1.044
[0.099] [0.123] [0.133] [0.216] [0.117]
(1) High school incomplete 1.303** 1.254 1.385* 0.945 1.389**
[0.131] [0.175] [0.186] [0.296] [0.154]
(1) High school complete 1.569* 1.308 1.853** 3.276** 1.489*
[0.281] [0.322] [0.361] [1.164] [0.292]
(1) Some college or more 1.659** 1.883** 1.444+ 1.138 1.719**
[0.236] [0.319] [0.303] [0.563] [0.259]
Zscore Raven's test 0.953 0.993 0.911+ 0.909 0.966
[0.034] [0.045] [0.044] [0.072] [0.040]
Height (cm) 1.008+ 1.010+ 1.002 1.012 1.007
[0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.004]
(1) Married 1.059 1.005 1.207 1.613* 0.93
[0.098] [0.110] [0.161] [0.339] [0.096]
Household characteristics 
(1) Own farm business 0.809 0.724+ 0.917 0.658+ 0.998
[0.139] [0.131] [0.187] [0.146] [0.244]
(1) Own house 0.443** 0.434** 0.454** 0.757+ 0.382**
[0.039] [0.043] [0.045] [0.118] [0.038]
(1) Own non-farm business 0.862 0.87 0.842 0.892 0.86
[0.098] [0.109] [0.102] [0.208] [0.108]
(1) Quartile 2 PCE2 0.817 0.837 0.811 0.745 0.855
[0.118] [0.143] [0.116] [0.151] [0.170]
(1) Quartile 3 PCE 0.879 0.912 0.861 0.524* 1.018
[0.114] [0.141] [0.118] [0.139] [0.170]
(1) Quartile 4 PCE 1.205 1.216 1.211 0.724 1.381
[0.190] [0.233] [0.197] [0.227] [0.272]
(1) Quartile 2 pc wealth2 0.700** 0.686** 0.703** 0.939 0.646**
[0.085] [0.097] [0.089] [0.201] [0.099]
(1) Quartile 3 pc wealth 0.583** 0.562** 0.594** 0.697 0.567**
[0.079] [0.090] [0.081] [0.177] [0.087]
(1) Quartile 4 pc wealth 0.726* 0.739* 0.696** 0.724 0.737*
[0.093] [0.110] [0.094] [0.220] [0.113]
Household size 0.992 1.021 0.963 0.959 1.008
[0.026] [0.030] [0.028] [0.041] [0.031]
Extended Model
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Variables measured in 2002 All Female Male Rural Urban
Household composition 
Number of children in the same dwelling 0.886** 0.872** 0.899* 0.712** 0.94
[0.034] [0.037] [0.043] [0.052] [0.041]
(1) At least one parent coresident 0.700** 0.602** 0.785* 0.781 0.666**
[0.054] [0.070] [0.092] [0.142] [0.061]
(1) Both parents dead 0.965 0.928 1.001 1.104 0.957
[0.086] [0.130] [0.123] [0.247] [0.092]
Health 
(1) Relative GHS better 0.94 0.948 0.933 0.925 0.945
[0.057] [0.078] [0.073] [0.121] [0.062]
(1) Relative GHS worse 0.856 0.763+ 1.041 0.602+ 0.938
[0.096] [0.110] [0.226] [0.182] [0.113]
(1) Hypertension 0.959 0.949 0.943 1.034 0.958
[0.065] [0.086] [0.108] [0.147] [0.076]
Labor market
(1) Work for pay 1.212 0.983 1.217 1.497 1.17
[0.198] [0.297] [0.276] [0.553] [0.218]
(1) Quartile 2 earnings last month 1.516 0.668 2.574* 1.487 1.516
[0.477] [0.360] [1.118] [0.823] [0.576]
(1) Quartile 3 earnings last month 0.771+ 1.158 0.586* 0.71 0.8
[0.121] [0.313] [0.129] [0.187] [0.151]
(1) Quartile 4  earnings last month 0.862 1.305 0.664+ 0.952 0.832
[0.142] [0.362] [0.145] [0.289] [0.165]
Hours worked/week 1.004+ 1.004 1.004+ 1.006 1.003
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
Migration
(1) Moved before age 12 1.07 1.091 1.054 1.094 1.047
[0.077] [0.087] [0.110] [0.163] [0.087]
(1) Thought about moving in the future 1.277** 1.264* 1.304** 1.084 1.337**
[0.117] [0.148] [0.129] [0.179] [0.145]
Integration to community
(1) Know person/institution to borrow 0.966 0.902 1.464 0.886
[0.060] [0.111] [0.359] [0.084]
(1) Activities outside the household 1.066 1.029 1.187
[0.073] [0.118] [0.217]
Subjective quality of life 
(1) Feel unsafe in neighborhood 0.988 1.083 0.9 0.944 0.964
[0.137] [0.166] [0.142] [0.427] [0.141]
(1) Quartile 2 emotional status 1.001 0.986 1.031 1.109 0.972
[0.072] [0.098] [0.097] [0.181] [0.081]
(1) Quartile 3 emotional status 0.929 0.938 0.919 0.863 0.95
[0.077] [0.123] [0.096] [0.138] [0.097]
(1) Quartile 4 emotional status 0.974 0.951 1.07 1.037 0.936
[0.085] [0.109] [0.146] [0.203] [0.097]
Locality Characteristics
(1) Rural 0.423** 0.319** 0.544*
[0.075] [0.039] [0.151]
Constant 0.032** 0.045** 0.064* 0.004** 0.024**
[0.021] [0.036] [0.073] [0.007] [0.015]
Number of observations 22829 11825 10361 8866 13963
Chi-Squared -6705 -3436 -3190 -1455 -5174
R-squared 0.173 0.18 0.168 0.15 0.144
1. Omitted category: Primay incomplete
2. Omitted category: Quartile 1
Municipality  Fixed Effects
Standard errors in brackets (adjusted for clusters at municipality level)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Extended Model
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Table 6: Quartic-root of Earnings in 2002 with Interactions - Age [21-65] 
Variables measured in 2002 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Age>21 0.033** 0.032** 0.045** 0.041* 0.027* 0.027* 0.026 0.027 0.037** 0.036**
[0.008] [0.009] [0.015] [0.016] [0.010] [0.011] [0.016] [0.017] [0.010] [0.010]
Age>32 -0.018 -0.018 -0.009 0.003 -0.016 -0.021 -0.026 -0.027 -0.012 -0.009
[0.014] [0.015] [0.026] [0.027] [0.015] [0.017] [0.024] [0.026] [0.016] [0.018]
Age>43 -0.035* -0.038* -0.052+ -0.069* -0.030+ -0.026 -0.018 -0.015 -0.041* -0.049**
[0.015] [0.016] [0.027] [0.028] [0.018] [0.019] [0.029] [0.030] [0.016] [0.018]
Age>54 -0.048* -0.044+ -0.034 -0.025 -0.056* -0.053+ -0.033 -0.037 -0.067** -0.058+
[0.022] [0.024] [0.046] [0.050] [0.026] [0.029] [0.040] [0.040] [0.025] [0.031]
Female -0.929** -0.959** -0.865** -0.890** -0.970** -1.010**
[0.058] [0.061] [0.097] [0.100] [0.072] [0.077]
Education
(1) Primary complete OG (Primary incomplete) -0.201 -0.214 0.195 0.186 -0.229 -0.225 0.07 0.112 -0.342+ -0.378*
[0.179] [0.173] [0.131] [0.131] [0.143] [0.137] [0.106] [0.114] [0.196] [0.179]
(1) High school incomplete 0.111 0.079 0.685** 0.707** 0.046 0.013 0.360* 0.362* 0.045 0.013
[0.201] [0.202] [0.122] [0.133] [0.162] [0.163] [0.141] [0.148] [0.201] [0.196]
(1) High school complete 0.209 0.189 0.943** 1.002** 0.108 0.081 0.563* 0.706** 0.177 0.139
[0.267] [0.248] [0.151] [0.171] [0.244] [0.212] [0.229] [0.240] [0.244] [0.206]
(1) Some college or more 1.216** 1.181** 2.050** 2.086** 1.001** 0.960** 1.461** 1.473** 1.171** 1.138**
[0.230] [0.237] [0.138] [0.153] [0.190] [0.194] [0.242] [0.246] [0.222] [0.223]
Married 0.092 0.097 -0.333** -0.322** 0.385** 0.398** 0.166 0.146 0.058 0.072
[0.067] [0.067] [0.114] [0.118] [0.079] [0.081] [0.113] [0.115] [0.077] [0.075]
Rural -0.955** -0.953** -0.841* -0.824* -0.997** -1.004**
[0.269] [0.267] [0.349] [0.360] [0.260] [0.258]
Lost -0.884 -0.763 -1.135
[0.809] [0.861] [0.910]
Age>21*Lost 0.008 0.039 -0.003 -0.006 0.009
[0.025] [0.042] [0.029] [0.061] [0.027]
Age>32*Lost 0 -0.094 0.038 0.011 -0.01
[0.040] [0.080] [0.051] [0.102] [0.046]
Age>43*Lost 0.032 0.101 -0.017 -0.065 0.06
[0.054] [0.083] [0.074] [0.147] [0.061]
Age>54*Lost -0.05 0.159 -0.043 0.104 -0.062
[0.083] [0.182] [0.101] [0.222] [0.092]
Female*Lost 0.268+ -0.436 0.471 0.294+
[0.145] [1.244] [0.399] [0.154]
Education*Lost
(1) Primary complete*Lost OG (Primary incomplete) 0.476 0.058 0.46 -0.875+ 1.010**
[0.323] [0.482] [0.305] [0.463] [0.356]
(1) High school incomplete*Lost 0.660* -0.221 0.822* -0.09 0.953*
[0.332] [0.445] [0.332] [0.405] [0.366]
(1) High school complete*Lost 0.621 -0.507 0.904* -1.946** 1.051**
[0.384] [0.591] [0.404] [0.702] [0.366]
(1) Some college or more*Lost 0.643+ -0.391 0.875* -0.173 0.923*
[0.361] [0.379] [0.384] [0.564] [0.383]
Married*Lost -0.04 -0.16 -0.08 0.355 -0.116
[0.190] [0.246] [0.238] [0.423] [0.209]
Rural*Lost 0.194 0.033 0.284 0.328
[0.206] [0.377] [0.232] [1.512]
Constant 6.258** 6.310** 3.961** 4.010** 5.670** 5.681** 4.352** 4.325** 6.190** 6.215**
[0.294] [0.317] [0.531] [0.564] [0.389] [0.411] [0.446] [0.482] [0.304] [0.331]
Observations 9,328 9,328 3,011 3,011 6,317 6,317 3,411 3,411 5,917 5,917
R-squared 24.47 24.47 27.7 27.7 24.39 24.39 20.16 20.16 19.97 19.97
F-statistic 60.07 33.18 30.59 21.06 30.00 18.49 13.49 10.58 58.92 34.24
Municipality Fixed Effects
Standard errors in brackets (adjusted for clusters at municipality level)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
All MalesFemales Rural Urban
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Table 7: Original and Imputed Models - Quartic-root of Earnings in 2002- Age [21-65] 
Variables measured in 2002 Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended
Age>21 0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 0.045** 0.046** 0.046** 0.027* 0.027* 0.027* 0.026 0.028+ 0.028+ 0.037** 0.037** 0.037**
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Age>32 -0.018 -0.023 -0.023+ -0.009 -0.013 -0.011 -0.016 -0.023 -0.023 -0.026 -0.028 -0.027 -0.012 -0.019 -0.018
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.015] [0.018] [0.017] [0.024] [0.026] [0.026] [0.016] [0.018] [0.017]
Age>43 -0.035* -0.032* -0.033* -0.052+ -0.053+ -0.057+ -0.030+ -0.023 -0.023 -0.018 -0.014 -0.014 -0.041* -0.039* -0.042*
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.027] [0.031] [0.033] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.016] [0.018] [0.019]
Age>54 -0.048* -0.044* -0.042+ -0.034 -0.034 -0.031 -0.056* -0.051+ -0.050+ -0.033 -0.041 -0.042 -0.067** -0.053+ -0.049
[0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.046] [0.051] [0.053] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.040] [0.038] [0.038] [0.025] [0.030] [0.033]
Female -0.929** -0.963** -0.964** -0.865** -0.918** -0.915** -0.970** -0.994** -0.997**
[0.058] [0.058] [0.059] [0.097] [0.100] [0.100] [0.072] [0.070] [0.072]
Education
(1) Primary complete OG (Primary incompleted) -0.201 -0.207 -0.209 0.195 0.189 0.193 -0.229 -0.228 -0.229 0.07 0.103 0.103 -0.342+ -0.358+ -0.359+
[0.179] [0.176] [0.177] [0.131] [0.123] [0.127] [0.143] [0.144] [0.145] [0.106] [0.117] [0.117] [0.196] [0.186] [0.187]
(1) High school incomplete 0.111 0.092 0.089 0.685** 0.700** 0.701** 0.046 0.019 0.016 0.360* 0.360* 0.362* 0.045 0.026 0.021
[0.201] [0.207] [0.209] [0.122] [0.127] [0.129] [0.162] [0.173] [0.173] [0.141] [0.147] [0.147] [0.201] [0.207] [0.209]
(1) High school complete 0.209 0.228 0.241 0.943** 0.959** 0.982** 0.108 0.124 0.135 0.563* 0.628** 0.646** 0.177 0.19 0.202
[0.267] [0.248] [0.249] [0.151] [0.161] [0.170] [0.244] [0.219] [0.218] [0.229] [0.234] [0.237] [0.244] [0.218] [0.218]
(1) Some college or more 1.216** 1.185** 1.187** 2.050** 2.005** 2.021** 1.001** 0.983** 0.980** 1.461** 1.465** 1.458** 1.171** 1.139** 1.142**
[0.230] [0.237] [0.236] [0.138] [0.162] [0.160] [0.190] [0.202] [0.201] [0.242] [0.244] [0.244] [0.222] [0.229] [0.227]
Married 0.092 0.113 0.104 -0.333** -0.264* -0.278* 0.385** 0.376** 0.371** 0.166 0.101 0.098 0.058 0.125 0.113
[0.067] [0.078] [0.072] [0.114] [0.128] [0.127] [0.079] [0.089] [0.082] [0.113] [0.110] [0.108] [0.077] [0.090] [0.083]
Rural -0.955** -0.977** -0.969** -0.841* -0.981** -0.961* -0.997** -0.966** -0.964**
[0.269] [0.254] [0.254] [0.349] [0.372] [0.369] [0.260] [0.233] [0.231]
Constant 6.258** 5.637** 5.639** 3.961** 3.985** 3.980** 5.670** 5.651** 5.657** 4.352** 4.733** 4.742** 6.190** 6.112** 6.178**
[0.294] [0.375] [0.365] [0.531] [0.554] [0.551] [0.389] [0.406] [0.397] [0.446] [0.444] [0.440] [0.304] [0.474] [0.469]
Observations 9,328 9,328 9328 3,011 3,011 3011 6,317 6,317 6317 3,411 3,411 3411 5,917 5,917 5917
R-squared 24.47 25.22 25.43 27.70 28.07 28.42 24.39 24.74 24.93 20.16 20.67 20.69 19.97 20.89 21.20
F-statistic 60.07 56.5 57.4 30.59 28.07 29.37 30.00 20.92 23.36 13.49 13.98 13.9 58.92 58.66 60.23
Municipality Fixed Effects
Standard errors in brackets (adjusted for clusters at municipality level)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
F-statistic for hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are equal to zero
All Females Males Rural Urban
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Table 8: Original and Imputed Models with Interactions - Quartic-root of Earnings in 2002- Age [21-65] 
 
 
 
 
Variables measured in 2002 Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended
Age>21 0.032** 0.031** 0.031** 0.041* 0.043* 0.042* 0.027* 0.025* 0.026* 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.036** 0.035** 0.035**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Age>32 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.021 -0.019 -0.02 -0.027 -0.025 -0.025 -0.009 -0.01 -0.01
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
Age>43 -0.038* -0.037* -0.038* -0.069* -0.062* -0.063* -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.049** -0.048** -0.049**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
Age>54 -0.044+ -0.043+ -0.042+ -0.025 -0.036 -0.035 -0.053+ -0.048+ -0.048+ -0.037 -0.039 -0.039 -0.058+ -0.052+ -0.051
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.050] [0.048] [0.048] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031]
Female -0.959** -0.956** -0.956** -0.890** -0.899** -0.900** -1.010** -0.998** -0.997**
[0.061] [0.058] [0.058] [0.100] [0.100] [0.100] [0.077] [0.073] [0.074]
Education
(1) Primary complete OG (Primary incompleted) -0.214 -0.219 -0.218 0.186 0.168 0.167 -0.225 -0.224 -0.223 0.112 0.099 0.1 -0.378* -0.381* -0.380*
[0.173] [0.169] [0.169] [0.131] [0.128] [0.129] [0.137] [0.136] [0.136] [0.114] [0.114] [0.113] [0.179] [0.176] [0.176]
(1) High school incomplete 0.079 0.082 0.083 0.707** 0.691** 0.689** 0.013 0.022 0.023 0.362* 0.351* 0.351* 0.013 0.019 0.021
[0.202] [0.199] [0.199] [0.133] [0.131] [0.131] [0.163] [0.164] [0.164] [0.148] [0.151] [0.151] [0.196] [0.196] [0.196]
(1) High school complete 0.189 0.171 0.171 1.002** 0.939** 0.938** 0.081 0.066 0.065 0.706** 0.618* 0.617* 0.139 0.135 0.134
[0.248] [0.241] [0.241] [0.171] [0.169] [0.169] [0.212] [0.210] [0.210] [0.240] [0.244] [0.244] [0.206] [0.203] [0.203]
(1) Some college or more 1.181** 1.166** 1.164** 2.086** 2.037** 2.029** 0.960** 0.953** 0.951** 1.473** 1.454** 1.455** 1.138** 1.123** 1.119**
[0.237] [0.233] [0.232] [0.153] [0.151] [0.151] [0.194] [0.193] [0.193] [0.246] [0.250] [0.250] [0.223] [0.220] [0.220]
Married 0.097 0.092 0.091 -0.322** -0.319** -0.319** 0.398** 0.385** 0.383** 0.146 0.109 0.105 0.072 0.088 0.087
[0.067] [0.062] [0.062] [0.118] [0.117] [0.117] [0.081] [0.074] [0.075] [0.115] [0.109] [0.108] [0.075] [0.074] [0.075]
Rural -0.953** -0.978** -0.970** -0.824* -0.972* -0.959* -1.004** -0.977** -0.972**
[0.267] [0.254] [0.254] [0.360] [0.377] [0.373] [0.258] [0.237] [0.236]
All Females Males Rural Urban
Continue on next page
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Variables measured in 2002 Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended Original Basic Extended
Lost -0.884 -1.116 -1.06 -0.763 -1 -0.892 -0.941 -0.833 -1.135 -1.015 -0.977
[0.809] [1.084] [0.850] [0.861] [1.156] [0.972] [2.125] [2.156] [0.910] [1.126] [0.860]
Age>21*Lost 0.008 0.021 0.02 0.039 0.027 0.028 -0.003 0.02 0.018 -0.006 0.036 0.031 0.009 0.014 0.013
[0.025] [0.039] [0.033] [0.042] [0.064] [0.059] [0.029] [0.043] [0.039] [0.061] [0.088] [0.086] [0.027] [0.038] [0.032]
Age>32*Lost 0 -0.042 -0.036 -0.094 -0.076 -0.069 0.038 -0.034 -0.028 0.011 -0.032 -0.021 -0.01 -0.048 -0.042
[0.040] [0.064] [0.050] [0.080] [0.092] [0.089] [0.051] [0.077] [0.064] [0.102] [0.148] [0.140] [0.046] [0.063] [0.051]
Age>43*Lost 0.032 0.048 0.037 0.101 0.053 0.037 -0.017 0.044 0.037 -0.065 0.017 0.013 0.06 0.059 0.045
[0.054] [0.061] [0.061] [0.083] [0.145] [0.166] [0.074] [0.082] [0.064] [0.147] [0.160] [0.147] [0.061] [0.065] [0.074]
Age>54*Lost -0.05 -0.014 -0.003 0.159 0.104 0.119 -0.043 -0.033 -0.027 0.104 -0.024 -0.043 -0.062 0.001 0.019
[0.083] [0.094] [0.095] [0.182] [0.350] [0.385] [0.101] [0.127] [0.106] [0.222] [0.339] [0.307] [0.092] [0.095] [0.124]
Female*Lost 0.268+ -0.036 -0.042 -0.436 -0.867 -0.937 0.471 -0.302 -0.23 0.294+ 0.044 0.025
[0.145] [0.207] [0.216] [1.244] [1.501] [1.333] [0.399] [0.468] [0.463] [0.154] [0.226] [0.237]
Education*Lost
(1) Primary complete*Lost OG (Primary incompleted) 0.476 0.47 0.496 0.058 0.218 0.27 0.46 0.402 0.41 -0.875+ 0.126 0.123 1.010** 0.689+ 0.730*
[0.323] [0.338] [0.348] [0.482] [0.619] [0.751] [0.305] [0.553] [0.494] [0.463] [0.641] [0.666] [0.356] [0.372] [0.351]
(1) High school incomplete*Lost 0.660* 0.454+ 0.463+ -0.221 0.003 0.049 0.822* 0.454 0.44 -0.09 0.173 0.21 0.953* 0.563+ 0.574+
[0.332] [0.265] [0.275] [0.445] [0.627] [0.685] [0.332] [0.356] [0.322] [0.405] [0.500] [0.513] [0.366] [0.313] [0.317]
(1) High school complete*Lost 0.621 0.79 0.919+ -0.507 0.071 0.276 0.904* 0.891 0.975 -1.946** 0.182 0.441 1.051** 0.893* 1.018*
[0.384] [0.479] [0.471] [0.591] [0.710] [0.823] [0.404] [0.708] [0.640] [0.702] [1.020] [1.049] [0.366] [0.400] [0.397]
(1) Some college or more*Lost 0.643+ 0.532 0.596+ -0.391 -0.211 -0.041 0.875* 0.68 0.686+ -0.173 0.12 0.048 0.923* 0.626 0.709+
[0.361] [0.327] [0.316] [0.379] [0.659] [0.720] [0.384] [0.416] [0.380] [0.564] [0.752] [0.713] [0.383] [0.415] [0.376]
Married*Lost -0.04 0.152 0.092 -0.16 0.379 0.265 -0.08 -0.071 -0.094 0.355 -0.074 -0.074 -0.116 0.203 0.133
[0.190] [0.408] [0.340] [0.246] [0.474] [0.468] [0.238] [0.508] [0.419] [0.423] [0.701] [0.652] [0.209] [0.419] [0.349]
Rural*Lost 0.194 0.198 0.219 0.033 -0.178 -0.065 0.284 0.36 0.34 0.328
[0.206] [0.284] [0.329] [0.377] [0.457] [0.508] [0.232] [0.342] [0.367] [1.512]
Constant 6.310** 5.731** 5.718** 4.010** 4.132** 4.128** 5.681** 5.713** 5.700** 4.325** 4.809** 4.806** 6.215** 6.137** 6.180**
[0.317] [0.367] [0.369] [0.564] [0.566] [0.564] [0.411] [0.402] [0.401] [0.482] [0.473] [0.472] [0.331] [0.402] [0.461]
Observations 9328 9328 9328 3011 3011 3011 6317 6317 6317 3411 3411 3411 5917 5917 5917
R-squared 24.47 25.22 25.43 27.70 28.07 28.42 24.39 24.74 24.93 20.16 20.67 20.69 19.97 20.89 21.20
F-statistic 33.18 32.55 32.73 21.06 16.12 16.28 18.49 13.82 14.47 10.58 7.43 7.54 34.24 32.18 32.61
Municipality Fixed Effects
Standard errors in brackets (adjusted for clusters at municipality level)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
All Females Males Rural Urban
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Table 9: Original and Imputed Models - Quartic-root of Earnings in 2005- Age [21-65] 
 
Tracked Imputed Diff Tracked Imputed Diff Tracked Imputed Diff Tracked Imputed Diff Tracked Imputed Diff
Age>21 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.012 0 0.003 -0.031* -0.026+ 0.026* 0.023*
[0.009] [0.009] [0.015] [0.015] [0.012] [0.011] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.011]
Age>32 0 -0.004 0.004 0 0 -0.004 0.042+ 0.034 -0.026 -0.025
[0.016] [0.016] [0.029] [0.028] [0.021] [0.019] [0.024] [0.023] [0.021] [0.020]
Age>43 -0.061** -0.062** -0.062+ -0.062+ -0.062** -0.062** -0.068** -0.062* -0.057** -0.062**
[0.016] [0.015] [0.033] [0.031] [0.020] [0.018] [0.024] [0.025] [0.021] [0.019]
Age>54 0.035 0.034 0.041 0.048 0.037 0.034 -0.001 -0.006 0.078* 0.070*
[0.024] [0.023] [0.047] [0.049] [0.030] [0.029] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.033]
(1) Female -0.819** -0.788** -1.002** -0.969** -0.742** -0.722**
[0.060] [0.059] [0.111] [0.106] [0.066] [0.065]
Respondent's Education
(1) Primary complete OG (Primary incomplete) 0.201** 0.139* * 0.145 0.095 0.205** 0.138+ * 0.144 0.13 0.222** 0.123 *
[0.061] [0.061] [0.137] [0.139] [0.069] [0.071] [0.090] [0.092] [0.078] [0.075]
(1) High school incomplete 0.589** 0.511** 0.747** 0.648** * 0.510** 0.443** + 0.606** 0.568** + 0.575** 0.466** *
[0.065] [0.065] [0.134] [0.128] [0.083] [0.083] [0.089] [0.090] [0.092] [0.088]
(1) High school complete 0.980** 0.855** + 1.298** 1.104** * 0.782** 0.703** 0.981** 0.910** 0.966** 0.807** *
[0.119] [0.117] [0.198] [0.189] [0.137] [0.128] [0.200] [0.232] [0.142] [0.130]
(1) Some college or more 1.768** 1.692** + 2.199** 2.041** + 1.523** 1.489** 1.762** 1.732** 1.771** 1.660** +
[0.109] [0.102] [0.157] [0.156] [0.133] [0.129] [0.181] [0.190] [0.135] [0.123]
(1) Married 0.094+ 0.06 -0.352** -0.305** 0.417** 0.341** 0.179* 0.163+ 0.047 0.015
[0.056] [0.054] [0.124] [0.109] [0.072] [0.069] [0.081] [0.084] [0.075] [0.069]
(1) Rural -0.348+ -0.375* -0.063 -0.141 -0.428** -0.446**
[0.181] [0.185] [0.448] [0.425] [0.134] [0.147]
Constant 7.281** 7.294** 4.606** 4.696** 6.831** 3.805** 6.714** 7.825** 5.916** 5.493**
[0.323] [0.317] [0.579] [0.582] [0.310] [0.372] [0.384] [0.372] [0.327] [0.319]
Number of observations 7,921 9,264 2,491 2,977 5,430 6,287 3,010 3,192 4,911 6,072
R-squared 13.75 13.82 18.02 17.37 12.53 12.72 15.99 16.17 9.72 9.94
F-statistic 45.7 48.45 37.45 32.63 31.07 33.2 32.57 30.04 35.63 38.64
Sstandard errors in brackets (adjusted for clusters at municipality level)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
F. F-statistic for hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero
All MaleFemale Rural Urban
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Table 10: Original and Imputed Models - Quartic-root of Earnings in 2009- Age 15+ 
Tracked Imputed Diff Tracked Imputed Diff Tracked Imputed Diff Tracked Imputed Diff Tracked Imputed Diff
Age>21 -0.018* -0.016+ -0.034* -0.032* -0.012 -0.009 -0.030* -0.031* -0.008 -0.003 **
[0.008] [0.008] [0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Age>32 0.018 0.015 0.056* 0.055* 0 -0.006 0.026 0.029 0.011 0.003 **
[0.015] [0.015] [0.023] [0.023] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.022]
Age>43 -0.060** -0.062** -0.099** -0.104** * -0.040* -0.040+ -0.061* -0.065* -0.056+ -0.057*
[0.019] [0.019] [0.032] [0.033] [0.020] [0.020] [0.023] [0.025] [0.028] [0.028]
Age>54 0.014 0.02 -0.015 -0.008 0.012 0.016 0.013 0.02 0.02 0.026
[0.043] [0.043] [0.086] [0.089] [0.045] [0.044] [0.055] [0.057] [0.057] [0.056]
(1) Female -1.062** -1.057** -1.232** -1.220** -0.958** -0.959**
[0.072] [0.074] [0.117] [0.115] [0.095] [0.097]
Respondent's Education
(1) Primary complete OG (Primary incomplete) 0.313** 0.281** 0.433* 0.420* 0.221* 0.179+ 0.257+ 0.266+ 0.321* 0.242+ **
[0.097] [0.095] [0.181] [0.181] [0.104] [0.104] [0.134] [0.134] [0.130] [0.126]
(1) High school incomplete 0.697** 0.643** 0.684** 0.667** 0.669** 0.604** 0.719** 0.694** 0.658** 0.566** *
[0.111] [0.116] [0.185] [0.180] [0.112] [0.122] [0.136] [0.136] [0.148] [0.153]
(1) High school complete 1.072** 0.974** + 1.299** 1.240** 0.875** 0.755** * 0.793** 0.836** 1.135** 0.960** **
[0.150] [0.160] [0.210] [0.202] [0.198] [0.214] [0.286] [0.296] [0.176] [0.187]
(1) Some college or more 2.072** 2.014** 2.499** 2.446** 1.731** 1.676** 2.246** 2.221** 2.001** 1.902** **
[0.134] [0.138] [0.214] [0.219] [0.171] [0.172] [0.206] [0.204] [0.169] [0.174]
(1) Married 0.067 0.074 -0.344* -0.288* 0.369** 0.346** 0.097 0.128 0.035 0.025 +
[0.078] [0.081] [0.138] [0.140] [0.101] [0.105] [0.123] [0.126] [0.103] [0.104]
(1) Rural -0.446* -0.464* -0.377 -0.351 -0.498+ -0.540+
[0.217] [0.227] [0.269] [0.283] [0.286] [0.289]
Constant 6.128** 6.173** 6.546** 6.426** 3.570** 3.584** 7.265** 7.286** 5.589** 5.445**
[0.264] [0.278] [0.413] [0.416] [0.317] [0.328] [0.300] [0.300] [0.248] [0.317]
Number of observations 8,856 8,856 3,139 3,139 5,717 5,717 3,666 3,666 5,190 5,190
R-squared 21.71 20.02 26.68 22.35 19.56 18.29 23.72 23.10 15.76 14.99
F-statistic 70.62 66.58 51.67 44.54 32.51 29.65 41.02 40.49 58.79 53.07
Sstandard errors in brackets (adjusted for clusters at municipality level)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
F. F-statistic for hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero
All Female Male Rural Urban
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Figure 1: Distribution of the Quartic-root of Earnings in 2002 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the Quartic-root of Earnings in 2009 
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Figure 3: Distribution of the Quartic-root of Earnings in 2002 – Males 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of the Quartic-root of Earnings in 2009 – Males 
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Figure 5: Distribution of the Quartic-root of Earnings in 2002 – Females 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of the Quartic-root of Earnings in 2009 – Females 
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3. Selection and Assimilation of Mexican Migrants to the 
U.S. 
3.1 Introduction  
Mexican migration to the United States and the return of Mexican-born migrants 
to their country of origin are of substantial interest from both a policy and scientific 
point of view. Mexican-origin migrants are the largest Hispanic population in the U.S., 
accounting for nearly two-thirds of all Hispanic migrants. Moreover, Mexican migrants 
have traditionally followed two distinct patterns of migration; one fraction migrates to 
settle permanently in the U.S. while others are cyclical migrants moving frequently 
between the two countries. Recent evidence suggests that these patterns may be 
changing as migration from Mexico to the U.S. has declined sharply since the onset of 
the Great Recession and many of the migrants who were living in the U.S. have returned 
to Mexico. It is estimated that in the last few years, net migration from Mexico to the 
U.S. has fallen to zero.  
This chapter uses novel data to provide new evidence on the characteristics that 
predict which Mexicans have chosen to migrate to the U.S. over the last decade and, 
among those migrants, the attributes that predict whether they settle in the U.S. for the 
longer term or return to Mexico. Finally, evidence is presented that sheds light on which 
characteristics at baseline are markers of successful assimilation in the U.S.  
A large and active literature has examined the process of migration into the U.S. 
by Mexican citizens (see, for example, Donato, et al., 1992; Durand and Massey, 1992; 
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Durand, et al., 1996; Durand, et al., 2001; Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2011; Hanson, 
2006; Hoefer, et al., 2006; Ibarraran and Lubotsky, 2007; Massey et al., 1990; Massey and 
Singer, 1995; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2004; and Rendall, et al., 2011).  Despite this 
extensive literature, evidence on recent changes in the selectivity of migrants, as well as, 
analysis of the characteristics that determine which migrants stay in the U.S. rather than 
return to Mexico is less well documented. This project sheds new light on these 
important subjects. 
To provide scientific evidence on the selectivity of migrants, it is necessary to 
compare characteristics of migrants to those of non-migrants before the migration takes 
place. However, the absence of pre-migration information has been a challenge for 
research in this field. One line of inquiry uses data collected by the U.S. government, 
such as the American Community Survey in combination with census data from the 
Mexican government. This necessarily involves a comparison of the characteristics of 
non-movers to the attributes of movers after the migration has already occurred. Using 
data collected in this way, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the roles of time-
varying characteristics in migration decisions. Moreover, studies based on data collected 
by the U.S. government are limited by the fact that such surveys are known to 
undercount the undocumented and most mobile migrants including those who cycle 
often between the U.S. and Mexico.  
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A second line of inquiry has relied only on Mexican census or survey data 
collected in Mexico on individuals that have already migrated. An important limitation 
of these data sources is that they only include migrants that have returned to Mexico or 
have at least one household member still living in Mexico and information about 
migrants is obtained by proxy. By design, these surveys exclude complete households 
that have migrated to the U.S. who make up an increasing and substantial fraction of 
migrants to the U.S. from Mexico. Both the selection and assimilation process of 
complete households that decided to migrate to the U.S. and never return to Mexico are 
likely to be quite different from the rest of the migrants and so studies based on these 
data sources are prone to biases due to the selection of those included in the study. An 
important, related source of data is the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) which is based 
on a sample of respondents in Mexico who have family in the U.S. While these data are 
supplemented by U.S. based snowball samples, the samples are also selected on having 
at least one family member remaining in Mexico and so these samples are also at risk of 
underrepresenting longer-term movers.  Moreover, both types of surveys only contain 
information on movers after the migration event. The ideal source of data for a study of 
migrant selectivity would be a sample that is representative of the Mexican population 
prior to migration and proceeds to follow all respondents that migrate to the U.S., 
including those who stay for a short period and those who remain in the U.S. long-term. 
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We designed and implemented an approach to study migrant selectivity using this 
methodology.   
The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) is an ongoing longitudinal data set that 
is representative of the Mexican population at baseline (in 2002). The first follow up was 
completed in 2005 and the second follow-up will be completed in mid-2013. In both 
follow-ups, movers to the U.S. have been tracked and interviewed in the U.S. The 
baseline respondents who are thought to have moved to the U.S. were found and 
interviewed at a rate of 90% and 85% in the first and second follow-up surveys, 
respectively. So far, we have re-interviewed over 1,000 baseline respondents who moved 
to the U.S. after 2002 and are still in the U.S., as well as, 570 respondents who migrated 
to the U.S. after 2002 and subsequently returned to Mexico. 
The combination of successfully tracking and interviewing movers, including 
international movers, with detailed information on their labor market and migration 
experiences, families and resources of each respondent yields an extremely rich set of 
data for investigating the nature of selectivity of migrants to the U.S. and the selectivity 
of those who remain in the U.S. over the longer haul. With these data, we will draw 
comparisons between those people who have migrated to the U.S. since 2002, and 
stayed, those who have migrated to the U.S. since 2002 and returned to Mexico and 
those who have only migrated within Mexico since 2002.  
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3.2 Data 
The MxFLS is an on-going large-scale population-representative longitudinal 
survey of Mexicans who were living in Mexico in 2002 when the baseline was 
conducted. The baseline survey, MxFLS1, collected detailed information on 35,677 
individuals living in 8,440 households in 150 communities spread across 16 states in 
Mexico. 
The second wave, MxFLS2, was conducted in 2005-2006. All baseline 
respondents and their biological children born after the 2002 baseline are eligible to be 
tracked in the follow-up surveys. They are our “panel respondents.” Over 89% of the 
panel respondents were re-interviewed in MxFLS2.  
A novel feature of MxFLS, which is key for this research, is that we decided to 
not only follow panel members that had moved within Mexico but also to follow 
respondents that had migrated to the U.S. Following movers is not straightforward. In 
the Mexican context, it poses special challenges because a significant number of people 
move to the U.S.  Moreover, Mexican migrants are generally very mobile and the great 
majority is undocumented, adding additional challenges to the tracking process. In the 
context of the MxFLS, following migrants to the U.S. is important not only because it 
allows us to have a representative sample of recent migrants to the U.S. but also because 
it is crucial to maintain the representativeness of the baseline sample. If migrants to the 
U.S. are not followed, not only would attrition rates be higher than otherwise, but 
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attrition would also be selected on characteristics associated with migration to the U.S. 
Inferences about the evolution of many indicators of well-being of the Mexican 
population over the last decade would potentially be contaminated if domestic and 
international migrants were not followed. 
As such, we designed and implemented an approach that allows us to have a 
representative sample of recent migrants to the U.S. for whom we have a rich set of 
characteristics measured at baseline, prior to migration.  To achieve this, we follow all 
panel respondents that remain in Mexico, as well as, track respondents who move to the 
U.S.  The MxFLS is the first population-representative large-scale longitudinal study that 
has attempted to follow migrants across an international border. Aware of the additional 
challenges this poses, we put substantial effort into developing and testing procedures 
to facilitate successfully interviewing migrants in the U.S. Those efforts have allowed us 
to maintain a very high re-contact rate: as shown in panel A of Table 11, in the second 
wave, 89.2% of the baseline respondents were re-interviewed. Moreover, we interviewed 
91% of the 854 respondents believed to be in the U.S. (This includes anyone who was 
reported by an informant to have moved to the U.S. and was not interviewed in Mexico.) 
Furthermore, of the U.S moving panel respondents who were at least 15 years old at the 
time of the baseline, 90.4 percent were re-interviewed in the U.S. In the rest of the 
analysis we will focus on this age group. This choice is made because children are likely 
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to move because of a migration decision made by their parents and it is their parents’ 
characteristics that are most likely driving the selection.  
The third wave of the survey, MxFLS3, is currently in the final stages of 
fieldwork. We anticipate achieving the same re-contact rate as in MxFLS2. At March 
2013, over 84% of the U.S. migrants have been interviewed in MxFLS3. Panel B of Table 
11 shows current recontact rates of MxFLS3. The results for the entire sample show that 
over 85 percent of baseline respondents have been re-interviewed. From those baseline 
respondents, 1,876 have moved to the U.S., and at this time 85.2 percent has been re-
interviewed. Due to the transient part of the Mexican migrant population, it is important 
to not only follow migrants that moved from Mexico to the U.S. but also to track those 
that return to Mexico after having lived in U.S. at some point between the waves. Out of 
the total U.S. migrants successfully re-interviewed, near 65% were still in the U.S. and 
the other 35% were found and interviewed back in Mexico.  The recontact rates for the 
entire sample and the sample of respondents older than 15 at baseline are very similar.  
In order to examine the selection and assimilation of Mexican migrants we will 
first group each respondent into one of several migration categories.  These categories 
are based on the respondent’s migration history and place of re-interview. We will 
describe in detail the migration history component and the migration categories used in 
our analysis.  
 73 
3.2.1 Migration and Characteristics at Baseline 
The MxFLS collects a rich array of information about each respondent, this 
include a component about the migration histories of all respondents age 15 or older at 
the time of the survey. The 2002 migration history component of the MxFLS includes all 
long-term movements (more than one year) and temporal movements (between one and 
12 months) that occurred after age 12. This allows us to determine who has moved to the 
U.S. and who has moved within Mexico prior to 2002.  In MxFLS2 the migration 
component follows the same structure and updates the migration history by assessing 
both permanent and temporal migration movements between the two waves. This 
feature, in addition to the successful tracking of migrants in the U.S. in the second wave, 
allows us to determine the migration trends of the Mexican population between 2002 
and 2005. In a similar way, MxFLS3 updates the migratory movements between the 
second and third wave. In addition, we tracked and interviewed respondents thought to 
be in the U.S. as well as those confirmed to be back in Mexico. This unique feature 
allows us to describe the recent migratory trends of the Mexican population both within 
Mexico and to the U.S. and allows us to compare different groups of the population on a 
rich set of characteristics measured at baseline according to their migration experiences 
through the third wave.  
Our analytical sample includes all panel respondents age 15 or older in 2002. In 
order to explore the migration status (between baseline and the third wave) of each 
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respondent we use data from the three waves of the MxFLS. Exploiting both the 
migration histories and the place of residence at the moment of each survey we can 
classify the migration status of each respondent in each wave. We classify the 
respondents as “non-movers”, if they never moved from their locality of origin (the 
locality in which they were interviewed in 2002) for a period longer than a year; 
“movers within Mexico”, if they moved out of their locality of origin but did not move 
to the U.S for a period longer than a year; “moved to U.S. and returned”, if they moved 
to the U.S. for a period longer than a year but in the third wave were found and 
interviewed in Mexico; and “moved to the U.S. and stayed”, if they were found and 
interviewed in the U.S. in the third wave. Table 12 shows the sample sizes in each group 
by gender.  
Along with the migration component, the MxFLS contains information about the 
economic, social and health status of each member of a surveyed household. The 
questionnaire for adults includes sections on education, labor supply and earnings, 
marriage and fertility history, health status, and use of health care. In addition, one 
member is interviewed about information at the household level. This questionnaire 
includes a complete household roster including basic socio-demographic characteristics 
of each household member, and information of household expenditure, and asset 
ownership. 
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Another useful section of the MxFLS is the assessment of the presence of 
relatives in the U.S. for all baseline respondents. An important variable for predicting 
migration is the presence of networks in the destination place. Specifically, the presence 
of networks in the U.S. could affect the decision to migrate through several different 
channels. For example, networks in the place of destination may reduce the initial costs 
of migration if the relatives help with living expenses. In addition, they can offer 
valuable information about available jobs or connect the recent migrant to job networks. 
Our measure of direct networks in the U.S. prior to migration will allow us to explore 
these hypotheses.    
Table 13 provides descriptive statistics for the variables that measure the 
presence of U.S. familial networks. Panel A provides evidence that conditional on being 
a migrant, those that moved to the United States have more relatives in America at 
baseline than those that only moved within Mexico. Moreover, disaggregated by family 
relationships, U.S. movers are significantly more likely to have relatives of each 
relationship type in the U.S. with the exception of extended family members. These 
results suggests than networks prior to migration have an important role in the 
subsequent decision to migrate.  
In addition to influencing the initial decision to migrate, the presence of 
networks in the U.S. could affect the decision on the length of the migrants stay. Table 14 
shows the same variables for U.S. migrants, distinguishing between those who 
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subsequently returned to Mexico and those who stayed in the U.S. The results show that 
the difference in the level of networks in the U.S is less significant when looking only at 
U.S. migrants. Even though current U.S migrant males are more likely to have relatives 
in the U.S. the presence of separate types of relatives is not significantly different 
between returners and stayers, with exception of siblings: current migrants are more 
likely to have siblings in US prior to migration. The results are similar for females with 
the one exception that female stayers are less likely to have extended family in the U.S. 
at baseline. 
This preliminary evidence suggests that networks might be an important 
determinant for the migration decision but is not a strong predictor of the decision to 
stay in the U.S. In a later section, we will explore these relationships more rigorously in a 
regression framework that allows us to control for a broader group of characteristics 
measured at baseline both at the individual and household level. 
3.2.2 Assimilation Outcomes  
A second goal of this chapter is to determine the characteristics, prior to 
migration that have predictive power of the migrant’s ability to assimilate in the U.S. For 
this analysis we will explore the sample of U.S. migrants interviewed in the U.S. in 
MxFLS2 and MxFLS3. In MxFLS2 we will use hourly wages to explore the baseline 
characteristics associated with successful assimilation. Additionally, we will compare 
this for migrants that later stayed in the U.S. and for those that later returned to Mexico 
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to see if baseline attributes had varying importance towards assimilation for these two 
groups. 
Using MxFLS3 we can explore a broader group of markers of assimilation 
including: knowledge of English, whether the migrant’s spouse is in U.S. conditional on 
being married, whether his/her children are in the U.S. conditional on having children 
and whether the migrants has sent remittances to Mexico in the last year. 
For these analyses our sample is formed by all panel members age 15 or older at 
the time of the interview in MxFLS3. Table 15 shows basic statistics of the assimilation 
markers for our sample of respondents interviewed in U.S in the third wave. 
 
3.3 Migration to the U.S.: Who Migrates, Who Stays, and Who 
Returns to Mexico 
The first goal of this chapter is to explore the selectivity of both migration to the 
U.S. and return migration to Mexico. Four features of the data are key for this analyses.  
First, we have detailed information about the lives of all the movers – and those 
who do not move – prior to the index international move (which occurred after 2002). 
Because of the design of MxFLS, these analyses are not contaminated by undercounts of 
the most mobile migrants from Mexico in U.S. surveys or by the loss of complete 
households that move. The latter concern is an increasingly common phenomenon 
among Mexican-origin migrants and is clearly documented in MxFLS (Farfan et al, 
2012.) 
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Second, we follow respondents who return to Mexico and have detailed 
information about their experiences in Mexico prior to moving, their experiences while 
in the U.S., and their experiences in Mexico once they return. 
Third, detailed information about migration experiences, labor market outcomes, 
and human capital are recorded in every wave of the MxFLS. It is, therefore, possible to 
provide a rich description of the nature of selection of migrants into the U.S. relative to 
those who stayed in Mexico. Similarly, focusing on those respondents who moved to the 
U.S. during the hiatus between the baseline and first re-survey, we will describe the 
characteristics that distinguish those who subsequently return to Mexico with those who 
stay in the United States.  
Fourth, whereas much of the information described above is recorded in surveys 
that have been used for analyses of selectivity of migrants, MxFLS contains a far richer 
array of information on the lives of respondents than has been used in prior analyses. 
This included information at baseline, before the migration event, not typically found in 
surveys used to analyze migration such as questions about own wealth and the wealth 
of household and family members, living arrangements, and the presence of networks in 
locations other than the baseline community.   
Table 16 and 17 present preliminary results for males and females, respectively, 
age 15 and older at baseline in 2002 using a linear probability model that explores which 
baseline characteristics are predictors of subsequent migration. We analyze the 
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migration decision for three different samples. The model in columns 1 and 2 predict the 
probability of any long-term migration, thus both within Mexico and to the U.S., for the 
entire sample of respondents. Columns 3 and 4, predicts migration to the U.S. 
conditional on being a migrant, and columns 5 and 6 predicts permanence in the U.S. 
conditional on being an U.S. migrant. For the purpose of this chapter we will focus on 
the results that predict migration to the U.S. (Columns 3 and 4) and staying in the U.S 
(Columns 5 and 6). For each of these samples we estimate two models that differ only on 
the measures used for the presence of networks in the U.S. The first model uses the 
number of relatives a respondent has in the U.S. at baseline as the measure of network 
presence while, in the second model, we disaggregate this variable by the relationship of 
the relative living in U.S. with our panel respondent. To highlight the role of individual 
and family factors in the selection process, these models include state fixed effects. 
Conceptually, we are comparing, for example in columns 3 and 4, those who move to 
the U.S. (both stayers and returners) with those who are from the same states and only 
move within Mexico. 
Table 16 shows the results for males. There are four main results. First, young 
Mexicans are the most likely to move either within Mexico or to the U.S. and given that a 
respondent is a mover the youngest ones are the most likely to move to the U.S. 
However, once migration to the U.S. takes place the age of the migrant is not a predictor 
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of whether he remains in the U.S over the longer term. These patterns are unaffected by 
the choice of measure for networks in the U.S.  
Second, human capital predicts of migration both within Mexico and to the U.S., 
and the effects are different depending on the migrant’s destination. Males who have 
not completed high school are about 3 percentage points more likely to move than those 
with no education and those who have some college are over 4 percentage points more 
likely to move. Conditional on being a migrant, those with only primary education are 
the most likely to move to the United States and those with some college are by far the 
least likely to move. This inverted U shape has been established in many studies of 
migrants from Mexico to the United States. A result that is not as well established is that 
among those Mexican males who move to the United States, those with some college 
education are also the least likely to remain in the United States for the longer term. 
These results are qualitatively equivalent when we do not control for height and the 
cognitive score.  
Two other dimensions of human capital are included in the models: a non-verbal 
cognitive assessment (the Ravens Progressive Colored Matrices test) and height. Height 
is not a significant predictor of migration, after controlling for education, but, even after 
controlling education, it is the migrants with lower cognitive scores that move to the 
U.S. Amongst the group that migrates to the United States, though, the cognitive score is 
not a significant predictor of their remaining in the United States for the longer term.  
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These results suggest that those in the lowest end of the distribution of education 
are the least likely to move to the United States, but having at least complete primary is 
enough to increase the likelihood of migrating to the U.S. However, the effect of 
education is non-lineal and higher levels of education do not increase the probability of 
migrating and in fact being in the highest level of the education distribution (college or 
more) significantly diminishes the probability of migrating to the U.S. These results hold 
when we estimate a specification that does not include height and the Ravens score. If 
the expected income of individuals with higher levels of education is greater in Mexico 
than in the U.S., it is reasonable to find that better educated individuals are more likely 
to stay in their country. Expected income at home and abroad plays an important role in 
the migration decision, but does not explain the whole picture. The migration of an 
individual can be understood as the decision of the whole household to economically 
support the migration costs. In addition, networks at the destination place can decrease 
the expected costs of migration (initial living expenses, information costs) and therefore, 
play a crucial role in the migration process. This will be explored in our next set of 
results.  
An innovative feature of the MxFLS is that it collects information about networks 
in U.S. prior to migration, this will provide our third results of interest. Table 16 
establishes that the presence of networks in the U.S. is a powerful predictor of migration. 
Results in columns 3 to 6 show that male migrants are more likely to move to the U.S., 
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the higher the number of relatives they have in the U.S. and having only one relative is 
enough to increase the probability of staying in the U.S. Moreover, the presence of 
parents, son/daughters, or siblings in the U.S increases the likelihood of moving to the 
U.S. but only the presence of the son/daughters or siblings increases the probability of 
staying in the U.S. These results make a clear statement that the presence of networks in 
the destination place is important for making the decision to move to the U.S. and then, 
for staying more permanently. 
The fourth main result is that living in a rural place at baseline has a different 
effect depending on whether the migrant is choosing to move or not versus the choice to 
move within Mexico versus to the U.S. While rural respondents are less likely to move, 
conditional on migrating, panel members living in a rural place at baseline, are 13 
percent more likely to migrate to the U.S. Moreover, while not statistically significant, 
there is also suggestive evidence that rural respondents are more likely to stay in the 
United States given that they’ve migrated into the U.S. The skills of rural farmers might 
be useful in agricultural and seasonal jobs in the U.S., which could make U.S. migration 
more appealing, profitable, and sustainable for these individuals. 
In addition to the covariates already discussed, the models control for a set of 
household characteristics that include household composition and household assets. 
These factors are relatively modest predictors of migration, with the exception of 
business ownership by the household at baseline and household wealth per capita at 
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baseline. Many studies have suggested that those with more assets in Mexico are more 
likely to keep ties with their home country and eventually return to Mexico. Ownership 
of a business while seeming to provide some of the recourses necessary to migrate to the 
U.S, does not appear to be a predictor of returning to Mexico, and in fact the sign of the 
coefficient suggests the opposite effect. Finally, conditional on moving to the U.S., being 
in the wealthiest quartile increases the likelihood of staying in the U.S. 
Table 17 shows results of the same models for females.  First, while age is a 
significant predictor of migration to the U.S. for males, it is not for women. Only women 
older than 50 at baseline have a lower probability of moving to the U.S. but in the 
younger groups there are not significant differences.  
Second, education is a significant predictor of overall female migration but not of 
U.S. migration. Contrary to males, conditional on education, height is a significant 
predictor of overall migration and U.S. migration for females: taller women are more 
likely to migrate and more likely to migrate to the U.S. On the other hand, the cognitive 
raven’s score does not have predictive power for migration to the U.S. for women.      
Third, as for males, the presence of networks in the U.S. also plays an important 
role in the migration process for females. Having relatives in the U.S. increases the 
probability of moving in general and conditional on moving it increases the likelihood 
that the move will be to the U.S.  Interestingly the effect sizes are considerably larger on 
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these characteristics for women than for men.  However, relatives in U.S. do not play a 
role in the decision to stay in the U.S. for females, while it does for males.  
Fourth, as before, coming from a rural locality increases the likelihood of 
migration to the U.S. yet the effect is half the size (6 percent) for females compared to 
males.  
These results provide evidence that selection into migration and, then, into 
laying down roots for the long haul are dissimilar processes determined by different 
characteristics and that longer term-migrants are not the same as those who migrate to 
the U.S. for the short term. These results raise questions about what characteristics, if 
any, are predictive of success in the labor market in the U.S. The next section address 
this question. 
 
3.4 Assimilation  
The second goal of this research is to provide evidence about predictors of 
markers for successful assimilation in the U.S. For this analysis we will exploit 
information collected in U.S. during the second and third waves of MxFLS. First, 
information collected in the second wave allows us to compare return migrants to those 
that stayed in the U.S. to determine whether characteristics at baseline predicted a more 
successful assimilation for either group. In this analysis, assimilation is measured as the 
individual level of earnings in the U.S. A second analysis we have conducted uses data 
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from the third wave of MxFLS in which we measure assimilation outcomes  for stayers 
whom we find and interview in the U.S. Assimilation is measured with four different 
markers: the earnings of the migrant, the per capita expenditure in the U.S., whether the 
migrant has sent transfers to Mexico, knowledge of English, whether the migrants’ 
spouse (conditional on being married) lives in U.S. and whether his/her children live in 
the U.S. (conditional on having children alive). 
For each of these outcomes, we assess whether socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics measured at baseline are predictive of the extent of assimilation for the 
select group of migrants who have stayed in the U.S. By drawing on the same models 
that are used in the analyses of selectivity of migrants, we provide a comprehensive 
picture of those characteristics that are predictive of both selection into migration and 
success in the new destination. Further, comparing the extent of assimilation in these 
dimensions of those who continue to stay in the U.S. with those who return to Mexico 
provides insights into the likely mechanisms that underlie decisions to set down roots 
for the longer haul. 
Table 18 shows the results of assimilation using the log of hourly U.S. earnings 
measured in MxFLS2 for individuals age 15 or older at the time of the interview in U.S. 
as the outcome. In the first two columns we show the results for the entire sample of 
migrants interviewed in US in MxFLS2 who report positive earnings, the following two 
columns show the same estimations for the subset of migrants who subsequently 
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returned to Mexico and the last two columns show the results for the group of migrants 
who stayed in the U.S. For each sample, we show two different estimation models as in 
the previous tables: the first one includes networks in U.S. measured as the number of 
relatives and the last one measures networks as the relationship of the migrants to their 
connections in the U.S. We focus the analysis on the results for education and networks 
in the U.S. 
The results in Table 18 show that female migrants earn on average 40 percent less 
than males, and the coefficient is very similar for migrants who stayed in the U.S. or 
return to Mexico. Education levels achieved at baseline are significant only for the 
sample of stayers: migrants whom had some years of high school or completed college 
earn higher hourly earnings than those in the lowest category of education. However, 
education attained at baseline does not seem to have any effect on the level of earnings 
of migrants that subsequently returned back to Mexico.  
The results for the variables that measure networks in U.S. suggest that, even 
though their presence in the U.S. is an important predictor of migration, is not evident 
that they will determine a more successful assimilation in the U.S. Having extended 
family in the U.S. prior to migrate has a negative effect on the level of earnings and this 
effect holds only for return migrants.  
Table 19 shows the results on what characteristics predict assimilation for the 
sample of U.S migrants who were found and interviewed in the third wave in the U.S., 
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our sample of stayers. For this analysis we use the sample of individuals age 15 or older 
at the time of the interview in U.S. in MxFLS3. Table 19 shows the results for outcomes 
that measure economic assimilation: hourly earnings (columns 1 and 2), per capita 
expenditure (columns 3 and 4) and whether the individual sent transfers to Mexico 
(columns 5 and 6).  Columns 1 and 2 show the results for the log of hourly earnings, and 
as in previous tables we estimate two models that differ by the measure of networks in 
U.S.  
These results suggest that the gender wage gap that existed between migrants in 
the previous wave is still present in the most recent wave of the data. The measures of 
human capital show that education is an important determinant of higher earnings; but, 
its effect seems to be very linear.  
Looking together at the results for the selection models and assimilation for 
stayers in Table 18, the results in Table 19 for networks in U.S. suggest that they not only 
predict migration to the U.S. but also affect how well the migrant does in the U.S. The 
results in Table 18 and Table 19 would together suggest that, the presence of relatives in 
the U.S. might have a positive effect on the level of earnings but, as suggested by Table 
18, the effect is not immediate. The results using MxFLS3 show that the presence of two 
relatives in the U.S. increases earnings by 30 percent and in particular, siblings and the 
extended family are having a positive impact on the level of earnings. 
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Following the models for selection we control the assimilation estimates for 
household characteristics and, as in the previous models, these variables have a modest 
effect on the outcome of interest. However, a surprising result is the negative effect that 
being in the third quartile of the per capita wealth distribution in 2002 has on earnings. 
In future work we will explore non-parametric relationships to better understand these 
effects.  
The results using the log of per capita expenditure PCE (columns 3 and 4) as the 
measure of assimilation confirm some of the results for earnings. In this analysis we 
keep only one observation per household and we keep the observation of the household 
head. A female household has a negative effect on the level of PCE and if the household 
head was married at baseline their current PCE is lower. A possible explanation put 
forth for this relationship is that these married household heads are spending less in the 
U.S. in order to send remittances to their families in Mexico; however, the results for 
transfers do not suggest that married individuals at baseline are more likely to send 
transfers.  The education of the household head is an important determinant of the level 
of expenditure of the household. Household heads in the top of the distribution of 
education have on average a higher PCE.  
Networks once again is an interesting part of the assimilation story. While 
individuals with more relatives in the U.S. do better in terms of earnings they spend less 
in the U.S. As with married household heads, one potential explanation is that migrants 
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with a larger network in the U.S may also have a larger network in Mexico and thus 
sends more transfers. However, the results for the likelihood of sending transfers do not 
show higher probabilities of sending transfers for migrants with a larger network in the 
U.S.  In future stages of this work we will complement this analysis by looking at the 
savings of the household in U.S. in order to understand whether households with lower 
PCE are those with higher savings.  
The last outcome of interest is whether the migrant sent transfers to Mexico in 
the last 12 months. An individual with deeper connections at home may have a more 
difficult time assimilating than an individual that does not leave as deep of roots in 
Mexico. Individuals that send transfers to Mexico might do it to keep savings back in 
Mexico or to invest in a business suggesting that the migrant has a plan to return to 
Mexico. Moreover, sending transfers to relatives as a financial help suggests that the 
migrant keeps deep roots in Mexico, which would affect their plans to stay in the U.S. 
permanently. When looking at transfers as an outcome we find very interesting results.  
We find that individuals that are attending school in the U.S. are less likely to 
send remittances to Mexico by 30 percent. This may indicate that individuals that invest 
in their education in the U.S. have lower expectations of going back to Mexico; therefore, 
investing in maintaining relationships at home or investing at home is less necessary. 
Moreover, individuals with parents that are in the U.S. prior to migration are less likely 
to send remittances. Finally, the more recently the migrant has arrived to the U.S., the 
 90 
more likely he/she is to send remittances to Mexico. This result may suggest that the first 
few years after migration are the most important in terms of maintaining connections 
and thus a potential safety net back in Mexico.  
Another important variable for measuring assimilation in the U.S. is the level of 
English that the migrant speaks. The higher the level of English the migrant possesses 
the easier it is for him/her to build a network outside the Mexican circle. Moreover, 
speaking English well can help the migrant attain better and more permanent 
employment. Table 20 shows the results for assimilation measured by how well the 
migrant speaks English. The measure for how well the respondent speaks English is self-
reported and he/she must assess whether he/she speaks Very Good, Good, Fair, Bad, 
very Bad or does not speak English. We build an index variable equal to one if the 
migrant self-reports that he/she speaks Fair, Good or very Good English. The results in 
Table 20 show that human capital measures are an important determinant of the level of 
English that the migrant speaks. The higher the education attained by the time of 
MxFLS3 the better the English spoken by the migrant.  Further, this effect is non-linear, 
the higher the education attained the higher its impact on the respondent’s English. 
Moreover, if the migrant attended school in the U.S. they, as expected, speak better 
English. Another measure of human capital is also an important determinant of this 
measure of assimilation as a higher cognitive score has a positive relationship to English 
proficiency. In addition, the earlier the migrant arrived to the U.S. the better his/her 
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knowledge of the foreign language. Interestingly, the presence of networks in U.S. does 
not seem to have a positive or negative effect on the respondent’s level of English 
assimilation.  
Finally, we analyze living arrangements in the U.S. as a proxy for assimilation 
(whether the migrant’s spouse or children live in the U.S.). Table 21 shows the results for 
whether the migrant’s spouse lives in the U.S. conditional on him/her being married and 
for whether the migrant’s children live in the U.S. conditional on him/her having 
children alive. We show these results disaggregated by gender.  
Interesting results are found for the presence of networks in the US on this 
measure of assimilation. For instance, while the number of relatives in the US at baseline 
are predictive of whether a males’ children are in the U.S. in the third wave, this does 
not matter for women. Although the network size is not significant for females, whether 
her parents or siblings were in the U.S. prior to migration increases the likelihood of her 
children being with her in the U.S. at the time of the MxFLS3 survey. In terms of having 
one’s spouse in the U.S. in the third wave we find that baseline characteristics do not 
have predictive power for females. For males, on the other hand, there are some 
noteworthy results.  
First, owning a farm business at baseline increases the likelihood of having a 
spouse in U.S. in the third wave, while being in the second and third quartile of the per 
capita wealth distribution decreases this probability. Second, the more co-resident 
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children in the baseline home decreases the likelihood of the spouse being in U.S. at 
follow-up. Having several children in Mexico may make it more difficult for the spouse 
to migrate since each child increases the initial migration cost, through the additional 
expense of bringing them as well or the expense of setting up care for them once the 
spouse leaves. Third, the later the arrival date of the migrant the less likely that his 
spouse is with him at follow-up, which could suggest that a male migrant arrives alone 
first with a possible reunion with his spouse once a secure foundation has been 
established by the migrant.    
 
3.5 Discussion and Future Work 
In summary, the analyses presented in this research provide new insights into 
the mechanisms that underlie the selectivity of migrants within Mexico, how they differ 
from migrants who move from Mexico to the United States and how those who return 
differ from those migrants who remain in the United States over the longer haul. By 
estimating parallel models of multiple markers of assimilation in the United States, we 
can draw conclusions about the predictors of both selection into migration and the 
predictors of success in the destination among those who move and stay. 
Human capital (as measured by education and cognitive skills) are predictive of 
migration within Mexico and to the United States. Those who move to the United States 
are not likely to be drawn from the bottom or top of the education distribution. There is 
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little evidence that the decision to stay in the United States is highly correlated with 
education of the movers except that those with some college education are far more 
likely to return to Mexico than any other migrant. Moreover, conditional on moving to 
the United States, there is little evidence that education carries a premium in terms of 
earnings in the labor market. This is in sharp contrast with results for natives in the 
United States. The results suggest that, relatively speaking, migrants to the United States 
from the bottom of the education distribution are doing better in the United States than 
those who are drawn from the top of the distribution.  
In contrast, having relatives in the United States is not only a powerful predictor 
of migration to the United States but it is also predictive of success in the labor market. 
Specifically, males are more likely to move to the United States if their spouse, a parent, 
child or sibling was living in the United States. The presence of a child or sibling is 
predictive of staying in the United States (at least for males). However, it is only the 
presence of a spouse that is predictive of elevated earnings and having a child or 
extended family members is predictive of lower earnings. 
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3.6 Tables and Figures 
Table 11: Sample Sizes and Recontact Rates in MxFLS 
 
Panel A. Recontact rates in MxFLS2
Eligible for 
survey Interviewed
% 
Interviewed
Eligible for 
survey Interviewed
% 
Interviewed
Total 35,134 31,338 89.20 23,222 20,612 88.76
In Mexico 34,280 30,564 89.16 22,606 20,055 88.72
In US 854 774 90.63 616 557 90.42
Source: MxFLS
Note - Excluded panel respondents who died between waves
Panel B. Recontact rates in MxFLS3
Eligible for 
survey Interviewed
% 
Interviewed
Eligible for 
survey Interviewed
% 
Interviewed
Total 34,225 29,238 85.43 22,357 18,845 84.29
In Mexico 32,349 27,640 85.44 21,123 17,791 84.23
In US 1,876 1,598 85.18 1,234 1,054 85.41
US sample ivw in MX 570 430
US sample ivw in US 1,028 624
Source: MxFLS
Note - Excluded panel respondents who died between waves
All Age in 2002>=15
All Age in 2002>=15
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Table 12: Migration Between Baseline and MxFLS3 
 
Table 13: U.S. Networks Reported at Baseline by MX/U.S. Migration Status 
 
MALE FEMALE Total
0.Non movers 7,371 8,615 15,986
since 2002 83.69 85.75 84.78
1.Movers within Mexico 739 1,023 1,762
since 2002 8.39 10.18 9.35
2.Moved to U.S. 345 129 474
and returned 3.92 1.28 2.51
3.Moved to U.S. 353 280 633
and stayed 4.01 2.79 3.36
Total 8,808 10,047 18,855
col% 100 100 100
Panel A
P-value
Variables measured at baseline mean sd mean sd Diff
% Has relatives in US 48.54 50.02 70.53 45.63 0.00
# of relatives in US 0.82 1.10 1.41 1.30 0.00
% Spouse in US 0.00 0.00 0.43 6.55 0.07
% Parents in US 1.20 10.91 5.19 22.20 0.00
% Daughter/son in US 2.05 14.17 5.36 22.55 0.01
% Siblings in US 13.18 33.87 27.97 44.93 0.00
% Extended family in US 17.95 38.42 20.50 40.41 0.32
Panel B
P-value
Variables measured at baseline mean sd mean sd Diff
% Has relatives in US 51.93 49.99 81.86 38.58 0.00
# of relatives in US 0.91 1.14 1.82 1.37 0.00
% Spouse in US 1.58 12.46 10.78 31.06 0.00
% Parents in US 3.21 17.64 9.41 29.23 0.00
% Daughter/son in US 2.13 14.44 9.40 29.23 0.00
% Siblings in US 16.02 36.70 40.74 49.21 0.00
% Extended family in US 16.90 37.50 18.80 39.13 0.43
MALE
MX Mover US Mover
FEMALE
MX Mover US Mover
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Table 14: U.S. Networks Reported at Baseline by U.S. Migration Status 
 
 
Panel A
P-value
Variables measured at baseline mean sd mean sd Diff
% Has relatives in US 66.57 47.25 74.35 43.73 0.03
# of relatives in US 1.32 1.29 1.49 1.32 0.09
% Spouse in US 0.29 5.38 0.57 7.52 0.58
% Parents in US 4.29 20.29 6.04 23.86 0.34
% Daughter/son in US 3.97 19.56 6.67 24.99 0.17
% Siblings in US 22.62 41.92 32.96 47.10 0.01
% Extended family in US 19.44 39.66 21.48 41.15 0.57
Panel B
P-value
Variables measured at baseline mean sd mean sd Diff
% Has relatives in US 80.99 39.40 82.25 38.28 0.77
# of relatives in US 1.84 1.41 1.81 1.35 0.83
% Spouse in US 7.75 26.85 12.19 32.77 0.18
% Parents in US 6.03 23.92 10.94 31.27 0.13
% Daughter/son in US 11.93 32.56 8.26 27.59 0.28
% Siblings in US 28.44 45.32 46.28 49.96 0.00
% Extended family in US 25.69 43.89 15.70 36.46 0.03
MALE
US Returner US Stayer
FEMALE
US Returner US Stayer
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Table 15: Characteristics U.S. Migrants - Panel Members Age15+  
 
Variables measured in MxFLS3 mean sd
Age in MxFLS3 30.58 13.19
% Female 41.11 49.23
Years of education 8.45 3.38
Height (cm) 161.56 9.46
Household size 3.15 1.89
% Married - conditional on age>=12 56.33 49.63
% Spouse in HH - conditional on married 82.60 37.96
% Has children alive 60.47 63.23
% Has children in US - conditional on having ch alive 81.90 38.53
% Worked last week 75.03 43.31
Ln(Hourly earnings) 1.99 0.72
% Speaks English Fair - Good or Very Good 43.46 49.60
% Has sent transfers to Mexico 67.37 46.91
Number Obs 934
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Table 16: Baseline Characteristics that Predict Migration Since 2002 - Males 
 
Variables measured at baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic demographics
(1) Age: 20- 24 Omitted 15-19 -1.84 -1.28 -5.67 -4.25 -8.62 -8.33
[1.688] [1.690] [3.686] [3.733] [5.963] [6.136]
(1) Age: 25-34 -6.53*** -6.94*** -11.60*** -10.73** -8.06 -8.96
[1.613] [1.615] [4.196] [4.220] [7.065] [7.134]
(1) Age: 35-49 -12.64*** -13.17*** -12.63** -13.10** -1.6 -2.61
[1.738] [1.741] [5.076] [5.122] [9.043] [9.197]
(1) Age> 50 -18.63*** -17.19*** -25.07*** -26.93*** -6.44 -12.35
[1.906] [1.906] [5.779] [5.809] [11.987] [12.537]
(1) Married 1.82 1.35 -4.68 -5.25 -3.37 -2.03
[1.372] [1.395] [4.035] [4.136] [7.248] [7.382]
Human Capital
(1) Primary complete Omitted Primay incomplete 1.43 0.76 6.99* 7.60** 3.02 2.61
[1.086] [1.082] [3.577] [3.516] [6.500] [6.566]
(1) High school incomplete 3.02** 2.37** 2.27 3.28 3.54 3.49
[1.194] [1.184] [3.530] [3.529] [6.387] [6.415]
(1) High scool complete 1.89 1.57 4.52 4.5 1.93 1.74
[1.850] [1.837] [5.741] [5.751] [9.582] [9.472]
(1) Some college or more 4.82*** 4.31*** -15.06*** -13.26*** -18.55* -17.2
[1.581] [1.568] [4.961] [4.934] [11.016] [11.088]
Height (cm) 0 -0.02 0.16 0.15 -0.22 -0.23
[0.059] [0.059] [0.198] [0.199] [0.359] [0.365]
Z score Raven's Score 0.17 0.36 -3.79** -3.48** -0.21 -0.61
[0.469] [0.471] [1.472] [1.477] [2.403] [2.399]
Networks in the U.S.
(1) One relative in US Omitted No relatives in US 3.47*** 6.44** 10.03*
[0.926] [2.830] [5.133]
(1) Two relatives in US 2.55** 16.06*** 1.13
[1.274] [3.621] [6.102]
(1) Three or more relatives in US 7.21*** 15.19*** 6.13
[1.420] [3.573] [5.970]
(1) Spouse in US 1.95*** 5.61*** 8.72
[0.677] [1.258] [30.896]
(1) Any parent in US 7.27** 17.37*** 5.03
[3.519] [5.260] [9.429]
(1) Daughter/Son in US 0.63 30.15*** 21.94**
[1.541] [6.554] [10.284]
(1) Siblings in US 5.12*** 11.25*** 11.57**
[1.227] [3.264] [5.256]
(1) Extended family in US 0.34 2.16 7.71
[1.155] [3.598] [6.037]
Continued on next page
Moved since 2002 = 
100
Moved to US since 
2002 =100 Stayed in US = 100
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Variables measured at baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HH characteristics
(1) HH own farm business -0.63 -0.13 6.31** 5.65* 1.84 0.8
[0.995] [0.984] [3.019] [3.033] [5.142] [5.111]
(1) HH own a house -3.41*** -3.37*** -1.68 -1.76 -0.53 -0.64
[0.871] [0.868] [2.489] [2.497] [4.317] [4.313]
(1) HH own a non-farm business -0.05 0.23 5.17 5.50* 5.47 4.27
[1.052] [1.048] [3.278] [3.259] [5.130] [5.162]
(1) Quartile 2 wealth per capita 0.82 1.36 -0.04 -0.04 1.59 0.83
[1.102] [1.095] [3.377] [3.374] [5.902] [5.960]
(1) Quartile 3 wealth per capita -1.13 -0.33 3.98 3.46 1.46 0.54
[1.139] [1.126] [3.419] [3.465] [6.190] [6.215]
(1) Quartile 4 wealth per capita -2.44** -1.65 4.79 4.94 22.01*** 20.26***
[1.219] [1.206] [3.900] [3.863] [6.361] [6.437]
HH size 0.69*** 0.94*** 0.5 0.84 -1.01 -1.03
[0.233] [0.233] [0.561] [0.559] [0.937] [0.939]
# coresident children -0.46 -1.02*** 1.61 1.48 -0.36 -0.54
[0.356] [0.355] [1.085] [1.070] [2.001] [2.011]
(1) Coresident parents 1.9 1.08 4.33 5.14 0.57 1.52
[1.277] [1.283] [3.512] [3.580] [6.433] [6.456]
Locality characteristics 
(1) Rural -1.72* -1.54* 12.69*** 12.62*** 7.46 7.7
[0.887] [0.880] [2.640] [2.649] [4.682] [4.735]
Constant 18.18* 21.80** 18.81 19.18 68.33 70.9
[10.047] [9.980] [33.446] [33.509] [59.875] [60.840]
Observations 8,808 8,808 1,437 1,437 698 698
R- squared 0.134 0.148 0.359 0.362 0.09 0.09
Mean dependent variable 16.31 16.31 48.57 48.57 50.57 50.57
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 Note: Includes State of origin Fixed Effects
Moved since 2002 = 
100
Moved to US since 
2002 =100 Stayed in US = 100
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Table 17: Baseline Characteristics that Predict Migration Since 2002 - Females 
 
 
Variables measured at baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic demographics
(1) Age: 20- 24 Omitted 15-19 2.52 2.19 2.44 2.18 9.63 8.68
[1.646] [1.647] [3.551] [3.579] [6.840] [6.794]
(1) Age: 25-34 -5.50*** -6.41*** -0.47 -3.12 9.12 6.48
[1.524] [1.526] [4.042] [3.983] [8.513] [8.889]
(1) Age: 35-49 -10.35*** -11.35*** 1.69 -3.33 -10.43 -14.14
[1.580] [1.581] [4.543] [4.555] [10.503] [11.163]
(1) Age: >50 -11.40*** -11.82*** -10.76** -16.75*** -17.18 -19.3
[1.693] [1.694] [5.046] [5.240] [14.027] [15.428]
(1) Married -0.42 0.65 -5.14 -5.22 -0.76 -0.39
[1.363] [1.364] [3.358] [3.280] [8.230] [8.168]
Human Capital
(1) Primary complete Omitted Primay incomplete 2.17** 2.06** -0.37 0.16 6.76 5.04
[0.933] [0.925] [3.543] [3.515] [8.448] [8.642]
(1) High school incomplete 2.49** 2.59** 2.47 3.33 7.28 5.78
[1.078] [1.075] [3.788] [3.775] [8.671] [8.937]
(1) High scool complete 2.94* 3.29* 6.94 5.97 15 13.88
[1.738] [1.719] [5.496] [5.511] [10.653] [10.784]
(1) Some college or more 3.80** 4.10*** -7.38 -4.04 -1.52 -1.61
[1.555] [1.555] [5.082] [5.025] [13.273] [13.633]
Height (cm) 0.11* 0.10* 0.28 0.31* -0.56 -0.5
[0.058] [0.058] [0.175] [0.173] [0.437] [0.444]
Z score Raven's Score 0.96** 0.97** -0.85 -1.11 -4.77 -4.35
[0.412] [0.412] [1.352] [1.342] [2.962] [2.926]
Networks in the U.S.
(1) One relative in US Omitted No relatives in US 1.58** 12.56*** 0.81
[0.801] [2.807] [7.675]
(1) Two relatives in US 3.94*** 18.27*** -2.72
[1.168] [3.881] [8.390]
(1) Three or more relatives in US 7.01*** 29.56*** -7.32
[1.263] [3.830] [8.253]
(1) Spouse in US 1.01 2.75** 0.85
[0.675] [1.359] [3.694]
(1) Any parent in US 11.78*** 12.41** 3.37
[3.085] [6.113] [7.900]
(1) Daughter/Son in US 1.86 42.92*** 7.94
[1.203] [7.112] [12.086]
(1) Siblings in US 4.80*** 21.92*** 7.71
[1.071] [3.379] [5.747]
(1) Extended family in US 1.47 6.37* -5.01
[1.109] [3.438] [7.637]
Continued on next page
Moved since 2002 = 
100
Moved to US since 
2002 =100 Stayed in US = 100
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Variables measured at baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HH characteristics
(1) HH own farm business -1.31 -1 12.25*** 11.18*** 9.77 7.19
[0.875] [0.864] [3.538] [3.566] [6.321] [6.307]
(1) HH own a house -4.20*** -3.84*** 8.29*** 7.39*** 0.6 0.4
[0.791] [0.790] [2.455] [2.459] [5.546] [5.564]
(1) HH own a non-farm business 0.05 -0.02 1.5 2.04 10.83* 10.15
[0.949] [0.936] [3.247] [3.239] [6.277] [6.296]
(1) Quartile 2 wealth per capita -0.74 -0.45 -2.68 -2.4 5.01 4.22
[0.983] [0.977] [3.273] [3.246] [7.427] [7.459]
(1) Quartile 3 wealth per capita -1.45 -1.34 2.04 2 9.9 7.77
[1.039] [1.032] [3.421] [3.367] [7.811] [7.762]
(1) Quartile 4 wealth per capita -0.81 -0.64 1.88 2.71 21.60** 20.03**
[1.116] [1.111] [3.866] [3.782] [8.694] [8.461]
HH size 0.22 0.35* -0.71 0 -1.32 -1.05
[0.210] [0.208] [0.610] [0.607] [1.266] [1.274]
# coresident children -0.38 -0.63** -0.79 -0.66 -1.47 -1.5
[0.316] [0.311] [1.136] [1.113] [2.829] [2.945]
(1) Coresident parents 3.15** 2.72** -1.48 -1.44 -7.09 -7.44
[1.236] [1.227] [3.385] [3.361] [7.046] [7.218]
Locality characteristics 
(1) Rural -1.57** -1.65** 6.74** 6.48** 7.36 6.1
[0.790] [0.780] [2.673] [2.666] [6.303] [6.511]
Constant 1.07 1.28 -28.76 -33.95 142.23** 131.51*
[9.107] [9.034] [26.882] [26.459] [71.503] [72.836]
Observations 10,046 10,046 1,432 1,432 409 409
R- squared 0.102 0.118 0.236 0.25 0.17 0.18
Mean dependent variable 14.25 14.25 28.56 28.56 68.46 68.46
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 Note: Includes State of origin Fixed Effects
Moved since 2002 = 
100
Moved to US since 
2002 =100 Stayed in US = 100
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Table 18: Baseline Characteristics Predictors of Assimilation in U.S. - MxFLS2 
 
 
Dependent variable US Ln(Hourly Earnings)  measured in MxFLS2       
Variables at baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic demographics
(1) Age: 15-19 Omiited Age<15 0.21* 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.2 0.1
[0.107] [0.137] [0.169] [0.224] [0.146] [0.196]
(1) Age: 20-24 0.27** 0.23 0.33 0.27 0.24 0.14
[0.124] [0.146] [0.222] [0.272] [0.159] [0.195]
(1) Age: 25-34 0.33** 0.28* 0.31 0.23 0.3 0.2
[0.140] [0.165] [0.215] [0.289] [0.193] [0.220]
(1) Age: 35-49 0.27 0.29 0.17 0.24 0.32 0.29
[0.167] [0.187] [0.269] [0.310] [0.232] [0.262]
(1) Age: >50 -0.21 -0.12 -1.11 -0.96 0.66* 0.59*
[0.405] [0.363] [0.714] [0.646] [0.348] [0.337]
(1) Female -0.30*** -0.33*** -0.34** -0.38** -0.30*** -0.32***
[0.082] [0.088] [0.152] [0.168] [0.095] [0.102]
(1) Married 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.02
[0.085] [0.087] [0.165] [0.183] [0.092] [0.095]
Human capital
Mother's years of education 0.02** 0.02** 0.05** 0.05** 0.01 0.01
[0.009] [0.009] [0.019] [0.020] [0.013] [0.012]
Father's years of education -0.01 -0.01 -0.03* -0.03* 0 0
[0.009] [0.008] [0.015] [0.015] [0.013] [0.012]
(1) Primary complete Omitted Primay incomplete -0.03 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 0.06 0.04
[0.083] [0.079] [0.143] [0.133] [0.100] [0.103]
(1) High school incomplete 0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.20** 0.21**
[0.079] [0.079] [0.150] [0.150] [0.094] [0.093]
(1) High scool complete -0.05 -0.06 -0.22 -0.23 0.1 0.07
[0.108] [0.109] [0.232] [0.221] [0.140] [0.145]
(1) Some college or more 0.18 0.17 -0.01 -0.02 0.39* 0.40**
[0.141] [0.134] [0.204] [0.207] [0.201] [0.190]
Height (cm) 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 0 0
[0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Z score Raven's Score 0.02 0.01 0.12* 0.10* -0.04 -0.05
[0.030] [0.030] [0.061] [0.058] [0.039] [0.038]
Networks in US
(1) One relative in US Omitted No relatives in US -0.02 -0.03 0.1
[0.068] [0.130] [0.080]
(1) Two relatives in US -0.08 -0.19 0
[0.086] [0.148] [0.111]
(1) Three or more relatives in US -0.05 -0.12 0.04
[0.083] [0.158] [0.098]
(1) Spouse in US 0.30** 0.04 0.37**
[0.146] [0.259] [0.187]
(1) Any parent in US -0.06 0.01 -0.15
[0.083] [0.168] [0.102]
(1) Daughter/Son in US -0.39* -0.43 -0.31*
[0.224] [0.487] [0.189]
Continued on next page
All Returners Stayers
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Dependent variable US Ln(Hourly Earnings)  measured in MxFLS2       
Variables at baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Siblings in US -0.01 -0.16 0.04
[0.067] [0.136] [0.084]
(1) Extended family in US -0.20** -0.39** -0.11
[0.103] [0.180] [0.116]
Year of arrival to US 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.02** 0.02**
[0.009] [0.008] [0.015] [0.014] [0.008] [0.008]
HH characteristics
(1) Quartile 2 wealth per capita -0.08 -0.09 -0.14 -0.15 -0.11 -0.09
[0.058] [0.060] [0.113] [0.113] [0.079] [0.082]
(1) Quartile 3 wealth per capita -0.14* -0.15* -0.43*** -0.46*** 0 0.01
[0.082] [0.083] [0.145] [0.147] [0.107] [0.105]
(1) Quartile 4 wealth per capita -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -0.09 -0.1 -0.12
[0.074] [0.076] [0.156] [0.168] [0.096] [0.096]
HH size 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0
[0.010] [0.011] [0.018] [0.018] [0.014] [0.015]
Locality characteristics
(1) Rural -11.44 -12.42 12.43 12.69 -32.44* -36.58**
[18.526] [17.157] [31.001] [28.703] [16.705] [15.799]
Constant 2.05 0.82 22.7 22.84 -18.11 -21.73
[16.138] [14.603] [28.931] [23.125] [15.028] [13.976]
Observations 485 485 195 195 290 290
R-squared 0.18 0.206 0.371 0.407 0.223 0.249
Mean dependent variable 1.89 1.89 1.86 1.86 1.92 1.92
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Includes State of origin Fixed Effects
All Returners Stayers
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Table 19: Assimilation of Current U.S. Migrants - Economic Variables  
 
Variables measured at baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic demographics
(1) Age: 15-19 Omiited Age<15 0.01 0.06 -0.1 0.11 -5.31 2.17
[0.203] [0.208] [0.262] [0.288] [10.421] [11.201]
(1) Age: 20-24 0.08 0.08 0.1 0.28 -0.3 5.15
[0.215] [0.215] [0.276] [0.296] [11.450] [12.083]
(1) Age: 25-34 0.25 0.27 -0.1 0.06 4.54 9.79
[0.212] [0.210] [0.252] [0.270] [11.628] [12.079]
(1) Age: 35-49 0.2 0.18 0.17 0.35 13.83 19.04
[0.252] [0.253] [0.275] [0.289] [13.102] [13.558]
(1) Age: >50 0.13 0.04 -0.11 0.11 -19.91 -12.29
[0.286] [0.297] [0.313] [0.325] [14.546] [15.793]
(1) Female -0.23** -0.21** -0.36*** -0.38*** -15.51*** -14.76***
[0.100] [0.100] [0.077] [0.078] [3.845] [3.910]
(1) Married 0.07 0.1 -0.27*** -0.31*** -8.44 -8.42
[0.126] [0.136] [0.102] [0.108] [6.493] [6.722]
Human capital
Mother's years of education 0 0 0 0 -1.57*** -1.54***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.011] [0.011] [0.572] [0.580]
Father's years of education 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.09* 1.15**
[0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.565] [0.576]
(1) *Primary complete Omitted Primay incomplete 0.25** 0.29** 0.09 0.06 -2.1 -2.46
[0.113] [0.116] [0.107] [0.106] [6.004] [6.159]
(1) High school incomplete 0.26** 0.28** 0.11 0.09 6.77 6.64
[0.120] [0.121] [0.105] [0.102] [5.971] [6.182]
(1) High scool complete 0.24* 0.28* 0.28** 0.27** 4.72 3.81
[0.144] [0.143] [0.128] [0.127] [7.763] [7.915]
(1) Some college or more 0.25 0.26* 0.29* 0.25* 8.03 6.27
[0.156] [0.159] [0.148] [0.147] [8.179] [8.365]
(1) Attended school in US 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 -32.02*** -28.92***
[0.142] [0.140] [0.126] [0.130] [6.481] [6.544]
Attained height (cm) 0 0 0 0 -0.08 -0.12
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.239] [0.241]
Z score Raven's Score 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.76
[0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.033] [1.765] [1.753]
Networks in US
(1) One relative in US Omitted No relatives in US 0.02 -0.21*** -6.5
[0.083] [0.076] [4.385]
(1) Two relatives in US 0.26** -0.08 -6.37
[0.108] [0.083] [5.022]
(1) Three or more relatives in US 0.13 -0.20** -2.07
[0.089] [0.084] [4.792]
(1) Spouse in US -0.19 0.11 -4.86
[0.203] [0.144] [9.429]
(1) Any parent in Us -0.05 -0.21* -16.02*
[0.118] [0.110] [8.690]
(1) Daughter/Son in US 0.25 -0.17 -6.06
[0.180] [0.187] [9.699]
Continued on next page
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Variables measured at baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Siblings in US 0.16* -0.05 1.44
[0.080] [0.071] [4.522]
(1) Extended family in US 0.33*** -0.11 -3.26
[0.111] [0.094] [5.663]
Year of arrival to US 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.49* 0.50*
[0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.265] [0.264]
HH characteristics
(1) HH own farm business -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -5.38 -4.94
[0.090] [0.089] [0.068] [0.068] [3.909] [3.897]
(1) HH own a house 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -5.17 -5.03
[0.071] [0.072] [0.057] [0.058] [3.314] [3.305]
(1) HH own a non-farm business 0 -0.01 0.01 0.01 1.38 1.91
[0.082] [0.083] [0.071] [0.072] [4.350] [4.366]
(1) Quartile 2 wealth per capita -0.09 -0.09 0 0 -0.18 0.65
[0.090] [0.089] [0.079] [0.079] [4.252] [4.207]
(1) Quartile 3 wealth per capita -0.28*** -0.28*** 0.14* 0.16* -0.53 -0.64
[0.103] [0.105] [0.084] [0.086] [4.788] [4.754]
(1) Quartile 4 wealth per capita -0.07 -0.07 0.09 0.08 -4.7 -4.68
[0.110] [0.110] [0.092] [0.092] [5.658] [5.577]
HH size 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1.27 0.85
[0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.807] [0.813]
# coresident children -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.68 -0.55
[0.036] [0.037] [0.031] [0.031] [1.798] [1.861]
(1) Coresident parents 0.13 0.12 0.05 0 -1.45 -2.14
[0.111] [0.116] [0.094] [0.099] [5.992] [6.105]
Locality characteristics
(1) Rural 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03 2.94 2.77
[0.089] [0.088] [0.073] [0.072] [4.014] [3.970]
Constant -12.75 -12.35 -5.6 -3.53 -873.84 -889.32*
[13.717] [13.850] [10.594] [10.797] [532.342] [530.545]
Observations 569 569 568 568 828 828
R-squared 0.125 0.131 0.234 0.235 0.238 0.247
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Includes State of origin Fixed Effects
* Note2: Education is attained education in MxFLS3
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Table 20: Assimilation of Current U.S. Migrants - Use of English  
 
Dept variable = 100 if speaks English Fair, Good or Very Good
Variables measured at baseline (1) (2)
Basic demographics
(1) Age: 15-19 Omiited Age<15 6.07 1.13
[10.504] [10.971]
(1) Age: 20-24 -3.57 -6.86
[11.533] [11.915]
(1) Age: 25-34 6.13 2.62
[11.572] [11.851]
(1) Age: 35-49 -7.12 -11.88
[12.549] [12.912]
(1) Age: >50 -24.87* -31.47**
[12.674] [13.753]
(1) Female -8.70** -8.57**
[4.013] [4.005]
(1) Married 4.67 5.13
[6.765] [6.991]
Human capital
Mother's years of education 1.66*** 1.67***
[0.613] [0.619]
Father's years of education 0.2 0.32
[0.639] [0.651]
(1) *Primary complete Omitted Primay incomplete 2.11 2.23
[5.613] [5.820]
(1) High school incomplete 10.68* 11.03*
[5.710] [5.902]
(1) High scool complete 13.99* 14.83**
[7.255] [7.388]
(1) Some college or more 29.45*** 31.62***
[7.926] [8.206]
(1) Attended school in US 44.15*** 41.57***
[5.288] [5.354]
Attained height (cm) 0.16 0.19
[0.237] [0.238]
Z score Raven's Score 3.53* 3.65*
[1.948] [1.947]
Networks in US
(1) One relative in US Omitted No relatives in US -1.12
[4.774]
(1) Two relatives in US 2.65
[5.307]
(1) Three or more relatives in US 1.25
[5.148]
(1) Spouse in US -3.19
[7.664]
(1) Any parent in Us 11.44
[8.369]
(1) Daughter/Son in US 6.4
[8.500]
Continued on next page
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Dept variable = 100 if speaks English Fair, Good or Very Good
Variables measured at baseline (1) (2)
(1) Siblings in US -0.95
[4.832]
(1) Extended family in US -7.23
[6.118]
Year of arrival to US -0.61*** -0.63***
[0.236] [0.235]
HH characteristics
(1) HH own farm business -5.88 -5.34
[4.206] [4.177]
(1) HH own a house -0.52 -1.4
[3.483] [3.502]
(1) HH own a non-farm business -8.33** -9.02**
[4.087] [4.032]
(1) Quartile 2 wealth per capita -4.97 -5.14
[4.722] [4.712]
(1) Quartile 3 wealth per capita -0.56 0.22
[4.897] [4.859]
(1) Quartile 4 wealth per capita -2.6 -1.91
[5.586] [5.456]
HH size -0.95 -0.55
[0.847] [0.866]
# coresident children -2.79 -2.92*
[1.755] [1.695]
(1) Coresident parents 3.16 3.81
[5.803] [5.977]
Locality characteristics
(1) Rural -1.73 -2.11
[4.071] [4.098]
Constant 1,237*** 1,263***
[475] [472]
Observations 829 829
R-squared 0.325 0.331
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Includes State of origin Fixed Effects
* Note2: Education is attained education in MxFLS3
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Table 21: Assimilation of Current U.S. Migrants - Relatives in U.S. 
 
 
 
Variables measured at baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Basic demographics
(1) Age: 15-19 Omiited Age<15 6.01 -2.32 9.26 -28.71 -1.67 -0.51 0.14 -0.59
[30.579] [35.966] [25.207] [30.218] [3.590] [2.832] [6.587] [6.134]
(1) Age: 20-24 4.46 -3.74 13.96 -25.62 -4.16 -3.64 -7.44 -7.34
[33.153] [38.043] [28.071] [32.684] [3.590] [3.302] [7.680] [6.944]
(1) Age: 25-34 2.25 -5.12 15.67 -25.92 -4.22 -3.65 6.38 5.06
[33.593] [37.364] [29.076] [32.753] [6.643] [6.303] [9.365] [7.833]
(1) Age: 35-49 -17.12 -22.89 11.63 -27.07 -5.46 -4.03 -4.86 -0.92
[34.341] [38.719] [29.387] [33.615] [8.268] [6.469] [9.944] [9.017]
(1) Age: >50 2.45 -1.85 39.32 0.7 4.12 9.44 -2.7 1.14
[33.185] [37.381] [28.339] [32.081] [6.348] [7.710] [10.591] [10.501]
(1) Married -13.3 -14.31 -15.61 -11.23 -2.85 -2.98 2.11 1.5
[12.224] [12.243] [13.185] [14.555] [3.546] [3.886] [6.325] [5.805]
Human capital
Mother's years of education -0.19 -0.16 0.53 0.27 -0.21 -0.25 0.47 0.58
[1.465] [1.511] [1.142] [1.178] [0.215] [0.245] [0.573] [0.540]
Father's years of education -0.48 -0.31 -0.46 0.07 0.02 0.11 -0.73 -0.64
[1.181] [1.238] [1.380] [1.423] [0.256] [0.264] [0.698] [0.638]
(1) *Primary complete Omitted Primay incomplete -0.04 1.43 16.81 19.82 2.19 1.35 -4.76 -5.31
[13.710] [13.931] [12.500] [12.554] [4.915] [4.280] [5.012] [4.603]
(1) High school incomplete 2.94 5.56 11.89 18.52 2.7 1.48 -8.46 -7.86
[13.521] [13.470] [12.238] [12.122] [4.679] [3.631] [5.868] [5.511]
(1) High scool complete -14.28 -11.61 1.67 8.87 4.58 2.82 -8.1 -7.55
[18.747] [18.937] [16.151] [16.359] [4.851] [4.042] [6.660] [6.324]
(1) Some college or more -16.2 -15.54 7.06 11.88 4.46 2.78 -24.27** -22.78**
[18.829] [18.856] [16.065] [16.667] [6.351] [4.428] [10.092] [9.923]
(1) Attended school in US -14.96 -13.27 7.32 4.16 0.59 1.43 0.73 0.58
[17.056] [17.586] [13.944] [14.630] [2.993] [3.158] [4.729] [4.299]
Attained height (cm) 0.96 0.92 0.1 0.08 -0.21 -0.16 -0.31 -0.28
[0.630] [0.649] [0.640] [0.646] [0.231] [0.204] [0.226] [0.197]
Z score Raven's Score 3.89 3.97 1 2.91 0 -0.08 1.32 1.41
[4.697] [4.606] [3.899] [4.101] [0.708] [0.674] [1.724] [1.651]
Networks in US
(1) One relative in US Omitted No relatives in US -0.04 21.99** 0.02 0.12
[8.669] [9.300] [2.624] [4.325]
(1) Two relatives in US 5.31 25.83** -1.76 -4.12
[11.177] [11.911] [2.800] [5.523]
(1) Three or more relatives in US 10.38 29.11** -1.71 0.57
[10.465] [11.248] [1.885] [4.730]
(1) Spouse in US 20.53 2.43
[18.871] [3.400]
(1) Any parent in Us -1.12 -0.96 -0.39 1.48***
[1.448] [1.389] [0.385] [0.549]
(1) Daughter/Son in US -5.54 -4.12
[10.780] [4.990]
Continued on next page
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Variables measured at baseline (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
(1) Siblings in US 8.5 6.04 4.26 7.17**
[8.129] [6.506] [2.632] [3.201]
(1) Extended family in US -2.08 -2.79 -0.52 -6.81**
[10.413] [6.308] [3.536] [3.431]
Year of arrival to US -1.25** -1.10** -0.67 -0.5 0.19 0.26 -0.39 -0.4
[0.534] [0.537] [0.439] [0.445] [0.282] [0.311] [0.258] [0.268]
HH characteristics
(1) HH own farm business 17.71* 18.71* 18.22** 17.81** -2.83 -3.98 4.47 3.07
[10.273] [10.320] [8.134] [8.307] [3.492] [3.061] [3.901] [3.634]
(1) HH own a house 11.98 10.51 5.48 5.33 0.79 0.14 1.38 0.99
[8.941] [9.597] [7.706] [7.595] [2.981] [2.673] [3.204] [3.086]
(1) HH own a non-farm business -4.58 -4.92 -1.56 -2.81 1.67 1 1.12 -0.12
[9.174] [9.700] [9.320] [9.602] [1.488] [1.369] [4.197] [3.908]
(1) Quartile 2 wealth per capita -26.15*** -25.19** -18.64* -19.30** 4.55 4.87 5.3 5.29
[9.924] [9.918] [9.676] [9.579] [3.967] [4.010] [4.043] [3.780]
(1) Quartile 3 wealth per capita -22.71** -21.22** -8.09 -9.68 6.09 5.95 4.12 6.09*
[10.647] [10.697] [10.264] [10.446] [4.114] [3.874] [3.595] [3.622]
(1) Quartile 4 wealth per capita 8.97 9.97 10.16 7.89 7.09 7.24 -0.26 -0.04
[12.746] [12.887] [11.593] [12.047] [4.541] [4.422] [4.710] [4.661]
HH size 2.86 2.99 2.35 2.67 0.15 0.18 -0.42 0.05
[2.363] [2.291] [2.142] [2.122] [0.640] [0.618] [0.760] [0.701]
# coresident children -8.13** -7.73** -1.9 -1.49 1.25 1.15 -2.68 -3.05
[3.428] [3.585] [3.291] [3.169] [0.948] [0.929] [2.668] [2.232]
(1) Coresident parents -3.34 -1.88 -8.67 -8.21 2.83 1.71 7.03* 6.69
[11.893] [12.113] [10.112] [10.535] [2.669] [1.972] [4.033] [4.293]
Locality characteristics
(1) Rural -3.55 -3.04 -6.56 -1.88 2.14 2.14 -4.48 -3.31
[8.458] [8.471] [8.919] [9.206] [3.367] [3.512] [4.111] [3.826]
Constant 2,422.77** 2,139.94* 1361.56 1077.23 -260.27 -407.66 933.48* 936.89*
[1,076.599][1,087.328] [865.599] [885.383] [538.094] [599.133] [522.708] [543.083]
Observations 189 189 226 226 218 218 259 259
R-squared 0.436 0.437 0.312 0.294 0.144 0.174 0.314 0.38
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Includes State of origin Fixed Effects
* Note2: Education is attained education in MxFLS3
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4. The Economic Burden of Crime: Evidence from 
Mexico 
4.1 Introduction 
Since 2007, drug-related crime in Mexico has increased at an unprecedented pace 
and intensity. Between 2007 and 2011 the official homicide rate reported by the National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI, its Spanish acronym) exploded from 8.5 to 
24.4 per 100,000 inhabitants (Figure 7 provides the monthly homicide rate in Mexico 
from 2002 to 2011). Moreover, not only has the homicide rate increased in the last few 
years, but the characteristics of the violence have also dramatically changed. The 
amplified effort against Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) taken by Felipe Calderón’s 
government had unanticipated consequences for the intensification and geographical 
dispersion of violence in Mexico. One of the main unexpected effects of the new military 
strategy, for example, was the growth in the number of OCGs from 6 in 2007 to 16 in 
2010 (Guerrero, 2012a).  
The loss in leadership within the drug cartels due to the death or incarceration of 
the previous bosses created power vacuums that have spawned the emergence of new 
leaders and have increased the struggle for dominance over critical drug running 
corridors.1  As these competitions intensified, the nature of crimes has also rapidly 
                                                   
1 The term “drug cartel” is a colloquial term to refer to organized crime organizations but it does not imply 
any collusion to set prices. I will use the term Organized Crime Groups (OCGs), traffickers’ organizations 
and “cartels” indistinctively to refer to organized crime organizations involved in the drug-trafficking 
business. 
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changed. For example, the strategic placement of dead corpses has become one useful 
tool to spread fear and send messages to rival traffickers, authorities, and citizens (Rios, 
2012). Moreover, in addition to changing the violent crime environment, the fracturing 
of the cartels has reduced the profits each individual OCG makes from drug trafficking 
and has pushed these groups to more aggressively pursue criminal enterprises that 
target non-combatants.2   
Research suggests that an environment of elevated crime, such as the current 
Mexican environment, severely alters the context in which people operate and 
drastically impacts individual and household behaviors.3  In particular, it can have an 
effect on labor markets, both on the demand and the supply side (Bozzoli et al., 2011; 
Calderón et al., 2011; Deininger, 2003; Fernández et al., 2011; Kondylis, 2007; 
Shemyakina, 2011). On the supply side, labor may diminish when violence increases if 
the fear of being victimized increases the cost of labor participation or if the outside 
option of drug-cartel membership reduces the relative utility of participation in the legal 
labor force. On the other hand, it may increase the labor supply if high levels of violence 
                                                   
2 There is evidence that increasing conflict in Mexico has led to an expansion of crimes targeting citizens, 
such as, extortions, kidnapping, as well as, car and business thefts, with extortions increasing from 3 per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2006 to 5.88 in 2009, business thefts from 54.42 in 2006 to 63.32 in 2009, (72.3 in 2011) 
(Robles et al., 2013) and executions by 60% between 2009 to 2010 (from 9,604 to 15,263) (Guerrero, 2012a).  
  
3 A rich strand of the literature has shown evidence of the effects of high levels of crime on health outcomes 
(Akresh et al, 2012; Baez, 2011; Bundervoet et al. 2009), human capital investment (Barrera and Ibáñez, 2004; 
Leon, 2012; Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2009; Shemyakina, 2010) and asset depletion and consumption (Justino 
and Verwimp, 2006; Ibáñez and Moya, 2010). 
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diminish the earnings of the main bread-winner and other members of the household 
have to join the labor force - this is known as the added-worker effect in the literature 
(Lundberg, 1986; Cunningham, 2001; Calderon et al. 2011). Labor demand is also likely 
to be impacted by violence, and as with supply, the direction of the effect is unclear. On 
the negative side, investment at the firm level may contract due to the added costs 
imposed by crime (Collier and Duponchel, 2013; Pshisva and Suarez, 2010; Camacho 
and Rodriguez, 2013), which would have a negative effect on availability of formal 
employment opportunities as some businesses close, reduce their size, or choose not to 
enter the market. Alternatively, increased presence of drug-cartel members, and thus 
their disposable income, may increase economic activity, leading to an increase on labor 
demand. 
The purpose of this chapter is to quantify the impact of the increasing wave of 
crime in Mexico on individual labor market outcomes and household consumption. Due 
to the multidimensional impact of violence on labor market outcomes, the effect may 
differ significantly depending on the employment sector of the individual. For example, 
a reduction in hours worked may be a successful strategy to decrease the probability of 
being victimized. However, this is a strategy that is more easily implemented by self-
employed individuals as they have more flexibility and control of their schedules. To 
shed light on the potential heterogeneity of the effect depending on type of employment, 
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I will identify the impact of violence separately for self-employed and wage employees, 
as well as occupation groups within these classes.  
In addition, this chapter makes a contribution to the literature on conflict and 
gender, by examining specifically at the effects of violence on labor market outcomes of 
women and per capita expenditure in households with a female household head. 
Looking at women separately from men is imperative when examining the 
consequences of violent crime, as it is very likely that they face a different level and type 
of victimization than men, especially with regard to sexual assault (USAID, 2007). 
Moreover, in the specific case of the recent conflict in Mexico, evidence suggests that 
there has been an increase in violence specifically targeted towards women (Pantaleo, 
2010). Additionally, since it is likely that the violence has heterogeneous effects on 
different job types, and since even within the same employment sector, men and women 
specialize in different types of occupations, separating the analysis by gender within 
occupation categories provides a richer understanding of the impact of violence on the 
labor market.   
High levels of violence can create long-lasting impacts on the well-being of 
civilians. In particular, when labor markets are affected, households that do not have the 
capacity to smooth negative income shocks can end up in poverty traps, with the next 
generation’s future welfare being affected by the lower household’s income, lower 
consumption, and lower human capital investment. Advancing the understanding of the 
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effect of high levels of violence and crime is a first order question for governments that 
need to provide the adequate assistance to the victims of these circumstances.      
However, assessing the effect of violence on economic outcomes imposes several 
empirical challenges. The major contribution of this work is the rigorous inclusion of 
and accounting for systematic migration, the use of respondent fixed effects, and the 
exploration of the heterogeneous impact of conflict on individual labor market outcomes 
and household per capita expenditure. An individual fixed effect strategy combined 
with an intent-to-treat approach controls for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity 
that affects exposure to crime and individual outcomes while shielding the estimates 
from potential systematic migration as a behavioral response to crime. Moreover, unlike 
the previous literature on this subject I am able to explicitly analyze migration as a 
behavioral response to violence. In addition, by assessing the effect of violence on a 
broad range of outcomes, rather than just employment status and total earnings, the 
analysis provides a more comprehensive exploration of the labor market and welfare 
effects of crime. This chapter’s analysis of labor market outcomes utilizes measures of 
participation in the labor market, total earnings, hours worked, hourly earnings and is 
complemented by a detailed analysis of per capita expenditure. The results confirm the 
importance of these advancements to this literature, as this chapter finds evidence of 
systematic migration as a response to violence, significant changes in hours worked, 
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hourly earnings, and per capita expenditure, as well as heterogeneous labor market 
effects by gender and occupation type. 
To conduct these analyses I exploit available information on homicide rates from 
the INEGI at the municipality level from 2005-06 (a period of low levels of violence) to 
2009-12 (a period of high levels of violence). In order to analyze the impact of violence 
on the outcomes of interest, the INEGI homicide data is matched, at the level of the 
municipality, to the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a nationally representative 
longitudinal survey. 
 The MxFLS is ideally suited to address the questions of this chapter. One 
important feature of the survey is that the first follow-up was conducted between 2005 
and 2006, during a time of relatively stable levels of conflict, and the second follow-up 
was performed from 2009 to 2013, when violence in Mexico rose with unprecedented 
intensity.4 This feature of the timing, paired with the panel nature of the survey, allows 
the comparison of outcomes of the same individual in periods of low and high violence. 
Additionally, the detailed survey information contained in the MxFLS provides a rich 
set of controls for time-varying individual and household characteristics. 
The results suggest that a higher homicide rate negatively affects labor market 
participation and the number of hours worked by self-employed women; and, there is a 
                                                   
4 94% of the sample of panel respondents interviewed
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great deal of heterogeneity on the labor income of the women who stay in the labor force 
depending on their occupation and the level of violence to which they are exposed. On 
the other hand, crime does not affect self-employed males’ labor market participation, 
but does negatively impact their hourly and total earnings. The adverse effect of crime is 
also evident for measures of per capita expenditure, in particular for households with a 
self-employed household head, as the results suggest that exposure to conflict has 
negatively affected consumption levels of these households.  
The next section introduces the homicide data available in Mexico, provides 
background on the Mexican experience of violent crime over the last decade, and 
describes the INEGI homicide data. Section 3.3 reviews the literature on the effect of 
crime on labor market outcomes and wealth. Section 4.4 describes the Mexican Family 
Life Survey (MxFLS) and shows descriptive statistics of the analytical sample. Section 4.5 
provides a description of the conceptual framework that motivates the empirical 
specification that is presented in section 4.6. Section 4.7 shows and discusses the main 
results. In section 4.8 robustness checks are discussed and section 4.9 concludes. 
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4.2 Background 
The rapid increase in violent homicides has led to a debate about its causes.5  One 
hypothesis is that the rapid increase in homicides and the degree of violence 
surrounding them is a byproduct of the military strategy of increased confrontation 
against OCGs that took place since late 2006 when Felipe Calderón became president 
(Molzahn, et al., 2012; Guerrero, 2011a).  
Calderón’s military strategy against the main “capos” of the cartels destabilized 
the old oligopolistic equilibrium where the OCGs operated while maintaining relatively 
low levels of violence. Guerrero (2012b) suggests that by confronting the main leader of 
a trafficking group two types of violence are created: first, an internal conflict arises for 
the leadership of the organization; and second, it increases the likelihood of 
confrontations from enemy organizations that seek to wrest territorial control by taking 
advantage of the weakened enemy. Rios (2013) describes this new equilibrium as a “self-
reinforcing violent equilibrium” where the violent confrontations between traffickers 
increase the likelihood of government interventions which promote subsequent 
confrontations between the remaining traffickers to control the market left by their 
predecessors. Related to this debate, Dell (2011) compares municipalities where a mayor 
from Calderon’s party (Partido Acción Nacional –PAN) won the election by a margin of 
                                                   
5 Castillo et al. (2013); Dell (2011); Guerrero (2011a); Guerrero (2012b); Molzahn et al. (2012); Rios and Shirk 
(2011); Rios (2013); Shirk (2011). 
 118 
5 percent or less to municipalities in which the PAN barely lost by the same margin. 
Comparing these municipalities 6 months before the election and 6 months after the 
election, the author finds a significant increase of drug related homicides in the 
municipalities where Calderón’s party won, suggesting that PAN related policies may 
have triggered the massive increase in homicides. 
This rapid and intense increase of violence is seen in the official homicide rate 
reported by the INEGI.6  According to this data source the annual homicide rate has 
increased in Mexico from 8.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2007 to 24.4 in 2011, 
an increase of almost 200% (Figure 7, red solid line). Comparing the numbers reported 
by the INEGI with those from the National Public Security System (SNSP, its Spanish 
acronym), which were collected under the direction of President Felipe Calderón (Figure 
7, green dashed line), and compiles homicides exclusively related to organized crime, it 
is evident that most of the increasing trend of homicides reports by the INEGI is 
explained by drug-related violence.7   
                                                   
6 In an effort to understand the new dynamics of crime in Mexico, in addition to the official numbers of 
intentional homicides reported by the INEGI, other data sources were assembled to shed light on the 
puzzling increase of crime in Mexico. For an analysis and comparison of the different data available to 
measure homicides see Rios and Shirk (2011) and Molzahn, Rios and Shirk (2012). 
 
7 The data that measures homicides related to organized crime was released by the Mexican government in 
December of 2010, and provides information of number of homicides “allegedly linked to organized crime” 
from December 2006 to September of 2011. The numbers from this data set show a rise in the annual 
homicide rate of more than 550% between 2007 and 2011; from 2.67 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2007 to 12.6 in 
2010 and 18 in 2011 (green dashed line in Figure 1 shows monthly homicide rates). 
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Since 2006, not only has the intensity of executions increased but the 
geographical concentration has changed as well: in 2010, 168 municipalities reported 12 
or more executions, whereas in 2007 only 48 municipalities reported 12 or more 
executions.8  Although the INEGI dataset captures all intentional homicide rates and not 
only drug-related violence, it also shows the geographical dispersion found in the 
organized crime dataset. Figures 9 and 10 show the homicide rates in 2002 and 2005 
before Calderón took office. At that point only a handful of municipalities were at the 
top of the distribution of homicides and they were highly concentrated in states with 
strong presence of OCG’s. Although the presence of traffickers could increase the levels 
of violence in general the figures show that before 2007 the levels were relatively low 
and concentrated in only a few places. 
Figures 11 to 13 show the geographical dispersion of the homicide rate from 2007 
to 2010. The first year of Calderón’s term, 2007, was a relatively stable year in terms of 
violence, even though his military strategy was already being implemented. The first 
dramatic increase of violence is observed in 2008 (Figure 8). Figures 12 and 13 show the 
almost epidemic dispersion of crime: there is a massive increase in violence in 
previously unaffected municipalities in Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa, Michoacán and 
Guerrero, among others.  
                                                   
8 The mean of executions in 2012 was 11.76 using the dataset from the SNSP. 
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Rios (2013) documents the dynamics of war within and between traffickers’ 
organizations after a leader of an OCG is captured. In 2008, for example, the Sinaloa 
cartel leader was captured which caused that cartel to split and as a consequence created 
a combative relationship between the Sinaloa Cartel and La Familia from Michoacán. 
One of the consequences of this was an intensification of violence in Guerrero where La 
Familia and the Sinaloa Cartel had operated together in previous years. The situation 
only got worse in 2009 and 2010 (Figures 12 and 13). In 2009 the Sinaloa Cartel split once 
again and an area that in 2007 had only one cartel operating became the territory of four 
competing cartels (Rios, 2013; Guerrero, 2011b). The fracturing of cartels intensified the 
violence in the competing territories and spread the violence as new groups attempted 
to increase their territorial control. In the meantime, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas 
suffered the consequences of a turf war between Los Zetas and their former employer 
the Gulf Cartel. The maps using the INEGI official homicides data show both the 
intensification of the violence and its geographical dispersion.9    
In addition to the increased number of confrontations between groups, the rising 
competition between OCGs has led to a diversification of their financial sources.  While 
drug trafficking activities still account for most of the drug cartels’ economic resources, 
                                                   
9 It is important that the INEGI data accurately reflects the relative levels of violence through Mexico, 
because unlike the data from other sources, the homicides reported in the INEGI are available from 1990 to 
2011, which allows the analyses to include both the pre-violence and high violence periods and thus fully 
exploit the panel nature of the MxFLS. 
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in order to increase profits and fund their fight against the military and other OCGs, 
they have been relying more on criminal activities that directly affect the civil 
population, like kidnappings, extortions and car thefts. Moreover, the visibility of crimes 
have changed the dynamics of the violence in Mexico. “Narco-messages” to spread fear 
in the communities have become a very popular method to signal territorial presence 
and to spread fear across other OCG’s but also toward authorities, journalists and any 
citizen that would not support their actions.  
Moreover, the feeling of fear is exacerbated by the public’s lack of trust in the 
State’s institutions and the high levels of corruption and abuses from the police 
(Guerrero, 2011a; Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2011). Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2011) measure the 
strategies that the OCGs use against the civil society and measure how embedded they 
have become in the society. Their results show that both OCGs and police take 
advantage of citizens, particularly preying on the poor and less educated. By looking at 
the effects of violence for different occupations and type of employment, this chapter 
will provide empirical evidence on the heterogeneous effects of crime on labor markets.  
In addition, although the main driver of the surge on violence has been the drug-
related business, women have also been victims of the intensity of crime. Not only the 
number of female homicides increased 120% from 2007 to 2012 (INEGI) but also, the 
violence used in female homicides is more violent than the one used against men. While 
more than 40% of the cases of homicides of men are deaths caused by a fire arm, female 
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deaths are more violent - strangulation and the use of a sharp object are the most 
common incidences of homicide. Moreover, sexual violence against women in Mexico 
has also increased in the last years, and a study from the United Nations shows that 
Mexico is the country with the highest percentage of women who have suffered this 
kind of violence (Echarri Canovas, 2011).   
The fear of being victimized can directly affect the decision to participate in the 
labor market. The effect might be different for men and women if the new dynamics of 
crime have had a differential effect on the decision to work of women. In particular, in 
cases where women are not the main bread-winner their opportunity cost of leaving the 
labor market might be lower. By measuring the effect of crime, separately for men and 
women, this chapter will provide evidence on these issues.   
 In order to measure the effect of crime on individual and household outcomes I 
will use the homicide rates reported by the INEGI. Although homicide rates have been 
extensively used in the literature as a measure of crime and violence, potential 
measurement error in the INEGI homicide rate when used as proxy for the measure of 
violence could bias the empirical estimation.10   On the one hand, one concern is that 
since the INEGI data only captures registered homicides this source to measure 
                                                   
10 Because the final act of a homicide is the violent death of a person, and because of the difficulty related 
with hiding a body, homicides are less likely to be subject to underestimation or misinterpretation in 
comparison to crime on property or physical violence; moreover, the classification of an homicide is 
homogeneous across regional boundaries which diminishes potential measurement error (Shrader, 2001). 
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homicide rates may reflect a lower bound on the actual level of violence. However, this 
does not seem to be a limitation, as the figures and maps show, the INEGI data captures 
the same increasing trend as the data on homicides related to organized crime. On the 
other hand, the increase in homicides might reflect a combination of actual increases in 
conflict as well as simply a shift in the ability/motivation to more accurately report 
homicides over this time period. In that case the effect of homicide rates on the outcomes 
of interest would be overestimated. Although shifts in reporting patterns could be an 
important source of measurement error in other scenarios, the increasing violence has 
not only been evident in the official numbers (INEGI and the SNSP datasets), but also in 
alternative data sources collected by academics, the national press, and NGOs, all of 
which have verified the findings of the public records (Molzahn, et al., 2012).11 
 
4.3 The Economic Effects of Crime and Violence    
Although a number of studies analyze the cause of the increasing violence in 
Mexico, relatively few studies measure the impact of crime on individual and household 
outcomes. Dell (2011) makes an important contribution to the literature and exploits a 
network model of drug-trafficking routes and information from the National Survey of 
                                                   
11 An additional concern is related with systematic measurement error. This would be the case if, for 
example, there is larger underreporting in the most violent places, which would be related with non-
classical measurement error. However, the close correlation of the INEGI dataset with other datasets that 
rely on alternative sources, does not seem to suggest non-classical measurement error on the INEGI 
homicide rates. 
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Occupation and Employment (ENOE) to measure the economic spillover effects of drug-
related violence. Dell’s results suggest no effects on male labor participation or wages in 
the formal sector but in contrast, negative effects on male wages in the informal sector 
and on female labor force participation.  
Two recent working chapters have also measured the effect of crime on labor 
outcomes using data from the ENOE. The ENOE is a rotating panel where a household 
is followed during 5 trimesters and is then replaced by a new household. The limitation 
of this dataset to analyze the effects of violence is that it does not allow the researcher to 
control for migration as a behavioral response to crime. If, for example, the highest 
skilled individuals migrate when violence increases, the effects of crime on labor income 
will be overestimated. By using the MxFLS, a longitudinal survey designed to follow all 
migrants, I am able to measure migration as a response to crime and to account for it in 
my empirical specification.  
Two working chapters have used the ENOE to examine the effects on labor 
outcomes. First, the empirical strategy of Robles et al. (2013) relies on an instrumental 
variable approach, using the variation in cocaine seizures in Colombia interacted with 
the distance of each municipality to the principal point of entry to the U.S., instrument 
from Castillo et al. (2013), as an instrument for homicides and find a dampening effect of 
violence on an individual’s labor market participation, and on the proportion of 
business owners in the population but no effect on self-employment or overall economic 
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activity (measured as domestic electricity consumption). Second, BenYishai and 
Pearlman (2013) relies on individual fixed effects and an instrumental variable approach. 
The IV in this case is the number of kilometers of federal toll highways in each state. 
Their results suggest that the marginal effect of violence has reduced the average hours 
worked of both salaried and self-employed males, and for the latter the impact has been 
larger for those males who work from home. The analysis, though, does not provide 
evidence on whether the lower labor supply has had any effect on the labor income of 
Mexican citizens. Moreover, in order to deal with migratory behavior, individuals that 
were not born in the current state of residence are dropped from the study, which, if 
migration is selective, leads to a non-random analytical sample. 
In addition to the chapters that study the recent violence in Mexico, there are 
important contributions in the literature that have measured the impact of crime on 
labor market outcomes and household’s economic conditions in other settings (Bozzoli, 
et al., 2011; Calderón, et al., 2011; Deininger, 2003; Fernández, et al., 2011; Kondylis, 
2007; Shemyakina, 2011). Most of these contributions are in settings were individuals 
have been forcibly displaced by violence and face considerable constraints in the labor 
markets of the destination cities.  
Bozzoli, et al. (2011) study the effects of the Colombian conflict on the probability 
of being self-employed in rural settings and find a decreasing share of self-employment 
in municipalities with higher rates of conflict. Calderón, et al. (2011) estimate the effects 
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of displacement on the labor markets of destination places. The authors find that a larger 
supply of unskilled labor increases the likelihood of informality and reduces wages in 
this sector. Kondilys (2007) exploits data from a longitudinal study to explore the effects 
of displacement on labor market outcomes in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
results show that displaced men experience higher unemployment levels, and displaced 
women are more likely to drop out of the labor force. Shemyakina (2011) measures the 
long-term impact of the 1992-1998 armed conflict in Tajikistan on education and labor 
market outcomes for both men and women. By performing a difference in difference 
regression the author finds that, for women, the conflict had a negative impact on 
educational attainment and a positive effect on labor market participation, while it had 
no effect for the outcomes of men.  
Moreover, there is an extended literature analyzing the response of individuals 
and households to negative shocks. In particular, a number of studies examine the 
ability of households to smooth consumption in times of crisis (see for example, 
Townsend, 1995; Morduch, 1995; Frankenberg et al. 2003). If we consider exposure to 
violence as a negative shock to wealth, as high levels of violence may alter labor market 
outcomes and thus decrease the level of household income, there is potential for 
significant consumption smoothing. However, low socioeconomic status individuals 
may have very few insurance and credit mechanisms in order to smooth consumption. 
This suggests that the impact of violence on labor outcomes, per capita expenditure 
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(PCE), and wealth may have meaningful potential to create poverty traps for the most 
vulnerable population. A second pathway, through which violence may affect 
consumption behavior directly is through the fear of being targeted for conspicuous 
consumption. For example, it has been found that individuals in the United States 
decrease the consumption of visible goods to reduce the probability of victimization 
from property crime (Mejia and Restrepo, 2010). In this case there is a reallocation of 
consumption that does not affect total wealth, but can have a negative effect on utility 
functions at the household and individual levels.  
This chapter makes a contribution to the understanding of the economic impact 
of Mexico’s recent outbreak of violence and to the literature on the effects of crime in a 
number of ways. First, it exploits a robust identification strategy by estimating an 
individual fixed effect strategy combined with an intent-to-treat approach. The 
individual fixed effect strategy controls for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
that affects exposure to crime and the outcomes of interest, and the intent-to-treat 
approach controls for potential selective migration as a behavioral response to crime. 
Moreover, I explicitly test the exogeneity of the increasing trend of crime by adding 
controls of economic performance at the state and municipality level, I estimate a model 
of the predictability of violence, and I provide evidence from a placebo test regarding 
the exogeneity of the increasing trend of crime. Second, I directly analyze migration as a 
response to violence and I show evidence of selective migration as a behavioral response 
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to high levels of violence. If we had not followed migrants and if I had not controlled for 
it in the empirical specification the estimates of the effects of crime on the outcomes of 
interest would have been biased. Third, by measuring the effect of crime on a broad 
range of individual and household outcomes I provide a more comprehensive analysis 
of the labor market and welfare effects of crime. 
 
4.4 Data: Mexican Family Life Survey  
In order to study the impact of crime on economic outcomes at the individual 
and household level the INEGI homicide data is matched with the Mexican Family Life 
Survey (MxFLS). The MxFLS is an ongoing longitudinal, nationally representative 
survey of individuals and households who were living in Mexico in 2002 when the 
baseline was conducted. It includes information on approximately 8,440 households and 
35,600 individuals spread among 150 communities and 16 states throughout Mexico. The 
MxFLS is designed to follow all baseline respondents and their children born after 2002, 
independently of whether they have moved within Mexico or to the U.S.  
The longitudinal nature of the MxFLS and its rich content make it an ideal source 
to study the dynamics of individuals and households living in Mexico in 2002 and, 
specifically for this research, the impact of crime on different individual and household 
behaviors and outcomes. However, the contribution of using longitudinal data depends 
on the extent to which the original sample is successfully re-interviewed in each 
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following wave. With regards to this study, it is important that attrition is unrelated 
both to observed and unobserved characteristics, and also to the increasing trend of 
violence. 
Overall, the MxFLS has achieved low levels of attrition. In the second wave, 
conducted between 2005 and 2006, over 89% of the panel respondents were re-contacted 
(Panel A. of Table 22 shows the re-contact rates in MxFLS2). The third wave of the 
survey, MxFLS3, has recontacted approximately 87% of all panel respondents.12  Panel B 
of Table 22 shows current recontact rates for MxFLS3. 
Even though the recontact-rates provide evidence of a successful follow-up, if 
attrition is correlated with homicide rates the sample could lose its representativeness. 
In section 4.8 I present the results of a model that test for selected attrition on measures 
of violence. I estimate the model separately for men and women and in an alternative 
model I allow for non-linearities in the measures of violence, and in each analysis I find 
no evidence of selected attrition as a response to violence. 
The MxFLS provides a number of advantageous features for studying the impact 
of the Mexican drug war on the lives of Mexican citizens. First, as mentioned previously, 
the MxFLS2 was conducted in 2005/06 (during a period of “normal” levels of homicide 
rates) and the second follow-up (MxFLS3) was conducted between 2009 and 2013 
                                                   
12 These recontact rates are preliminary. Final recontact rates are currently being estimated. 
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(during a period of high levels of violence). As indicated in Figure 8, the timing of the 
MxFLS allows the comparison of outcomes of the same individual in periods of low and 
high levels of violence and the longitudinal nature of the data allows us to control for 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics.13   
Second, in the MxFLS there has been a concerted effort made to follow migrants 
within Mexico and to the U.S. This is particularly important for this study because 
migration may be a behavioral response to crime. For the sample of interest in this 
chapter, 8.9 percent of respondents were found in a different municipality between the 
two waves and 7.7% were found in the same municipality but report a long-term 
migration (more than one year) outside their municipality of residence. If migration is 
due to unobserved characteristics correlated with labor market outcomes and related to 
violence, it could bias the coefficients of interest.  
By using a panel dataset, I am able to limit this potential bias, as the empirical 
estimation controls for any time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the respondent. 
Moreover, since it is possible that individuals may be migrating as a reaction to or in 
anticipation of violence, the empirical specification relies on an intent-to-treat styled 
model where an individual will get assigned the homicide rate over the 12 months prior 
                                                   
13 Although the information at baseline provides another measure of pre-violence status, this study focuses 
on the first and second follow-up. One of the reasons to focus only on the last two waves of the MxFLS is to 
avoid excluding from the sample young individuals just entering the labor market in 2005 and for whom 
labor market information is not available in 2002. 
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to the MxFLS interview from his/her municipality of residence in 2005 to remove the 
possibility for local violence based systematic migration. Moreover, a model will be 
estimated to determine if potential changes in local violence predict migration behavior. 
The results, which will be discussed in more detail in the empirical section, suggest that 
violence predicts migration of single women and women living in rural places, and of 
self-employed men. These results highlight the importance of following movers in 
longitudinal surveys, and in particular for the purpose of this chapter.  
Third, the MxFLS has a rich set of characteristics about its participants, including 
information about the economic, social and health status of each member of a surveyed 
household. Of particular interest for this study, the MxFLS contains a great deal of 
content about a respondent’s labor market participation. For instance, employment is 
defined to include formal and informal jobs, we collect information on occupation and 
sector of employment, and complete information on earnings, weeks, and hours worked 
is collected for the two main jobs.  The information about the earnings and hours 
worked during the last 12 months allows analysis of the impact of crime not only on net 
participation in labor markets but also on total earnings and productivity, measured by 
hourly earnings. 
4.4.1 Labor Force Participation  
Before describing the conceptual and empirical framework, I describe in this 
section the changes on labor outcomes observed between 2005 and 2009, for the 
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analytical sample of this chapter, i.e. MxFLS respondents interviewed in Mexico in 
MxFLS2 and MxFLS3 age 18 and older at the time of the MxFLS2 interview. Table 23 
reports employment transition matrices exploiting the longitudinal nature of the MxFLS. 
Employment rates are calculated as the fraction of the population age 18 and older at the 
time of the MxFLS2 interview who report being active in the labor force.14   
The evidence showed in Panel A suggests that 81.1% of this cohort of males were 
active participants in the labor force in 2005, and their net participation in the labor force 
only increased by 0.6 percentage points by 2009. Panel B of Table 23 shows employment 
transition in and out of work, and between wage employment and self-employment. 
The results in the first columns show that, from the 9.2% of males leaving the labor force, 
56% were employees in the pre-violence period and 33% were self-employed. In 
addition, the results of Panel B for males suggest that, even though male labor 
participation was pretty much constant between the two periods, there is some mobility 
across the labor sectors. Out of the 72% of males who work in both periods, 52% work as 
employee in both waves, 15% remain self-employed, and around 26% move between 
                                                   
14 In MxFLS, employment is defined as having worked for at least one hour during the week prior to the 
interview for a salary, wage, or other payment in cash or in kind. It also includes individuals that did not 
work the week prior to the survey if the reason for missing work is a temporary cause such as a vacation or 
a short-term leave. 
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sectors.15  The purpose of this chapter is to identify whether the increase of crime 
explains any of these changes.    
Female participation, on the other hand, increased by almost 4 percentage points 
but more than half of women remain outside the labor market in both waves. The 
composition of women leaving the labor market is very similar to that of males: 53% 
were employees and 32% were self-employed. Out of the women working in both 
periods, 54% work as employee both periods, 14% are self-employed and do not switch 
and 24% move between wage employment and self-employment.  
This evidence suggests that between 2005 and 2009 both males and females have 
seen changes in their labor force participation. The next sections of this chapter show 
tests for whether increases in crime explain some of these changes and whether these 
changes in labor participation have an effect on individual earnings and on household 
per capita expenditure. 
 
4.5 Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework that underlies the empirical analysis is based on an 
individual maximization problem.16 Individuals’ make consumption (C) and labor 
                                                   
15 A very small percentage are unpaid workers in both waves. And, in total for 5.4% of males we have 
information on labor force participation but no information on their labor sector, and for females only 2.3% 
do not report employment sector.   
16 See Becker, 1965; Becker, 1968. 
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supply decisions into the wage labor market (E) or self-employment (S), which 
determines their leisure (L), to maximize their utility function:  
./0,1,2(3, ,)	 
																																																											. 4.		50 + 617 − 83                                                (4.1)                              
9: =  + 7 + ,					 
Where 50, is the wage in the labor market and 61 , is the profit function in the 
self-employment sector. The individuals’ labor supply decision, in either sector, is a 
function of the prices of the goods, P, wages in the labor market, 50, profits in the self-
employment sector, 61 ,	community characteristics, ;<, the level of violence, V, and 
observed and unobserved idiosyncratic individual and household characteristics, = ,	and 
=>. 
 = (8,50 , 61 , ;<, ?, = , =>)	/@A	7 = 7(8,50 , 61 , ;< , ?, = , =>)	        (4.2) 
As discussed in the introduction, the effect on the labor supply is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, given the characteristics of the conflict in Mexico, the effect of violence on 
the labor supply is expected to be negative if the fear of being victimized creates an 
additional cost on the labor force participation. As mentioned before, Organized Crime 
Groups have not only increased in number, but they have also started to use extortions 
of civilians as a financial resource and to increase the sense of fear in the community. An 
increasing sense of insecurity, lack of confidence in the police, and an increasing 
probability of being a direct victim of OCGs can induce, for example, business owners to 
close early, and street vendors to reduce their hours of exposure on the streets. The fear 
 135 
factor, can also have a negative effect on the decision to participate in the wage labor 
market, though, it is important to note that self-employed individuals have more 
flexibility to reduce their hours or temporarily leave the labor market. Second, the cost 
imposed by the high levels of violence may cause some firms and businesses to close 
completely or reduce their size. In addition, the economic activity of the community may 
be impacted by violence, which negatively affects the profits of businesses and the self-
employed and therefore may further reduce labor supply.  
On the other hand, if for example the presence of drug-cartels incentivize the 
economic activity in the community, the effect of violence on the labor supply could be 
positive.  An empirical test for the effect of violence on the labor force participation is a 
test of: 
B0
BC
< 0 and  B1
BC
< 0. Thus, the total effect on the labor force participation will 
reflect a combination of the impact on labor supply and labor demand. In addition, I can 
test whether violence has had an effect on labor transition between the wage labor 
market and self-employment sectors.  
This analysis also test the effect of high levels of violence on wages in the labor 
market, 50 , and profits in the self-employment sector, 61: 
50 = 50(8, ;< , ?, = , =>)	/@A	61 = 61(8, ;< , 	, ?, = , =>)		                                         (4.3) 
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Where A, are productive assets. The total effect on the wages depends on the 
extent to which violence changes labor market demand.17 If firms close or reduce their 
size, the final effect on wages (for the workers that stay in the labor market) will depend 
on the negative magnitude of the shift in the labor demand and supply; but, 
unambiguously, the expected impact on labor participation would be negative. Evidence 
from Mexican newspapers as well as reports from respondents during the fieldwork of 
the third wave MxFLS suggest that both small businesses (self-employed) and bigger 
firms (in particular those related with tourism and manufacture) have been affected by 
the violence. By disaggregating each employment category by occupation this analysis is 
able to differentiate the impact of violence in different sectors of the labor market.  
The effect of violence on the individual labor force participation might depend 
on idiosyncratic characteristics at the individual and household level. For example, the 
presence of young children in the household may incentivize one of the parent’s to drop 
out of the labor force to take care of the children in order to avoid their direct exposure 
to violence. A rich set of characteristics measured before the increasing trend of violence 
will allow for exploration of this heterogeneity.  
 
                                                   
17 The negative effect of conflict on various economic outcomes has previously been established in the 
literature (Collier 1999; Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Deininger, 2003) 
and in particular on investment at the firm-level (Collier and Duponchel, 2013; Pshisva and Suarez, 2010; 
Camacho and Rodriguez, 2013). 
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4.6 Empirical Strategy  
Drawing from a longitudinal survey where individuals were interviewed in 
2005-06 (period of low levels of violence) and in 2009-13 (period of high levels of 
violence), the empirical specification relies on an individual fixed effect model, 
controlling for a rich set of individual and household time-variant characteristics, to 
estimate the effect of a plausibly exogenous shock of crime in Mexico on individual and 
household outcomes. 
One of the challenges to the empirical estimation of this relationship is 
systematic behavioral response to crime. Specifically, non-random migration as a 
response to elevated conflict would hinder identification of the true impact of violence 
on labor market outcomes. For example, if individuals with higher earnings are more 
likely to migrate when violence increases, the impact of violence on wages would be 
overestimated. Table 24 shows the results of a linear probability model that predicts 
migration between municipalities, for the sample of interest in this chapter, as a function 
of the change in the homicide rate between the second and third waves of the MxFLS, 
using the following specification: 
E =  + FGE∆IJK + K ∗ FGE∆IJK + LK +                     (4.4)                      
The measure of migration is a binary outcome equal to 1 if the respondent was 
interviewed in a different municipality in MxFLS2 and MxFLS3 (8.9%) or if in the 
migration history the respondent reported a long-term migration (one year or more) 
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away from the municipality of residence in MxFLS2 (7.7%). FGE∆IJK	 is the 
difference in homicide rates between 2005 and 2009 in the municipality of residence in 
MxFLS2; and,		K	are household and individual characteristics measured at the time 
of the MxFLS2 survey and include: age, years of education, marital status, cognitive 
score, household size and household composition, employment status and log of 
earnings, a dummy for whether the household has relatives in the U.S. and for whether 
the locality of residence is rural.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 24 show the results for males. The results suggest that 
on average the change in the homicide rate does not predict migration of men. However, 
the model that adds interactions with individual and household characteristics shows 
that self-employed men are more likely to migrate when violence increases. If we had 
not followed migrants, we would have systematically lost self-employed men in places 
with high levels of changes in homicide rates. This result is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence that describe how business owners have migrated and closed their business to 
avoid being victimized by organized crime organizations. The results for women, in 
columns 3 and 4, show that single women and women living in rural places are more 
likely to migrate when violence increases. It is reasonable to think that the cost to 
migrate for married women might be higher since their migration possibly implies the 
migration of their entire family. Therefore, even if violence increases, married women 
are less likely to migrate than single women. The results for women living in rural 
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places is consistent with the fact that most of migration in Mexico is from rural to urban 
places. For women living in rural places higher level of violence decreases the relative 
cost of migration and therefore increases their likelihood of migration.    
In order to control for migration as a behavioral response to crime, the empirical 
specification follows an intent-to-treat approach, where the municipality of residence in 
the second wave of the MxFLS (MxFLS2) determines an individual’s exposure to 
violence. By using an individual’s location during the period of low and constant levels 
of violence, I am able to eliminate potential bias due to violence related endogenous 
migration. 
In addition to behavioral responses, an additional challenge when estimating the 
effect of violence on economic outcomes is omitted variable bias. The difficulty in 
estimating the relationship between violence and economic outcomes could emerge 
from the fact that homicide rates have not increased in a random fashion over time and 
might not be orthogonal to unobserved factors that affect economic performance in the 
municipality or at the individual level.  
To control for this unobserved heterogeneity the empirical specification will 
exploit an individual fixed effect model. The identification strategy exploits the variation 
over time of homicides rates between 2005 and 2009-12. For each of the outcomes of 
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interest an individual fixed effect model18 is estimated, thus by definition the empirical 
strategy compares the same individual across time periods which captures the 
unobserved, time invariant factors that affect the dependent variable. This is particularly 
useful if we believe that there are time-invariant characteristics of individuals, such as 
ability or risk preferences, that are correlated with both labor outcomes and the violence 
level of the municipality in which the individual chooses to live. Moreover, if homicides 
are reported with error, the individual fixed effect strategy differences out error that is 
constant over time.  
The empirical strategy can be generalized in the following regression framework: 
M = NO0 < FGEP/4QM ≤ 5T + -NO5 < FGEP/4QM ≤ 15T + 	UNO15 < FGEP/4QMT +	 
+;VMW + 	X + "Y +  + #M		                                                                                               (4.5)                                                                     
Where y is the outcome of interest of individual i living in municipality j at time 
t. I start the analysis by estimating a general model of labor force participation 
stratifying by sector of employment in 2005 (wage employment and self-employment) 
and by gender for respondents between the ages of 18 and 75 in 2005. Then, I estimate 
the model using hours worked and labor income as dependent variables on the sample 
of individuals working in both waves. The measure of earnings in the empirical section 
is the quartic root of hourly earnings and the quartic root of total earnings in the last 12 
                                                   
18 With two periods an individual fixed effect model is similar to a first difference model. The results of a first 
difference model are qualitatively the same.  
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months.19 Finally, I estimate a model that predicts the effect of violent crime on 
household expenditure (this model follows the same specification of equation (4.5) but 
estimates household fixed effects).  
I estimate the effect of crime on the outcomes of interest exploiting a non-linear 
model. Although the levels of violence at the national level have more than tripled in 
only four years, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the local exposure with many 
municipalities seeing no change in violence and others suffering increases of more than 
500%.20 A linear model might underestimate the effects of violence and, in addition, a 
non-linear specification allow for exploration of a threshold of violence after which the 
effects of violence are particularly significant.     
In equation (4.5) O0 < FGEP/4QM ≤ 5T, NO5 < FGEP/4QM ≤ 15T	/@A	NO15 <
FGEP/4QMT are indicators that denote different levels of the homicide rate at the 
municipality level at time t; and, therefore, δ, - and U	are the coefficients of interest.21 In 
an individual fixed effect framework, these variables will identify the effect of violence 
                                                   
19 Earnings in the last month might be a noisy measure of labor income, particularly for self-employed 
individuals whose labor income can significantly vary within the year. For this reason I use earnings in the 
last 12 months. However, some individuals report non-positive earnings and using a logarithmic 
transformation for earnings would drop a number of observations. The quartic root behaves similarly to a 
logarithmic transformation for positive numbers (Thomas et al. 2006). 
 
20 In the state of Durango and Nuevo Leon, for example, there is a significant number of municipalities where 
homicide rates multiplied in only 4 years and went from being at the bottom of the national homicide rate 
distribution to the highest end of the distribution. 
21 The omitted category are municipalities with homicide rates equal to zero. 
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in municipalities whose homicide rate switched to each of the different groups between 
2005 and 2009.  
 The rest of the specification continues as follows: X is a vector of individual and 
household time-varying characteristics (marital status, whether the respondent lives 
with his/her parents, household size, number of kids in the household, whether the 
place of residence is rural or urban, expectations of future migration, a measure of risk 
aversion and patience, a measure of emotional well-being and presence of relatives in 
the US);  X denotes the individual fixed effect; "Y 	includes GDP at the state level; and  
includes controls for year and quarter of interview.22  
An additional challenge of the specification is the possible endogeneity of crime. 
In order to produce consistent estimates, the idiosyncratic error at each observation has 
to be uncorrelated with the variable that measures crime in both periods (Wooldridge, 
2002). It would be reasonable to think that #M	is correlated with FGEP/4QM because 
crime is not allocated in a random way and it might be higher in municipalities with 
better economic performance, so the expected profit of the extortions to the civilians is 
larger. Second, we might think that #M 	is correlated with FGEP/4QMZ if unobserved 
variables in 2005 affect both labor outcome variables in 2005 and the level of crime in 
2009.  
                                                   
22 Specification with time trends were estimated and the results do not change.  
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There are reasons to believe that increasing crime rates might be correlated with 
the error term in 2005: first, crime might be more likely to happen in areas with better 
economic growth because it is more profitable to extort civilians in these places, or it 
might be more likely in places with worse economic activity if that is a reflection of bad 
institutions and low state presence. While the individual fixed effect strategy controls for 
all time-invariant characteristics, if economic trends are changing differently in 
municipalities that have suffered a higher change of violence, the individual fixed effect 
estimates will be biased. In order to control for this I add controls for changes in GDP at 
the state level; moreover, in additional specifications I add unemployment rates at the 
municipality level. This is not my preferred specification since unemployment rates at 
the municipality level is clearly endogenous to the individual labor market measures. 
However, even adding this characteristic of the labor markets, the results of the main 
specification hold.  
In order to examine the relationship between a municipality’s change in violence 
to demographic and economic characteristics of that municipality, in section 4.8, I show 
the results of a model where municipality characteristics measured in 2002 and 2005 
predict the levels of violence observed in 2009. Using pre-high violence data from the 
Census and from the MxFLS I do not find evidence of municipality characteristics being 
a predictor of the high levels of violence. In addition I estimate a placebo model to test 
the exogeneity of the surge in crime and the results give support to the assumption that 
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changes in crime levels was unrelated to other underlying economic trends (the results 
are shown and discussed in section 4.8).23 
 
4.7 Results 
4.7.1 Labor Market Outcomes 
Tables 25 to 30 provide results for the analysis of the participation in the labor 
market, hours worked, the quartic root of hourly earnings, and total earnings stratified 
by gender and by occupation.  
4.7.1.1 Females 
Table 25 provides the results for women who were self-employed in 2005 in 
Panel A and those who were wage employees in 2005 in Panel B. Column 1 in Panel A 
shows the effect of violence on labor force participation (either as self-employed or wage 
employee) conditional on being self-employed in 2005.24  These results show that 
exposure to violence has an adverse effect on the labor force participation for self-
                                                   
23 A final challenge for the empirical specification is that the main fieldwork was conducted during 2009 and 
2010, and it would be reasonable to think that those interviewed in 2010 would have responded to the 
increasing trend of crime in a different way than those for whom the impact of violence was unanticipated. I 
compared the two groups of respondents and as expected those interviewed in 2010 have the characteristics 
of a group that in the field would be more difficult to track: younger, more educated, more likely to work, etc. 
I estimated the main specification with and without the individuals interviewed in 2009 and after 2009 and 
the results of the main specification hold. 
 
24 Transitions from self-employment to formal employment and vice versa are not considered a change in 
labor force participation in this version of the model. Models of transitions between self-employment and 
formal employment were estimated, but homicide rates are not a significant predictor of the change in 
occupation for any of these samples or models. 
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employed women. The results suggest that women living in a municipality that 
experienced any level of homicides above 0 were approximately 20% less likely to stay 
active in the labor market. These results are robust to changes in GDP and 
unemployment rates at the municipality level.  
If the cost of participating in the labor market is rising due to increased crime, it 
is intuitive to think that women may re-allocate their time to other activities like 
household production. Column 2 shows whether the intensity of participation in the 
labor force, for women who stay active in the labor market, has been affected by the 
increase of violence. The results in column 2 of Panel A show a U-shaped effect on hours 
worked. Women reduce their hours worked if the municipality where they were leaving 
suffered a relatively small increase from zero to a positive homicide rate smaller than 5 
or if their municipality’s crime jumped to a rate larger than 15. Women living in these 
municipalities decreased their hours worked by around 70%. This means that from an 
average of 37 hours per week (7.4 hours per day in a work week of 5 days) self-
employed women affected by violence, basically changed their status from being full-
time workers to part-time workers.  
The results in columns 3 and 4 show the effects on labor income. The results in 
column 3 and 4 show a great deal of heterogeneity depending on the degree of the 
change of homicide rates. Although, the results are imprecisely estimated for hourly 
earnings, the estimates suggest that, the women living in municipalities that switched to 
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the highest level of homicide rates that stayed in the labor market are being rewarded 
with an increase in their hourly earnings. On the other hand, women that stay in the 
labor market in municipalities that suffered the smallest increase in violence are not 
experiencing an increase in earnings. The dual impact of fewer hours worked and lower 
hourly earnings translate into significantly lower total earnings for women living in 
these municipalities.  
Panel B of Table 25 shows the effects for women who were wage employees 
before the intensification of violence. Employee females compared to the self-employed 
do not suffer as adverse an impact from the increasing violence in Mexico. Columns 1 
and 2 show negative effects of violence on labor force participation and in hours worked 
but the effects are not significantly different from zero. Moreover, the effect on the 
hourly earnings of employee women seems to be positive but the effects are not 
significant and the magnitude is smaller than the effect for self-employed. This positive 
effect seems to translate into overall positive earnings but the coefficients are imprecisely 
estimated. These findings reinforce the idea that wage employees who were likely to be 
under contract before the onset of violence are employed in jobs where wages are more 
sticky and individuals less able to adjust their labor force intensity. 
Individual Heterogeneity  
Individual characteristics may play an important role in the total effect of 
violence on labor outcomes. As discussed in section 4.6, households with young children 
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or varying levels of wealth may react differently to higher levels of crime. To test 
whether this is the case in the Mexican context, I estimate equation 4.5 adding 
interactions of the violence variables with individual characteristics measured in the pre-
violence period.  
Table 26 shows the results of this model for self-employed women. The same 
models were estimated for wage employee women but, similar to the main specification, 
no significant results were found for this sub-sample.  
Columns 1 to 4 show the results adding an interaction of the homicide rate with 
an indicator equal to 1 if the woman has children living in her household. The results in 
column 1 show that women with children are significantly more likely to leave the labor 
market and the effect does not seem to vary with the level of violence suffered in the 
municipality of residence. In Mexico, the need of the new drug cartels to establish their 
territorial presence has created new relations between them and juvenile local gangs 
(Guerrero, 2012a). This has created financially profitable opportunities for young 
individuals and increased their opportunity cost of attending school. The combination of 
wanting to both protect their children from exposure to victimization and to keep them 
from joining the local gangs may cause women with young individuals in their 
household to react to high violence by leaving the labor force to better monitor their 
activity.   
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The results in column 3 show that the positive effect observed for hourly 
earnings in municipalities with the highest change in crime in the main specification 
becomes significant for women with no children. The opportunity cost of staying in the 
labor force might be lower for this group of women and the lower supply of labor might 
be having a positive effect on the hourly earnings of those who stay in the labor force.   
Finally columns 5 to 8 show the results adding an interaction of the variables of 
violence and a dummy equal to one if the women’s household per capita expenditure is 
in the top 50th percentile of the distribution. The results show than women in this end of 
the PCE distribution cut significantly their hours worked significantly more than less 
wealthy women when facing the highest level of crime.  
The results in this section suggest that the labor market outcomes of self-
employed women have been affected by violence. Violence has adversely affected the 
labor force participation and labor intensity of self-employed women. In addition the 
response in hourly income to increased homicide rates, for the women who stay in the 
labor force, is dependent on the level of violence exposure. These results suggest that a 
nontrivial number of self-employed females are leaving the labor market or reducing 
their hours worked, most likely to avoid being directly affected by violence or to take 
care of their children, but those who stay in the labor market may be receiving a wage 
premium. On the other hand, labor outcomes of women who were employees before the 
escalation of violence do not seem to be reactive to changes in the homicide rate.  
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Analysis by occupation  
Given the fact that the fracturing of the drug cartels has led to an increase in non-
violent crimes that are directed at non-combatants like extortions and kidnappings, it is 
reasonable to think that occupations where individuals are more exposed to potential 
victimization, such as business owners and street vendors, might be more adversely 
affected by the recent change in the conflict environment.   
Table 27 shows the results of the main specification for self-employed women, in 
columns 1 to 4, disaggregating the sample by the three most popular occupations in self-
employment.25  The three most popular occupation categories for self-employed women 
are jobs in retail and commerce (51.47%), manufacturing (women in this sector are 
mainly artisans, tailors and food makers, 23.25% of self-employed women are in this 
category) and domestic employees and women working in personal services (16%).  
Examining the results for self-employed women across the different occupations 
it is clear that women in retail/commerce and manufacturing are the most likely to leave 
the labor force.  The results in column 2, suggest that for women that remain employed 
work intensity is decreasing similarly for all three occupation types (although the results 
are not significant). Interestingly, only the women working in personal service and 
                                                   
25 The MxFLS provides information on the two-digit Mexican classification of occupations. I aggregate those 
in 1. Professionals, technicians; 2. Agricultural, cattle activities, foresting, hunting and fishing workers; 3. 
Manufacture activities; 4. Administrative jobs; 5. Retail and commerce; 6. Personal services, domestic 
employees; and 7. Other.  
 150 
domestic employment are seeing their work incentivized by increases in hourly wages. 
This may be due to the fact that since these types of service providers have such a great 
deal of access to the employer’s property/personal life, employers in a time of increased 
fear of victimization are providing an incentive for the women they are already 
comfortable and familiar with to stay in the labor market through increased wages. 
Finally, I find that women working as artisans, tailors, and food makers are suffering the 
largest deficit in their total earnings. This likely a result of reduced foot traffic and street 
sales brought on by fear-induced reductions in economic activity in areas with increased 
crime.  
4.7.1.2 Males  
Table 28 provides the results for male labor force participation, following the 
same structure of Table 25 for females. The results in Table 28 suggest that changes in 
the homicide rate over the last few years have not had a significant effect on labor force 
participation, for both self-employed and employee men.  
Column 2 of Table 28 displays the results of the analysis using the log of hours 
worked in the last 12 months as the dependent variable. The estimates in Panel A (for 
the sample of self-employed males) and Panel B (for the sample of employees), provide 
evidence that the labor force intensity of males was also not affected by the surge in 
violence in Mexico. Taken together the results from columns 1 and 2 strongly suggest 
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that regardless of the conflict environment men do not change their level of engagement 
in the labor market. 
The results for the impact of violent crime on the hourly earnings and total 
earnings in the last 12 months for men are found in columns 3 and 4. The coefficients in 
columns 3 and 4 of Panel A show an increasing negative effect of violence on both 
hourly and total earnings of self-employed men at the highest intensity of violence 
exposure. The results suggest that males living in municipalities where the homicide 
rates reached levels higher than 15 homicides per 100.000 saw a significant reduction in 
their hourly earnings and total earnings.  Panel B shows the results for employees and 
while there is some evidence of reduced hourly earnings for these men, contrary to what 
was found for self-employed men, total labor income is not adversely affected by crime. 
The negative effect on total earnings of self-employed may lend support to the 
anecdotal evidence in Mexico that suggests business owners have been particularly 
affected by violence. It has been suggested that businesses in places heavily exposed to 
violence tend to close earlier to avoid being directly victimized. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to think that individuals in those municipalities are less likely to engage in 
commerce in the evening due to increased insecurity, harming the profits of 
independent businesses. In a later subsection I check the hypothesis that the earnings of 
business owners may be more susceptible to increasing violence by looking at the 
disaggregated results by occupation.   
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Individual Heterogeneity  
The results in Table 29 show the models with interactions of homicide exposure 
and having young children in the household, as well as, SES for the sample of self-
employed men. As was the case with the female analysis, the sub-sample of employees 
did not show significant heterogeneity.  
The results in column 1 to 4 suggest that, for men, the presence of children in the 
same household, unlike for women, does not differentially change their decision to 
participate in the labor force under conditions of increasing violence. In terms of a 
heterogeneous impact of violence by socio-economic status, columns 5 to 8 show that 
men in the highest percentile of the per capita expenditure are the most adversely 
affected by higher levels of violence, as they are more likely to reductions in the hourly 
income, as well as, their total income even after they increase their total hours worked. 
These results provide further evidence that is consistent with business owners being the 
most negatively affected by violent crime, as this the most common profession for high 
SES self-employed men. As mentioned previously, in order to test this directly I 
disaggregate the sample by occupation in the next set of results.   
Analysis by occupation  
Table 30 provides the results of the impact of violence on labor market outcomes 
for men disaggregated by occupation. Forty percent of self-employed men work in 
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agricultural, cattle activities, foresting, hunting and fishing activities (Panel A), 30% in 
manufacturing (Panel B) and 20% in retail and commerce (Panel C).  
 The results in columns 1 and 2 suggest that, independently of the 
intensity of violence and occupation, self-employed men do not leave the labor market 
or reduce the hours worked. Columns 3 and 4, on the other hand, support the previous 
hypothesis that self-employed men in the retail and commerce industry have been the 
most affected by violence and the effect is particularly strong in municipalities with the 
highest increase in the homicide rate. Moreover, the effect for the labor income of men in 
this industry is negative and significant. These findings strongly suggest that high 
incidence of crime through diminished business activity has a significant negative effect 
on the total earnings of men working in retail/commerce and these negative effects seem 
to be driven by lower hourly earnings. 
Overall the results of the analyses in section 4.7.1 highlight the significant 
heterogeneity of the effects of violence in Mexico on labor market outcomes. Specifically, 
the findings suggest that self-employed individuals are the most adversely effected by 
increasing local violence. This relatively higher level of vulnerability to negative shocks 
may be a result of having less stable income sources. Moreover, the results suggest there 
is a significant difference in the labor market environment for self-employed males that 
faced increased violence relative to self-employed females exposed to more violence. 
Males’ labor force participation is not being affected by the increasing violence 
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regardless of the level intensity, while self-employed women are highly reactive to any 
increase in the level of conflict. Moreover, while self-employed women that remain in 
the labor force in areas with the most violence see no change, or perhaps a positive 
change, in their total and hourly earnings, the comparable self-employed men are 
suffering significant losses. 
The lower labor income some of these individuals are earning when exposed to 
violence may translate into lower consumption in these households and thus affect long-
term investment that spills over into the well-being of the next generation. In order to 
assess whether increased exposure to violence has translated into lower consumption I 
analyze this outcome in the next section.  
4.7.2 Per Capita Expenditure (PCE) 
There is a growing literature on household responses to negative shocks 
(Townsend, 1995; Morduch, 1995; Beegle et al 2001; Frankenberg et al., 2003; Thomas et 
al. 2003; Thomas et al, 2007). Intuitively, the negative shock of increasing levels of 
violence in Mexico could have affected households’ wealth in several ways. First, if labor 
income is negatively impacted by crime, households without mechanisms to smooth 
consumption will be affected by this unanticipated loss in resources. Second, in order to 
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minimize the probability of victimization, conspicuous consumption and consumption 
that increases the likelihood of being a target of exploitation, might decrease.26 
This section of the chapter assesses whether the negative shocks in the labor 
market have translated into reductions in other measures of the household’s wealth such 
as per capita expenditure. The MxFLS has a rich component of household expenditure 
measures that allow analysis on PCE to be disaggregated by different consumption 
categories in order to assess which components have been more or less affected by 
violence. This component records detailed information on household expenditures on 
food (including self-production) and non-food goods and services, personal care, 
household items and durable goods. I estimate equation (4.5) for four different 
categories of per capita expenditure in the last month: total per capita expenditure, 
expenditure on food, a category of arguably “conspicuous” consumption27, and 
education. Panel A of Table 31 shows the results for all the households, Panel B for 
households with a female household head and Panel C for those with a male household 
head. 
                                                   
26 It is also intuitive to think that expenses on security devices will increase. However, there is not a clear way 
to disentangle these expenses from the consumption section.  
 
27 I include in this category more visible expenditures or expenditures that could potentially increase the 
probability of being victimized like: meals out, recreation, communication, clothes, domestic appliances, 
transportation, furniture, ceremonies and vacations and semi-durable goods.   
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Column 1 shows the results for the log of total per capita expenditure for the 
three samples. Looking at the sample in Panel A that includes all households, the results 
suggest that the total PCE for households living in municipalities in which violence 
increased to a positive homicide rate smaller than 15 homicides per 100.000 decreased 
between 9 and 12%. However, the effect is significant only at the 10% confidence level. 
Disaggregating the sample by the gender of the household head there is not strong 
evidence that the effect is particularly damaging to the per capita expenditure of 
households with a certain gendered household head. Since the previous results 
suggested that it is self-employed men that are suffering the largest reductions in total 
earnings, I next tested if households led by these individuals are more susceptible to 
decreases in expenditure. To do this I estimate a model adding interactions between the 
variables of violence and a dummy for self-employment. The results (not reported in 
this version of the chapter) show that, as expected, it is self-employed male-headed 
households that face the largest reductions in per capita expenditure, while the self-
employed female-headed households are not differentially reducing spending. This 
suggests that, the negative effects found for labor income is translating into 
consumption decisions and the most affected households may not be able to smooth the 
negative shock through the use of savings or other mechanisms.    
Column 2 and 3 shows the results for expenditure on food and “conspicuous” 
consumption and these analyses provide little evidence of significant decreases in these 
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types of consumption. Column 4, on the other hand, shows negative and significant 
effects on education expenditure for households with female household heads living in 
municipalities where the violence increased the least. The results of previous section 
suggest that some self-employed women are leaving the labor market, and earnings of 
self-employed women working in commerce activities decrease with violence. 
Moreover, when the impact of expenditure on education is stratified by the employment 
type of the female household head, it is those household’s led by a self-employed 
woman that are facing the largest decreases in education expenditure. The negative 
impact on education expenditure for female-headed households may be a result of the 
direct reduction in household income or due to a decrease in the woman’s bargaining 
power in the household, as it had been shown that women are more likely to invest in a 
child’s education.  If this reduction in educational expenditure and loss in family income 
leads young kids of school age to be more likely to drop out of school and join the labor 
market it may lead to longer-term and persistent deficits in human capital accumulation 
for the next generation. With this in mind, Brown and Velásquez (2013) assesses the 
extent to which a violent environment may alter the educational attainment, cognitive 
scores, time allocation, and employment behavior of children and young adults. 
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4.8 Robustness Checks 
4.8.1 Attrition 
In order to test for potential selected attrition on measures of violence I estimate 
a model that predicts the probability of attrition from MxFLS3. The independent 
variables are individual and household characteristics measured in MxFLS2, the 
difference of homicide rates between 2005 and 2009 in the municipality of residence in 
MxFLS2 and the interactions of the measure of violence and individual characteristics. 
These interactions provide evidence of whether individuals with certain characteristics 
were more likely to attrit from the survey when violence increased. The sample includes 
all panel respondents age 18 and older at baseline and therefore at risk of being in the 
analytical sample of this chapter. The model is estimated as a linear probability model 
based on the following empirical specification: 
	 =  + FGE∆IJK + K ∗ FGE∆IJK + LK +                       (4.6)                                     
Where 	 is a binary outcome equal to 1 if the panel respondent attrited from the 
survey in MxFLS3 conditional on being found in MxFLS2 and equal to zero if not.  The 
model for attrition follows the same empirical specification as the one for migration in 
equation (4.4). Therefore, attrition from MxFLS3 depends on the change of violence 
between 2009 and 2005, individual and household characteristics measured in 2005 and 
the interaction of the measure of violence and own characteristics.  
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The results are reported in Table 35 in section 4.11 for the sample of males and 
Table 36 for the sample of females. The results for males in Column 1 suggest that on 
average the homicide rate in 2009 do not predict attrition; and, the results in Column 2 
suggest that the change of homicide rates between 2005 and 2009 do not predict attrition 
in a different manner for males with different characteristics measured in 2005. The 
results for females in Table 36 show similar results. The change on homicide rates do not 
predict attrition and it does not predict attrition differently for females with different 
characteristics. In addition to this model I estimated a model where I allow for a non-
linear effect of violence on attrition and the results do not change.    
4.8.2 Prediction of Homicide Rates 
In order to test the exogeneity of the surge in crime observed in Mexico since 
2007 I estimate a model where the first, characteristics of the municipality in 2005, and 
second, trends in these characteristics between 2002 and 2005 predict the change of the 
municipality homicide rate between 2005 and 2009. The covariates are averages at the 
municipality level of MxFLS variables in one specification and Census variables in the 
other. Table 37 shows the results. Columns 1 and 2 show the results using variables 
measured in 2005 as covariates. The results suggest that municipalities with, on average 
higher labor participation of women had lower changes on their homicide rates, but 
those with lower illiteracy, and with higher electricity saw a higher change in violence. 
Places with a higher percentage of individuals with less than primary but also with 
 160 
higher percentage of high school graduates had higher changes in their homicides levels. 
The results do not suggest a clear pattern by which pre-violence characteristics are 
related to the change in the homicide rate between 2005 and 2009, other than that 
suggest that violence increased more in more urban municipalities (those with better 
supply of public goods).  Moreover, if the characteristics of the places where violence 
increase are constant over time, these fixed characteristics will controlled for in the fixed 
effect model. If however, some trends at the municipality level are correlated with the 
trends on violence and with labor outcomes, the specification in (5) could be biased.  
The results from Columns 3 and 4 show that pre-violence trends in a rich set of 
economic and demographic characteristics are unrelated to future changes in violence. 
This provides suggestive evidence that the change in a municipality’s level of violence is 
not simply a reflection of underlying trends in other characteristics of that municipality 
and that the change in violence levels in a municipality is not caused by pre-existing 
trends in the labor market environment.  
4.8.3 Placebo Test 
Measuring the impact of crime on economic outcomes imposes important 
challenges. One first order issue is that crime might be endogenous to economic activity, 
which makes it difficult to identify a causal relationship between crime and, for 
example, labor market outcomes. The increasing trend of crime in Mexico is evident 
from 2007, but from 2002 to 2005 the homicide rate was very stable. As a robustness 
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check, I estimate the same model discussed in the main specification, using individual 
and household observations measured in 2005 (MxFLS2) and in 2002 (MxFLS1), while 
continuing to utilize the same measures of violence (MxFLS2 and MxFLS3) as in the 
main specification. If it is the case that the level of change in crime in Mexican 
municipalities was not a result of underlying economic trends, no significant effects 
should be observed for the variable of violence in this specification, as future violence 
should not predict economic outcomes between 2002 and 2005. 
Tables 32 and 33 shows the results for labor outcomes for women and men 
respectively. The estimates for women in Table 32 do not show any significant results 
and, moreover, the sign and magnitude of the coefficients do not follow the same 
pattern as those from the main specification.  
Table 33 provides the results for males. The results in the main specification 
suggest that men do not change their labor participation but the total earnings diminish 
for men living in municipalities that switched to the highest percentile of the homicide 
rate distribution, but the effect is larger for self-employed men. The results in Table 22 
show no evidence of these effects when looking at labor outcomes measured before the 
increasing wave of violence. 
The results in Table 34 show the results of the placebo test for the PCE outcomes. 
These results suggest that municipalities where crime increased may have been on a 
positive trajectory of per capita expenditure for households with a female household 
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head and the results of the mains specification may actually be an underestimation for 
this sub-sample.                                          
 
4.9 Conclusions 
In order to test for potential selected attrition on measures of violence I estimate 
a model that High levels of crime may substantially alter the context in which 
individuals operate, affecting behaviors at the individual and household level (Verwimp 
et al., 2009). In particular, crime may have an effect on labor markets, as fear of 
victimization may increase the cost of participating in the labor market or reduced 
economic activity leads to decreases in investment and diminished job opportunities. 
Measuring the impact of crime on labor market outcomes in Mexico is critical 
given the high incidence of crime observed since 2007. In addition OCGs have 
diversified their financial sources, and begun to rely increasingly on criminal activities 
that directly affect the civil population, like extortions, kidnappings, and car thefts. 
Exploiting information from the MxFLS, which was collected in periods of both 
low and high levels of violent crime, this study estimates an individual fixed effect 
model that controls for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that could affect both 
exposure to violence and labor market outcomes. Moreover, combining this strategy 
with an intent-to-treat approach, where the municipality of residence in the pre-violence 
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period determines an individual’s exposure to violence, this analysis is able to shield the 
estimates from potential bias due to violence-related endogenous migration. 
The results of this study show that the increasing violence in Mexico has had a 
strong and significant negative effect on the labor market participation and intensity of 
self-employed women. The analysis further provides evidence that women who worked 
in personal services and as domestic employees and remain in the labor market are 
earning higher hourly wages, which leads to gains in total earnings. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that in times of increased feelings of vulnerability 
employers have a strong preference for domestic employees they know and trust as 
these service providers have a great deal of access to an employer’s property and 
personal space. As such these women are being encouraged not to leave the labor 
market through high remuneration.   
Similarly, for males, the negative impact is also stronger for self-employed 
individuals. A major difference between the genders though is that for males, labor 
participation and intensity is not significantly reduced and there is no evidence of a 
positive impact on earnings for any occupational subgroups. Moreover, earnings of self-
employed males particularly in the commerce industry are negatively affected by an 
increased exposure to violent crime, suggesting these business owners’ profits are being 
adversely affected by reductions in economic activity. The negative effects found for 
these men’s labor income has been translated into decreases in measures of households’ 
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well-being, as well. Suggesting the households are not able to perfectly smooth 
consumption when facing this shock of violence. 
This chapter provides evidence that the increasing violence in Mexico not only 
affects the direct participants in the Mexican Drug War but also regular civilians. If this 
is the case, it may be in the best interest of the government to mediate the negative 
wealth shocks the rise in violence is imposing in order to reduce the long-term impact of 
this conflict. In on-going research I am exploring the impact of crime on measures of 
wealth at the household level, focusing specifically on whether households with more 
defined safety nets are less susceptible to changes in the violence environment. 
 
4.10 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 7: INEGI and SNSP - Monthly Homicide Rate (per 100,000) 
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Figure 8: Timing of MxFLS and INEGI - Monthly Homicide Rate (per 1000,000) 
 
Figure 9: INEGI Annual Homicide Rate - 2002 
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Figure 10: INEGI Annual Homicide Rate - 2005 
 
Figure 11: INEGI Annual Homicide Rate - 2007 
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Figure 12: INEGI Annual Homicide Rate - 2009 
 
Figure 13: INEGI Annual Homicide Rate - 2010 
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Table 22: Sample Sizes and Recontact Rates in MxFLS 
 
A. MxFLS2 
Eligible for 
survey Recontact % Recontact
Total 35,134 31,338 89.20
In Mexico 34,280 30,564 89.16
In US 854 774 90.63
B. MxFLS3
Total 34,360 29,798 86.72
In Mexico 32,551 28,206 86.65
In US 1,809 1,592 88.00
US sample ivw in MX 563
US sample ivw in US 1,001
Source: MxFLS
Note - Excluded panel respondents who died between waves
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Table 23: Employment Transitions 
 
A. By Gender
Males
2009 Not 
working Working
2005
Not working 9.2 9.7
Working 9.2 72.0
Females
2009 Not 
working Working
2005
Not working 51.2 15.5
Working 11.7 21.6
B. By Employment Status and Gender
2009 Not 
working Employee
Self-
Employed Unpaid DK
2005
Not Working 9.2 6.1 2.6 0.6 0.5
Employee 5.2 37.7 7.5 0.9 2.0
Self-employed 3.0 6.1 10.9 0.9 0.5
Unpaid 0.6 1.8 1.4 0.2 0.1
DK employment category 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.0 0.3
2009 Not 
working Employee
Self-
Employed Unpaid DK
2005
Not Working 51.2 8.5 4.9 1.5 0.5
Employee 6.2 11.7 1.6 0.4 0.6
Self-employed 3.8 1.1 3.1 0.6 0.1
Unpaid 1.4 0.7 0.9 0.2 0.0
DK employment category 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.1
Source: MxFLS2 and MxFLS3 
Males
Females
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Table 24: Prediction of Migration 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents Age 18 and older in 2005
Variables measured in 2005 (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Hom Rate (2009-05) 0.38 5.89 2.73 -3.36
[2.725] [13.721] [2.807] [13.061]
∆ Hom Rate (2009-05) interacted with  
Age -0.11 -0.05
[0.131] [0.143]
Education 0.05 0.82
[0.642] [0.714]
Married -1.06 -9.68**
[3.983] [4.802]
Worked last week -13.18+ 12.8
[7.263] [11.239]
Log(Earnings last 12 months) 0.73 -0.85
[0.637] [0.902]
Self-employed 10.05** -1.21
[4.572] [9.738]
Rural 5.37 14.34**
[6.831] [6.201]
Sample size 6,310 6,310 8,428 8,428
Mean dependent variable 11.43 11.43 10.94 10.94
R-squared 0.030 0.031 0.028 0.032
F-test jointly =0 - P-value 0.338 0.338 0.006 0.006
Standard errors clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
Notes:  Includes controls for baseline characteristics (age, years of education, cognitive score,
 marital status, household characteristics, labor characteristics,  whether respondent
 has relatives in US and place of residence rural/urban characteristic)
Migration=100 Migration=100
WOMENMEN
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Table 25: Labor Outcomes of Women Age [18-75]  
 
Panel A. Self-Employed in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 -0.18*** -0.70** -0.22 -2.61**
[0.059] [0.313] [0.278] [1.115]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.19*** -0.31 0.24 0.51
[0.052] [0.280] [0.244] [1.057]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.22*** -0.73** 0.44 0.83
[0.071] [0.314] [0.276] [1.123]
Constant 1.83*** 8.29*** 0.34 13.78**
[0.383] [1.488] [1.342] [6.773]
Sample size 780 327 327 327
R-squared 0.47 0.13 0.09 0.08
Panel B. Employee in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 -0.03 -0.23 0.13 0.23
[0.049] [0.151] [0.117] [0.462]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.05 -0.11 0.13 0.6
[0.045] [0.148] [0.116] [0.416]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.41
[0.048] [0.168] [0.125] [0.482]
Constant 1.20*** 7.25*** 1.86*** 12.42***
[0.124] [0.324] [0.190] [1.174]
Sample size 1,985 1,160 1,160 1,160
R-squared 0.36 0.06 0.02 0.03
Standard errors clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Omitted variable is homicide rate = 0
Note: All models include marital status, household composition, rural/urban, migration expectations,
 preferences, emotional status, presence of relatives in US, year and quarter of interview and state GDP
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Table 26: Labor Outcomes of Self-Employed Women Age [18-75]  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 -0.12+ -0.69** -0.21 -2.81** -0.13 -0.96 0.25 -2.6
[0.067] [0.328] [0.280] [1.194] [0.117] [0.941] [0.485] [2.284]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.13** -0.37 0.3 0.7 -0.14+ -0.12 0.32 0.82
[0.054] [0.295] [0.246] [1.060] [0.071] [0.394] [0.398] [1.694]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.17** -0.80** 0.55+ 1.15 -0.24*** -0.19 0.28 0.49
[0.075] [0.339] [0.290] [1.202] [0.090] [0.415] [0.418] [1.707]
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 * Has children -0.29** 0.33 -0.47 -0.19
[0.139] [1.112] [0.800] [4.302]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] * Has children -0.29*** 0.73 -0.75 -2.48
[0.097] [0.984] [0.701] [3.821]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] * Has children -0.26** 0.71 -0.91 -2.74
[0.122] [1.021] [0.712] [3.717]
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 * Upper 50th pctile PCE -0.07 0.15 -0.59 0.01
[0.143] [1.089] [0.586] [3.182]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] * Upper 50th pctile PCE -0.08 -0.47 -0.08 -0.35
[0.066] [0.369] [0.447] [2.036]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] * Upper 50th pctile PCE 0.03 -1.00** 0.29 0.66
[0.089] [0.470] [0.496] [2.201]
Constant 1.78*** 8.39*** 0.27 13.44** 1.83*** 8.12*** 0.36 13.99**
[0.385] [1.466] [1.330] [6.751] [0.378] [1.517] [1.348] [6.783]
Sample size 780 327 327 327 780 327 327 327
R-squared 0.47 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.47 0.15 0.09 0.09
Standard errors clustered at municipality level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Omitted variable is homicide rate = 0
Note: All models include marital status, household composition, rural/urban, migration expectations,  preferences, emotional status, presence of relatives in US, 
year and quarter of interview and state GDP
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Table 27: Self-Employed Women by Occupation Age [18-75]  
 
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 -0.19** -0.53 -0.1 -2.44
[0.077] [0.424] [0.506] [2.361]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.20*** -0.29 0.23 0.34
[0.061] [0.288] [0.441] [2.317]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.20** -0.57 0.46 0.63
[0.076] [0.347] [0.479] [2.372]
Constant 2.05*** 6.74*** 1.76 16.37
[0.436] [1.703] [2.425] [14.960]
Sample size 392 152 152 152
R-squared 0.489 0.162 0.0504 0.0816
Panel B 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 -0.11 -0.83 -1.39 -7.51**
[0.131] [1.010] [0.829] [3.095]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.17+ -0.15 -0.33 -1.41
[0.094] [0.551] [0.417] [1.670]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.17 -0.8 0.03 -1.03
[0.129] [0.532] [0.492] [1.980]
Constant 2.48*** 6.49 4.27 23.21
[0.590] [4.640] [3.594] [14.536]
Sample size 173 75 75 75
R-squared 0.559 0.312 0.335 0.306
Panel C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 -0.05 -1.4 0.41 -1.31
[0.163] [0.842] [0.625] [2.824]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.08 -0.45 0.83+ 2.97
[0.153] [0.611] [0.488] [2.005]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] 0.14 -0.63 0.90+ 3.19
[0.187] [0.662] [0.507] [2.192]
Constant -1.16 8.80** 0.8 13.47
[0.902] [3.845] [2.921] [15.193]
Sample size 110 62 62 62
R-squared 0.483 0.28 0.192 0.14
Standard errors clustered at municipality level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Omitted variable is homicide rate = 0
Note: All models include marital status, household composition, rural/urban, migration expectations,  
preferences, emotional status, presence of relatives in US, year, quarter of interview and state GDP
Personal Services/Domestic Employee
Retail/Commerce
Manufacturing
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Table 28: Labor Outcomes of Men Age [18-75]  
 
Panel A. Self-Employed in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.54
[0.028] [0.130] [0.160] [0.824]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] 0.01 0.06 -0.11 -0.45
[0.022] [0.096] [0.114] [0.553]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.01 0.09 -0.29** -1.55**
[0.024] [0.126] [0.128] [0.598]
Constant 0.90*** 7.99*** 1.84*** 15.84***
[0.066] [0.276] [0.371] [1.971]
Sample size 1,658 1,069 1,069 1,073
R-squared 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.04
Panel B. Employee in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.29
[0.015] [0.086] [0.052] [0.300]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.01 0.11 -0.08+ -0.02
[0.012] [0.074] [0.046] [0.270]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.02 0.11 -0.08 -0.14
[0.014] [0.086] [0.050] [0.315]
Constant 0.90*** 7.80*** 1.82*** 12.62***
[0.033] [0.208] [0.130] [0.593]
Sample size 4,380 3,327 3,327 3,336
R-squared 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.01
Standard errors clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Omitted variable is homicide rate = 0
Note: All models include marital status, household composition, rural/urban, migration expectations,
 preferences, emotional status, presence of relatives in US, year and quarter of interview and state GDP
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Table 29: Labor Outcomes of Self-Employed Men Age [18-75]  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.76 -0.01 -0.28 0.09 0.15
[0.032] [0.139] [0.174] [0.888] [0.030] [0.190] [0.777] [0.141]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] 0.01 0.01 -0.1 -0.52 0 -0.07 0.51 0.13
[0.023] [0.096] [0.119] [0.583] [0.028] [0.129] [0.553] [0.110]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.01 0.06 -0.31** -1.68*** -0.03 -0.09 -0.86 -0.05
[0.025] [0.125] [0.125] [0.633] [0.030] [0.164] [0.578] [0.115]
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 * Has children 0.05 0.34 0.11 1.13
[0.072] [0.333] [0.442] [2.437]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] * Has children 0.01 0.29 -0.14 0.26
[0.050] [0.303] [0.270] [1.146]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] * Has children 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.64
[0.051] [0.305] [0.251] [0.972]
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 * Upper 50th pctile PCE 0.08 0.54** -1.26 -0.43+
[0.051] [0.253] [1.376] [0.246]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] * Upper 50th pctile PCE 0.02 0.27 -1.99** -0.50***
[0.034] [0.182] [0.913] [0.164]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] * Upper 50th pctile PCE 0.03 0.39+ -1.46 -0.51***
[0.035] [0.204] [1.008] [0.184]
Constant 0.90*** 7.99*** 1.84*** 15.81*** 0.89*** 7.99*** 15.73*** 1.81***
[0.066] [0.271] [0.374] [2.000] [0.067] [0.271] [1.982] [0.364]
Sample size 1,658 1,069 1,069 1,073 1,658 1,069 1,073 1,069
R-squared 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.04
Standard errors clustered at municipality level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Omitted variable is homicide rate = 0
Note: All models include marital status, household composition, rural/urban, migration expectations,  preferences, emotional status, presence of relatives in US, 
year and quarter of interview and state GDP
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Table 30: Self-Employed Men by Occupation - Age [18-75]  
 
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 0.01 0.19 0.04 0.84
[0.044] [0.229] [0.188] [0.955]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.01 0.06 -0.14 -0.23
[0.035] [0.181] [0.151] [0.793]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] 0.01 0.03 -0.21 -1.11
[0.038] [0.179] [0.173] [0.756]
Constant 1.02*** 7.39*** 1.77*** 12.15***
[0.087] [0.403] [0.407] [1.980]
Sample size 627 384 384 384
R-squared 0.175 0.0506 0.0423 0.0536
Panel B 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 0.08 0.1 -0.31 -1.62
[0.061] [0.268] [0.334] [1.692]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] 0.01 0.23 -0.3 -1.17
[0.037] [0.191] [0.251] [1.276]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.04 0.15 -0.3 -1.71
[0.046] [0.273] [0.310] [1.515]
Constant 1.07*** 7.80*** -0.47 6.75
[0.196] [1.581] [1.867] [7.572]
Sample size 425 322 322 323
R-squared 0.124 0.0356 0.0897 0.0995
Panel C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 0.05 -0.31 -0.07 -1.7
[0.085] [0.333] [0.570] [3.234]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.02 -0.32 -0.27 -3.57
[0.066] [0.292] [0.486] [2.717]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.01 0.06 -0.68 -4.98+
[0.072] [0.292] [0.500] [2.778]
Constant 0.74** 6.91*** 4.71*** 25.30***
[0.333] [1.521] [1.489] [7.529]
Sample size 278 182 182 183
R-squared 0.209 0.0719 0.1 0.0797
Standard errors clustered at municipality level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Omitted variable is homicide rate = 0
Note: All models include marital status, household composition, rural/urban, migration expectations,  
preferences, emotional status, presence of relatives in US, year, quarter of interview and state GDP
Retail/Commerce
SELF-EMPLOYED
Agr/Hunt/Fish wrker
Manufacturing
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Table 31: Log(Per Capita Expenditure) 
 
Panel A. All Households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Total PCE) Log(PCE Food) 
Log("Conspicuous" 
PCE) Log(Education)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 -0.12+ -0.06 -0.13 -0.09
[0.059] [0.058] [0.106] [0.095]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.09+ -0.05 -0.1 0.05
[0.053] [0.052] [0.094] [0.072]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0
[0.055] [0.056] [0.100] [0.085]
Constant 7.15*** 6.76*** 5.34*** 3.21***
[0.061] [0.062] [0.101] [0.119]
Sample size 8,350 8,350 8,037 5,752
R-squared 0.148 0.166 0.0406 0.0683
Panel B. Households with Female Househol Head 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Total PCE) Log(PCE Food) 
Log("Conspicuous" 
PCE) Log(Education)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 -0.11 -0.08 -0.01 -0.40**
[0.072] [0.070] [0.168] [0.201]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.13** -0.11+ -0.13 -0.13
[0.065] [0.063] [0.162] [0.174]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.12
[0.063] [0.063] [0.158] [0.177]
Constant 6.97*** 6.61*** 5.57*** 3.62***
[0.069] [0.067] [0.168] [0.230]
Sample size 2,867 2,867 2,747 1,899
R-squared 0.19 0.207 0.0585 0.0515
Panel C. Households with Male Househol Head 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Total PCE) Log(PCE Food) 
Log("Conspicuous" 
PCE) Log(Education)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 -0.13+ -0.06 -0.19 0.01
[0.071] [0.062] [0.120] [0.121]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 0.11
[0.063] [0.057] [0.102] [0.096]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.04
[0.069] [0.063] [0.107] [0.109]
Constant 6.79*** 6.31*** 5.57*** 3.26***
[0.070] [0.068] [0.134] [0.156]
Sample size 5,483 5,483 5,290 3,853
R-squared 0.126 0.147 0.0363 0.0846
Standard errors clustered at municipality level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Omitted variable is homicide rate = 0
Note: All models include marital status, household composition, rural/urban, migration expectations,  
preferences, emotional status, presence of relatives in US, year and quarter of interview and state GDP
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Table 32: Placebo Test - Labor Outcomes of Women Age [18-75]  
 
Panel A. Self-Employed in 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 0.02 -0.03 0.26 0.07
[0.078] [0.275] [0.331] [1.707]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] 0.04 -0.04 0.2 0.49
[0.066] [0.268] [0.237] [1.374]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.03 0.11 0.12 0.04
[0.086] [0.305] [0.285] [1.470]
Constant 0.73*** 6.23*** 1.62*** 7.39***
[0.113] [0.364] [0.324] [2.457]
Sample size 820 357 358 367
R-squared 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.04
Panel B. Employee in 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 0.05 -0.13 -0.11 -0.81
[0.054] [0.123] [0.136] [0.962]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] 0.07 -0.11 -0.04 -0.28
[0.047] [0.115] [0.136] [0.861]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] 0.07 -0.21+ 0.12 0.42
[0.051] [0.120] [0.160] [0.981]
Constant 0.77*** 7.35*** 2.44*** 13.18***
[0.068] [0.251] [0.191] [1.127]
Sample size 1,641 1,106 1,106 1,112
R-squared 0.17 0.03 0.11 0.02
Standard errors clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Omitted variable is homicide rate = 0
Note: All models include marital status, household composition, rural/urban, migration expectations,
 preferences, emotional status, presence of relatives in US, year and quarter of interview and state GDP
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Table 33: Placebo Test - Labor Outcomes of Men Age [18-75]  
 
Panel A. Self-Employed in 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 -0.03 -0.1 0.67 0.08
[0.039] [0.151] [0.756] [0.149]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] -0.03 -0.01 0.64 0.04
[0.029] [0.109] [0.621] [0.098]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] 0.01 -0.09 0.93+ 0.13
[0.034] [0.108] [0.558] [0.102]
Constant 0.75*** 7.31*** 5.91*** 1.35***
[0.049] [0.232] [1.336] [0.216]
Sample size 1,686 1,257 1,271 1,258
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Panel B. Employee in 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worked last 
week (1)
Log(Hours 
worked last 
12 months)
4
√(Hourly 
Earnings)
4
√(Earnings 
last 12 
months)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 0.02 -0.07 -0.25 -0.01
[0.017] [0.069] [0.501] [0.065]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] 0.02 -0.10+ 0.22 0.07
[0.017] [0.050] [0.501] [0.061]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] 0.03 -0.09 0.17 0.06
[0.018] [0.068] [0.601] [0.075]
Constant 0.89*** 7.52*** 13.06*** 2.15***
[0.036] [0.127] [0.718] [0.104]
Sample size 3,625 3,130 3,152 3,133
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06
Standard errors clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Omitted variable is homicide rate = 0
Note: All models include marital status, household composition, rural/urban, migration expectations,
 preferences, emotional status, presence of relatives in US, year and quarter of interview and state GDP
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Table 34: Placebo Test - Log(Per Capita Expenditure) 
 
Panel A. All Households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Total PCE) Log(PCE Food) 
Log("Conspicuous" 
PCE) Log(Education)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.01
[0.058] [0.051] [0.090] [0.101]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] 0.07 0.03 0.13 -0.01
[0.054] [0.052] [0.081] [0.086]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] 0 -0.03 0.08 -0.08
[0.060] [0.057] [0.101] [0.090]
Constant 5.95*** 6.51*** 5.21*** 3.28***
[0.093] [0.071] [0.151] [0.190]
Sample size 7,447 7,447 7,208 5,170
R-squared 0.159 0.116 0.0256 0.102
Panel B. Households with Female Househol Head 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Total PCE) Log(PCE Food) 
Log("Conspicuous" 
PCE) Log(Education)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 0.21** 0.19*** 0.02 -0.2
[0.089] [0.069] [0.133] [0.153]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] 0.16** 0.12+ 0.19 -0.08
[0.079] [0.068] [0.124] [0.154]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] 0.08 0.07 0.03 -0.18
[0.081] [0.067] [0.148] [0.164]
Constant 6.10*** 6.62*** 4.78*** 3.56***
[0.136] [0.117] [0.237] [0.309]
Sample size 2,252 2,252 2,159 1,475
R-squared 0.257 0.167 0.0634 0.164
Panel C. Households with Male Househol Head 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Total PCE) Log(PCE Food) 
Log("Conspicuous" 
PCE) Log(Education)
(1) Homicide Rate: (0-5] 1 0.03 0.01 0.17 0.08
[0.064] [0.058] [0.102] [0.121]
(1) Homicide Rate: (5-15] 0.03 -0.01 0.1 0.02
[0.059] [0.059] [0.088] [0.098]
(1) Homicide Rate: (15-+] -0.04 -0.08 0.09 -0.03
[0.071] [0.069] [0.107] [0.102]
Constant 5.81*** 6.51*** 5.03*** 3.03***
[0.122] [0.091] [0.208] [0.207]
Sample size 5,195 5,195 5,049 3,695
R-squared 0.129 0.101 0.0235 0.0928
Standard errors clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
1. Omitted variable is homicide rate = 0
Note: All models include marital status, household composition, rural/urban, migration expectations,  
preferences, emotional status, presence of relatives in US, year and quarter of interview and state GDP
 181 
4.11 Supplementary Tables 
Table 35: Prediction of Attrition from MxFLS3 - Men Age 18+ 
 
 
Variables measured in 2005 (1) (2)
∆ Hom Rate (2009-05) 0.68 -2.57
[1.585] [10.510]
∆ Hom Rate (2009-05) interacted with  
Age 0.15
[0.131]
Education 0.83
[0.532]
Married -0.44
[3.218]
Worked last week -5.45
[5.755]
Log(Earnings last 12 months) -0.11
[0.411]
Self-employed -3.74
[2.609]
Rural -2.84
[3.571]
Sample size 9,516 9,516
Mean dependent variable 15.46 15.46
R-squared 0.073 0.074
F-test jointly =0 - P-value 0.435 0.435
Standard errors clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
Notes:  Controls for baseline characteristics (age, years of education, cognitive score,
 marital status, household characteristics, labor characteristics,  whether respondent
 has relatives in US and place of residence rural/urban characteristic)
Attrition=100
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Table 36: Prediction of Attrition from MxFLS3 - Women Age 18+ 
 
 
 
 
Variables measured in 2005 (1) (2)
∆ Hom Rate (2009-05) 0.45 0.34
[1.669] [10.327]
∆ Hom Rate (2009-05) interacted with  
Age 0.03
[0.126]
Education 0.08
[0.634]
Married -1.51
[3.678]
Worked last week 4.95
[5.648]
Log(Earnings last 12 months) 0.07
[0.662]
Self-employed 1.36
[5.440]
Rural -3.87
[3.863]
Sample size 10,888 10,888
Mean dependent variable 13.43 13.43
R-squared 0.079 0.079
F-test jointly =0 - P-value 0.176 0.176
Standard errors clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
Notes:  Controls for baseline characteristics (age, years of education, cognitive score,
 marital status, household characteristics, labor characteristics,  whether respondent
 has relatives in US and place of residence rural/urban characteristic)
Attrition=100
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Table 37: Prediction of Changes on Homicide Rate between 2005 and 2009 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables measured in 2005
MxFLS 
Individual 
Variables
Census 
Variables Changes between 2002 and 2005
MxFLS 
Individual 
Variables
Census 
Variables
Years of Education -0.26 Years of Education 0.99
[1.166] [5.414]
Married -6.29 Married -11.51
[18.604] [52.449]
Household Size -3.05 Household Size -3.39
[3.714] [6.112]
Worked last week - Female (1) -41.59+ Worked last week - Female (1) 27.68
[21.187] [49.251]
Worked last weekd - Male (1) 18.69 Worked last weekd - Male (1) -13.74
[30.330] [57.241]
Self-employed - Female (1) 16.79 Self-employed - Female (1) -50.55
[14.665] [42.449]
Self-employed - Male (1) -2.38 Self-employed - Male (1) 58.77
[18.124] [45.018]
Log Hourly Earnings - Female -0.5 Log Hourly Earnings - Female -5.62
[5.903] [5.878]
Log Hourly Earnings - Male 2.7 Log Hourly Earnings - Male 4.63
[5.729] [6.911]
Rural (1) -1.51 Rural (1) 8.04
[5.657] [7.030]
Has relatives in US (1) 6.99 Has relatives in US (1) -30.03+
[9.347] [16.258]
Log PCE 8.28 Log PCE 10.01
[9.667] [13.459]
Thoughts about future migration (1) -8.27 Thoughts about future migration (1) -27.98
[12.054] [27.547]
Fear in the day (1) 6.89 Fear in the day (1) 8.86
[39.344] [57.344]
Fear in the night (1) -40.32 Fear in the night (1) -48.2
[37.014] [59.703]
Rate of analfabetism -371.37*** Rate of analfabetism 88.84
[116.270] [242.705]
Share dwellings with water -27.58 Share dwellings with water 71.08
[20.269] [46.582]
Share dwelling with phone -19.29 Share dwelling with phone -10.56
[53.626] [49.221]
Share dwellings with sewage -21.74 Share dwellings with sewage -40.16
[22.958] [38.232]
Share dwellings with electricity 216.86** Share dwellings with electricity 51.36
[98.405] [69.679]
Percentage with less than primary 171.58** Percentage with less than primary -110.62+
[66.934] [63.379]
Percentage with High School 70.23*** Percentage with High School -152.52
[26.475] [102.922]
Percentage population younger than 18 123.49 Percentage population younger than 18 9.81
[79.159] [116.490]
Percentage population older than 65 -53.71 Percentage population older than 65 -69.31
[107.284] [193.190]
Constant -31.35 -212.79*** Constant 6.36 10.54+
[58.814] [71.801] [6.895] [5.492]
Sample size 151 193 Sample size 134 193
R squared 0.0819 0.227 R squared 0.102 0.103
Standard errors clustered at municipality level Standard errors clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
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